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Abstract
The existence of children's rights in law does not resolve the question as to whether 
children have rights in reality. In 1973 Hillary Rodham Clinton claimed that children's 
rights were a 'slogan in search of a definition'. Since then many advances have been 
made in children's rights: the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child was 
adopted in 1989 and many countries have introduced national legislation protecting the 
rights of children. Despite these advances the rights of children remain under theorised 
and poorly implemented. The fundamental question 'do children have rights?' remains 
contested.
This thesis defends and applies a theoretical argument for children's rights over five 
papers. It does so in two parts. The first part builds a theory for children's rights across 
three papers: paper one Capacity, claims and children's rights, paper two, 'Capacity' and 
'Competence' in the Language of Children's Rights and paper three, Children's Rights and 
the Future Interest Problem. Children have rights because they have interests that are of 
sufficient importance to be protected and these interests ground claims that produce 
duties in others to act or refrain from acting. Rights are therefore understood as 
Hohfeldian claims with correlative duties. This thesis sets out the relationship between a 
child's capacity, competence and their rights. It is not conceptually necessary for a child 
to hold the power to enforce or waive their claim in order to hold a right. However a 
child must be competent in realising the interest to which a particular claim pertains. 
Furthermore the duty correlated with a child's claim must be reasonable and achievable 
and the duty-holder must hold the capacity to fulfil the correlative duty. Children are in 
a special category of right holders as their capacities are rapidly evolving. As a 
consequence they hold claims to the development of core capacities that produce duties 
in others to assist in their development.
The second part of the thesis applies this theory of children's rights to two cases across 
two papers: paper four, What's Love Got to do with it? Why children do not have a right 
to be loved and paper five, No harm, No Foul: donor conceived children and the right to 
know their genetic parents. The case of a child's right to be loved demonstrates what 
children's rights are not. Children do not have a right to be loved because love as a duty
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cannot be reasonably fulfilled or enforced. The case of a right to know one's genetic 
parents illustrates what children's right are. Children have a right to identifying 
information as they have an interest in being free from psycho-social harm. They have a 
corresponding right to be told that they are donor conceived. These two cases 
demonstrate the importance in locating the interest grounding the claim in order to 
determine the shape of the corresponding duty. This is essential for addressing real 
policy problems. Understanding why children have rights therefore presents effective 
pathways for moving children's rights from 'a slogan' into reality.
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Chapter One
Introduction
No political theory is adequate unless it is applicable to 
children as well as to men and women
- Bertrand Russell
2
Introduction
ln 1973 Hillary Rodham Clinton wrote that children's rights were a 'slogan in search of a 
definition' (1973, 487). Nearly 40 years have passed since Clinton wrote these words. 
Rights for children are no longer just a slogan but a reality. The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC) was adopted in 1989, and now stands as 
the most ratified UN convention. All member states, with the exception of the United 
States and Somalia, have ratified the Convention. There are now national and regional 
charters on children's rights and individual states have made significant steps to 
integrate CROC into national law.1 The work of organisations such as UNICEF, Save the 
Children and Defence for Children International (DCI) continues to provide a high profile 
for the rights of the child.
However all is not well in the world of children's rights. Despite these steps forward the 
rights of children remain under theorised and the fundamental question 'do children 
have rights?' remains contested. Although on the surface policy makers and politicians 
seem to be in furious agreement in support of the Convention, philosophers and 
political theorists are not always sure rights work for those who are not quite adults. 
One reply to this may simply be - so what? Philosophers and theorists often spend their 
time examining issues that do not affect people's lives.2 If the world has a Convention
1 Regional charters on the rights of children include the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child (1990) and the Charter of the Rights of the Arab Child of the League of Arab States. 
National declarations include The Children's Charter Japan (1950), Declaration of the Rights of 
the Child in Israel (1989) and Declaration of the Rights of Mozambican Children (1979). Regional 
human rights instruments protecting the rights of the child have also been adopted by the 
Council of Europe and the Organisation of American States (OAS).
2 One example that has always struck me to be particularly separate from reality is the field of 
moral philosophy called (tongue firmly in cheek) 'trolleyology' - hypothetical scenarios regarding 
an agent's acts or omissions. For example I must choose whether to pull a lever to stop a 
runaway train (or trolley) from running over 5 men but will as a consequence kill one man. See 
Fried, B. (2012) 'What Does Matter? The Case for Killing the Trolley Problem (Or Letting it Die), 
The Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming 2012.
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protecting the rights of the child that is internationally binding, does it really matter if 
theorists disagree on the details? I believe that in this case the answer is yes. It does 
matter because the lack of theory underpinning rights for children hinders their 
implementation.
Near universal ratification of CROC does not guarantee that children's rights exist as a 
logically coherent concept in theory or that they are adequately protected and 
implemented in practice. It is not clear that simply by drafting an article, treaty or 
legislation that a right can be coherently justified outside of the black letter of the law. 
For example the Australian parliament could pass a law tomorrow that protected the 
rights of domestic pets to vote in federal elections. Despite the existence of this right in 
law, there would still be doubts over whether it had moral justification or could ever be 
implemented in practice. There is also disagreement about whether rights in 
international law are in fact individual rights at all. Some claim that the rights outlined in 
international treaties are nothing more than social ideas or goals, albeit justified ones 
(Wellman, 2002, 368; Fienberg, 1970; Fortin, 2005, 12). Others worry that this means 
that some rights in CROC will never be translated into meaningful legal rights (King, 
1994, 395).
In practice the Convention has been poorly implemented and as Caroline Moorhead 
observed in her study of the treaty, it has for many become, 'something of a sham' 
being violated 'systematically and contemptuously' (1997). The recent study by Alston 
and Tobin on the implementation of the Convention reaches similar conclusions. 
Although advances have been made, these are hard to reconcile with the massive 
violations that continue across the world (Tobin & Alston, 2005, ix). Martha Minow 
(1995, 267) points out that a lack of understanding about why children have rights can 
lead to their ridicule and be counterproductive to their implementation. When Hillary 
Rodham Clinton announced that the US would be signing CROC (an attempt that did not 
lead to ratification by the USA) several news articles appeared satirising Rodham's work 
from the 1970's. These articles portrayed the concept of rights for children as 
inappropriate and potentially dangerous as they could break down the family unit 
(Palmer, 1992). An article by humorist Art Buchwald (1992) titled 'Make bed then sue' 
depicted the 'worst case scenario' -  a child asking a judge to be divorced from her 
parents and little sister due to irreconcilable differences and asking for part custody of
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the family dog, Spot. Comic portraits like this do little to help engender understanding of 
children's rights.
Where genuine commitment exists it is often ungrounded in strong theoretical 
explanation for why children have rights in the first place. Much work has been done on 
the concept of human rights and we now have a solid grounding of theory to draw on 
when making the case for these rights.3 The controversies have been visited and 
revisited so that we are comfortable in our use of them -  or at least comfortable in our 
disagreement over their use. Discussion of children's rights has generally lacked such 
analytical rigour. This often means that when children's rights are translated from paper 
into practice they lack the strong theory that underpins human rights in general. This 
can have real consequences for their implementation.
A good example of this is the renewed discussion of child soldiers following the Kony 
2012 campaign.4 Kony 2012 is a campaign run by the organisation Invisible Children that 
seeks to achieve the arrest of indicted Ugandan war criminal Joseph Kony. Kony is 
notorious for the use of child soldiers in his Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The campaign 
and accompanying film brought discussion of child soldiers to the fore. For most people 
the case of child soldiers is an easy one -  children have a right not to fight in armed 
conflict. But why? In the case of Kony's child soldiers the answer may lie in their forced 
coercion into the LRA. Being forced to fight against one's will is clearly against the 
interests of children, yet is such coercion not also against the interest of adults? Many 
countries still allow the option of forced conscription for adult citizens. Why is the issue 
particularly different for children? More problematically many child soldiers are not 
coerced into participating in conflict but join autonomously. Joining a military group is 
often an ideological choice for children, a way of gaining social esteem or demonstrating 
solidarity with family, clan or nation. The international legal definition of a child soldier, 
however, does not recognise this. Instead it says that no child under the age of 18 is
3 For a good overview of the different arguments underpinning human rights see Dembour, M. 
(2010) 'What are Human Rights? Four schools of thought', Human Rights Quarterly 32: 1-20.
4 Details of the campaign can be found at www.kony2012.com. My thanks to Georgia Swan 
whose own work and comments helped bring out the complexities of this case.
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capable of consenting to fight.5 This view can be problematic as it sees children simply as 
passive objects in need of protection rather than people that display agency in conflict 
zones and that have a desire to participate politically. Furthermore in situations of 
conflict where children grow up fast, who counts as a child? Should modern 
understandings of childhood still apply? Should we treat a 17 year old child soldier the 
same as a 7 year old?
Despite whether a child has joined voluntarily or was coerced there seems to be 
something particular about children fighting that we wish to prevent. This may lie in the 
nature of childhood that can be seen as a period of rapid development of capacities. 
Children who are soldiers are exposed to harm in ways that adults are not. They spend 
their formative years immersed in a culture of violence and denied other forms of 
education, development and agency (Wessells, 2006, 3). Given this it would appear that 
understanding the relationship children have with conflict may be essential in properly 
identifying their rights and what duties we owe them. Simply stating that children have 
a right not to be soldiers is not enough. We need to understand why they have this right 
in order to properly shape our corresponding duties, to make strong arguments to 
others in favour of these duties and to see the way these rights interlock and relate to 
the rights of others.
It is also often unclear exactly what a particular right is protecting and what kind of duty 
it produces. Theoretical arguments are important in identifying the different interests a 
right may be protecting. For example is it the exposure to physical harm, the lack of 
education or the corrupting influence of a culture of violence that a child's right not to 
be a soldier is concerned with? If it is all three then there will be many types of 
corresponding duties to shape our actions. In order to build up a specific argument for 
particular rights we must have a solid answer to the question how and why children 
have rights in general. Gut instinct is not enough. More worrying still, the vague
5 As outlined in the 2002 United Nations Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. The Optional Protocol outlaws the 
involvement of children in armed conflict, raising the previous age of 15 to 18. The definition of a 
child soldier as held by UNICEF includes children working as cooks, porters, messengers etc. The 
definition, therefore, does not only refer to child who is carrying, or has carried, weapons (Cape 
Town Principles, 1997).
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language of CROC ungrounded in any strong theory lets governments 'off the hook' as it 
allows them to couch their language in formalistic terms while avoiding any substantive 
improvements in children's lives (King, 1994, 396). Acting to prevent children from 
becoming soldiers may address one particular problem yet do nothing to enfranchise 
children's agency or address their true needs and interests in conflict zones. A sound, 
nuanced and expressly articulated theoretical basis is necessary to identify when rights 
oriented action is meeting its moral objectives and when it is not.
This example highlights the common assumption that children are passive objects in 
need of protection rather than active participants who hold rights. Despite the 
Convention's recognition that children have 'evolving capacities' most measures to 
protect children's rights work from the starting point that children are static in their 
incompetence. Underestimating children's capacities and their development of 
competencies ignores a child's participation and contribution to their environment. The 
assumption of static incompetence may deny rights where they are due and miss the 
complexity of implementing children's rights according to their development.
Throughout this thesis I answer the fundamental question, 'do children have rights', 
resoundingly in the positive. In defending this position I also examine some key 
questions about children's rights. For example if children are the type of beings that can 
hold and claim rights, are these rights identical to those held by adults? If not, in what 
way are they different and how do these differences influence how the rights play out in 
practice? How do children's developing capacities relate to their rights? The 
disagreement about whether a child has rights reflects both a broader discussion about 
the nature and function of rights but also the moral status of children. As such this thesis 
contributes to a growing movement of scholars who seek to consider the philosophical 
and theoretical groundings of children's rights. This introductory chapter will first 
outline the thesis aim, the thesis structure and provide a brief summary of the papers 
that make up the body of the text. The second part of this chapter then turns to 
addressing two questions -  what are children and what are rights -  before providing an 
overview of the children's rights literature so far.
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1.2 Thesis Aim
This thesis does not seek to find the rights of children in law, nor does it seek to test if 
children's rights are protected in practice. It examines the theoretical construction and 
application of children's rights. It argues that the foundations of why children have 
rights are under theorised. Discussion of children's rights is often dominated by an 
assumption of their static incompetence. The role of capacity and competence is under 
investigated in rights theory. This is a problem when we are concerned with building a 
theory of rights for children as denying children rights usually relies on some 
interpretation of incapacity or incompetence. In order to show why children have rights 
we must build upon our understanding of how capacity and competence interact with 
rights theory as determinants for the allocation of rights, or indeed justifications for the 
exclusion of certain categories of people from particular rights. This type of theory is 
essential in ensuring strong and consistent application of children's rights. It also, as I 
shall argue in the final chapter of this thesis, helps us translate rights from theory into 
practice. Knowing why children have rights is essential to know how to protect them.
Samantha Brennan (2002, 53) has argued that anyone responding to the challenge of 
children's rights must do two things. First they must address the theoretical issues and 
show that we can overcome the logical problems within theories of rights as applied to 
children. Second, once it has been demonstrated that it is conceptually possible for 
children to have rights, we must also show what it means for children to actually have 
particular rights. This can only be done through the application of rights theory to reai 
cases.
This thesis therefore has four aims;
1) to present a theoretical argument for why children have rights;
2) to examine and unpack the role of 'capacity' and 'competence' in rights theory 
and their application to children's rights;
3) to apply the theory of children's rights to particular cases; and
4) to demonstrate the power of a strong theory in bringing children's rights from 
the realm of 'slogan' into reality.
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1.3 Thesis Structure
This is a thesis by publication. This thesis answers the question, 'do children have rights' 
through five papers written throughout the period of my doctoral candidacy. Each paper 
can be read as a standalone piece of academic research that individually contributes to 
the literature on children's rights. However, while the individual papers can be seen as 
independent, they are not designed to sit in isolation next to their neighbours. When 
the five papers are read together, consecutively and within the context set out by the 
introductory and concluding chapters, the thesis becomes greater than the sum of its 
parts. Concepts and theories developed in one paper are often revisited and applied in 
other papers in order to bring out new and different aspects of rights for children.
In order to respond to Brennan's twofold challenge the thesis is broken into two parts. 
The first part establishes the analytical and theoretical argument, demonstrating that it 
is conceptually possible for children to have rights and considers some conceptual 
problems that will inevitably arise when working with theory. The second part of the 
thesis demonstrates that children have the type of interests that ground rights by 
examining two discrete case studies. The first, the proposed right to be loved, illustrates 
what children's right cannot be. The second paper illustrates what children's rights are 
by examining a current policy issue, the rights of children conceived using donated 
gametes. This helps us understand the type of interests that ground rights. The structure 
of the thesis can be seen overleaf in figure one. The following section provides a brief 
summary of each paper.
I am indebted to the editors of Contemporary Political Theory, Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy and International Journal of Law, Policy and 
the Family for kindly allowing the papers to be faithfully reproduced here. Each paper 
has been reproduced as it appears in the original publication, therefore the formatting 
style and referencing of the original publisher has been retained. For papers currently 
under review, the house style of the journal to which it has been submitted has been 
retained.
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Do Children have Rights?
Part One: Theoretical Basis
PI: Capacity, claims and children's rights
P3: Children's Rights and the Future Interest Problem
P2: 'Capacity' and 'Competence' in the Language of Children's Rights
Part Two: Cases and Application
P4: What's Love Got to do with it? Why children do not have a right to be loved
P5: No harm, No foul: a child's right to know their genetic parents
Figure One: Thesis Question and Structure
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1.4 Summary of Papers
1.4.1 Paper One: Capacity, claims and children's rights
The first paper, 'Capacity, Claims and Children's Rights' sets out the debate between the 
two leading theories of rights, will theory and interest theory, and examines the role 
that the concept of 'capacity' plays in determining who qualifies as a right-holder within 
each theory. In doing so it introduces the work of Wesley Hohfeld and establishes that 
for the purpose of this thesis rights are understood as Hohfeldian claims.
The paper introduces the 'argument from incompetence' that claims children should be 
denied rights on the basis of their incompetence. For example we deem it appropriate 
to exclude children from those who are allowed the right to vote primarily due to their 
lack of capacity to make informed political decisions. Traditional liberal theorists such as 
Hobbes, Locke and Mill employed variations on the argument from incompetence. The 
concept of competence still plays a central role within contemporary will theory of 
rights. According to will theory, as children lack the capacity of rational choice, they 
cannot be the type of beings eligible to hold rights. Interest theory, however, does not 
apply capacity in this way. Interest theory argues that those who have interests (children 
or adults) that are sufficiently important to impose duties on others are the type of 
beings that hold rights.
This paper broadly defines children as young human beings in the period of 
development before they become an adult. This period is defined by two particular 
features: lesser physical and cognitive capacities and rapid development of these 
capacities. In this paper I first introduce the distinction between capacity and 
competence. Capacity is understood as one's potential ability and competence as one's 
actual ability. This is the first time in this thesis that the distinction is employed and the 
definitions as they stand are simple and are not yet comprehensive. The full conceptual 
distinction appears in the following paper, ''Capacity' and 'Competence' in the Language 
of Children's Rights'. Having made the distinction I examine whether the denial of rights 
to children in will theory is based on incapacity or incompetence. I conclude that given 
the emphasis on factual competence within will theory it must be competence, as actual 
ability, that is the relevant factor.
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Rights holders under interest theory do not need to meet this competence requirement. 
This is because it is the relevant interest o f the right-holder and not their competence to 
exert power over their claim that determines the right. Children, on this account, hold 
interests and therefore they hold rights. However questions of capacity or competence 
are not completely absent from interest theory. Interests are only sufficiently strong to 
found a right-claim when the claim-holder has the competence to realise the benefit to 
which that interest pertains. Therefore although interest theory allows that it is 
conceptually possible fo r children to hold rights it does not allow that children can hold 
all rights. Children only hold rights that they have the competence to realise the benefit 
of. For example a young baby cannot have rights surrounding employment, they cannot 
have an interest in receiving a fa ir pay, having sufficient time o ff work as they lack the 
competence to hold most jobs in the modern labour market.6 This allows us to recognise 
children as right-holders while constraining the types of rights they hold according to 
the ir developing competencies.
Therefore the first paper of the thesis provides a thorough analysis of the relationship 
between capacity, competence and rights. This paper establishes the basis fo r a theory 
of rights fo r children. It argues that children have rights if we understand rights as 
Hohfeldian claims that pertain to a duty to  either do or to refrain from doing a particular 
action. The power to  enforce this action can be held by the right-holder or by another 
designated entity. This claim constitutes a right when it is based on an interest worthy of 
protection. An interest is worthy of protection when the right-holder has the capacity to 
realise the benefit to  which the interest pertains, and the corresponding duty is 
reasonable and achievable.7 This central argument will be built upon and employed 
throughout the following papers of the thesis.
6 Perhaps with the exception of modeling baby clothes or appearing in advertisements for 
nappies. Older children however certainly do have interests in fair employment. Child 
employment in the entertainment industry is a difficult legal area as children lack the legal 
competence to sign a binding employment contract. The interests of child employees have to be 
protected in other ways. For the Australian context see ACT Government, Employment of 
Children and Young People, http ://www.dhcs.act.gov.au/ocyfs/young workers#actors
7 It may be the case however that some duties that are not achievable are still justifiably imposed 
and therefore the corresponding reparations for their violation are also justified. This is the case 
in strict liability. Strict liability is legal or moral responsibility for a wrong without finding fault. It
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1.4.2 Paper Two: 'Capacity' and 'Competence' in the Language of Children's 
Rights
The second paper, "Capacity' and 'Competency' in the Language of Children's Rights', 
was co-authored with Joanne C. Lau. This paper investigates in more detail the 
conceptual distinction that was briefly introduced in the first paper -  namely that there 
is a relevant and useful difference between the terms 'capacity' and 'competence'. 
Understanding these terms correctly can help avoid confusion when using them in 
relation to the rights of the child.
Within this paper we argue that the terms 'capacity' and 'competence' are often used 
interchangeably. This is of little consequence when the terms are used in everyday 
public discourse, however is more problematic when the use occurs within the literature 
of children's rights. This is because capacity and competence, as outlined in the first 
paper, play a central role in moral and political philosophy by determining the moral 
status of a subject. More specifically, they play a central role in determining the 
subject's rights. Insufficient distinction between these concepts leads to talking past 
each other within scholarly debates and a lack of clarity of what is actually required for 
an agent to be considered competent or to hold a capacity.
We propose a distinction between the concepts 'capacity' and 'competence' and 
introduce the additional concepts of ableness and latent capacities. A capacity is the 
potential ability to do A. One has the capacity to A when one has all the relevant skills 
internal to that person to A. Competence is one's actual ability to A. By actual ability we 
mean the capacity to A plus the relevant intentional states, such as knowledge and 
intention, necessary for successfully doing A. We fine-tune this framework by 
introducing the additional concepts of ableness and latent capacities. Ableness is one's 
actual ability (viz. competence) to do A plus the availability of external resources and
is designed to ensure that in particularly dangerous or risky cases all possible precautions are 
taken. For example even if it is legal to store explosives in a certain area, and impossible to 
completely guarantee that a freak accident will not occur, the individual storing the explosives 
holds strict liability for any injury that results from such an accident. For a thorough discussion 
see chapter eight of Kramer, M. (2004) Where Law and Morality Meet, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
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opportunity to do so. Latent capacities refer to the capacity to develop a capacity. We 
provide a conditional analysis for each concept.
The distinctions between 'latent capacities', 'capacities' and 'competencies' will assist 
those concerned with children's rights. First, the distinctions provide us with the 
requisite tools to properly identify the threshold that is needed for the allocation of 
individual rights. Second, the distinctions can prevent talking past each other when 
engaged in debates. Finally, the terms can assist us in identifying special duties we hold 
towards children due to the constant development of their latent capacities into 
capacities proper and capacities into competencies. The second paper in the thesis 
therefore further develops the theory of children's rights by investigating the distinction 
between capacity and competence. The distinction is relevant in the first paper when 
developing a theory of rights for children and will be used throughout the following 
papers.
1.4.3 Paper Three: Children's Rights and the Future Interest Problem
The third paper, 'Children's Rights and the Future Interest Problem' deals with a central 
problem arising from the theory set out in the first two papers of the thesis - namely the 
problem of how to protect the future interests of children.
The first two papers of the thesis outlined that children's rights are most properly 
conceptualised through the interest theory of rights. However the interest theory works 
best when identifying the present interests of the claim-holder. As the first paper of the 
thesis outlined, rights are constrained by the capacities and competencies of the right­
holder. Children, however, are often defined by the development of their capacities. 
Although they may not have certain capacities or competencies (and therefore 
interests) now, they are in the processes of developing and acquiring capacities, 
competencies and interests. Therefore actions can be taken towards children that do 
not harm their present interests but do harm interests that they are likely to hold in the 
future. The second paper in the thesis identified the concepts of latent capacities and 
capacities proper and acknowledged the difference between children and other 
incompetents. A child may not hold some competencies and capacities but they hold
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latent capacities. A child's latent capacities may mean that others have duties to assist in 
developing these capacities.
Any comprehensive theory of rights for children needs to able to account for and 
protect not only the present interests of the child but also the future interests. This 
paper examines two potential solutions to the future interest problem, one from Joel 
Feinberg and the other from John Eekelaar. I argue that these two proposals fail to 
identify the wrong that is occurring in such future interest cases. Instead this paper uses 
a framework of competencies and capacities to argue that children have a right to non­
interference in the development of certain capacities and a potential right to assistance 
in developing other capacities.
The final section of this paper examines whether the potential right to assistance in 
developing capacities and competencies can be applied to the case of congenitally deaf 
children and cochlear implants. I argue that children have a right to assistance of the 
development of their capacities, but not of all capacities. A useful way of determining 
which capacities are sufficiently important to constitute a right is the adoption of the 
normal human functioning model. Children have rights to certain core capacities that 
allow them to achieve normal human functioning.
This paper therefore begins to apply the theory developed throughout the three papers 
of this thesis to a real case study, along with offering a solution to a conceptual problem 
arising from it. The assessment of the future interest problem reveals that capacity and 
competence are once more important in the determination of rights for children.
1.4.4 Paper Four: What's Love Got to do with it? Why children do not have a 
right to be loved
The fourth paper of the thesis examines the question as to whether children have a right 
to be loved. It is often stated in international and national legal documents that children 
have a right to be loved. Yet there is very little explanation of why this right exists or 
what it entails. Matthew Liao has recently sought to provide an explanation by arguing 
that children have a right to be loved as a human right. Throughout this paper I examine 
Liao's explanation and in turn argue that children do not have a right to be loved.
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Although love may be seen to be a good thing for children, this does not equate to love 
as a claim right. The first part of this paper argues that loving cannot be a duty. Love 
cannot be a duty because the structure of a right, as set out in the first three papers of 
this thesis, necessitates that there be a real and achievable corresponding duty.8 The 
internal emotional component of love is often something we do not have proper control 
over and therefore may be an unachievable duty. The expressions of love, such as caring 
for and interacting with a child, may be reasonable and achievable, however this paper 
argues that the emotional aspect of love can be logically separated from treatment we 
deem desirable for a child. A child has a claim to this desirable treatment irrespective of 
whether it comes from a place of love or not
Even if we were willing to concede that love could be a duty, love is not always 
accompanied by, nor does it guarantee, loving treatment. Protecting love for children is 
not enough. This paper considers two alternative interpretations of the right to be 
loved, that the right to be loved is a manifesto right and that the right to be loved is a 
claim right against the state. I argue that even given these, children do not have a right 
to be loved. Not all interests translate into claims. This paper was partially developed as 
a critique of Matthew Liao who responded in a subsequent issue of the journal for which 
the editor gave me a right of reply. I include my reply, 'A Need is not a Right', as an 
Appendix to this thesis.
In applying this theory of why children have rights to the proposed right to be loved we 
consolidate a number of particular aspects of how rights apply to children. First duties 
need to be reasonable and achievable. Secondly, it demonstrates that rights are at their
Throughout the papers I argue that a duty must be achievable. In this introductory chapter I 
pointed out that some duties that are not achievable are still justified (see...). The case of the 
duty to 'love' is not one of these justified unachievable duties. First of all the duty to 'love' does 
not fulfill the weaker requirement that a duty be reasonable, for reasons I set out in length in the 
paper. Second, the reasons for justifying strict liability are usually based on public policy 
considerations, for example that the action or situation is so risky or dangerous that strict liability 
must be undertaken before one voluntarily takes on this risk/danger. The dangers discussed in 
this paper do not come about because of a lack of 'love' but rather other omissions or actions 
such as negligence or abuse. I have argued that these duties restricting these omissions or 
actions are reasonable and achievable.
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most powerful and effective when they protect interests that are manifest and 
identifiable.
1.4.5 Paper Five: 'No harm, no foul': donor conceived children and the right to 
know
The final paper of the thesis illustrates how rights can be effectively employed in a real 
policy situation. The case examined in this final paper is the right of children conceived 
using donated gametes (sperm and egg) to know the identity of their donor. The paper 
examines this case within the legislative and regulatory framework of Australia.
In many countries, including Australia, governments have legislated against anonymous 
gamete donation. A recent Australian Senate inquiry has reinforced this position and has 
supported non-anonymous donation grounded in a child's right to know the identity of 
their genetic parents. This paper considers the main reasons for the existence of such a 
right and as such applies the interest theory of rights developed in the first paper by 
asking, 'what interest is sufficient to ground a claim to know the identity of one's genetic 
parents?' I review the three main interests that are commonly cited, first that children 
have an interest in knowing their medical and genetic history, second that children have 
an interest in knowing their genetic family in order to avoid concerns of consanguinity 
and finally that children who do not know the identity of their donor can suffer psycho­
social harm. An appeal to this third interest, the most valid of the three, is open to the 
response that parents should simply not tell children they are donor conceived. 
Therefore in order to argue that children have a right to know the identity of their 
genetic parents it must first be shown that there exists a prior right to know the nature 
of one's conception. The existence of such a right requires that the principle of 'no harm, 
no foul' is false in the case of non-disclosure of a child's genetic origins.
In this paper I argue that children are due respect
Establishing the interest that grounds this right is imperative to guide Australian 
legislation and regulatory frameworks. If 'no harm, no foul' does not hold then the state 
in Australia will hold a duty not only to allow donor-conceived children access to 
identifying information regarding their donors but also a duty to ensure disclosure 
regarding the nature of the child's conception in the first place. Understanding and
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applying the theory of why children have rights allows us to see the shape of how a right 
and duty should be implemented within a policy framework. A right to know one's 
genetic parents is inadequate without a corresponding right of disclosure to children 
that they are donor conceived.
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1.4.6 Concluding Chapter
The concluding chapter draws these five articles together and highlights the conclusions 
that arise from reading them together as a whole. The conclusions of this thesis are:
1) Children have rights. Children have rights because they have interests that are of 
sufficient importance to be protected and these interests ground claims that produce 
duties in others to act or refrain from acting. Rights are therefore understood as 
Hohfeldian claims with correlative duties.
2) There is an important relationship between capacity, competence and children's 
rights. It is not conceptually necessary for a child to hold the power to enforce or waive 
their claim in order to hold a right. Consequently it is not necessary for a child to be 
competent in autonomous choice to be the type of being that may hold rights. However 
a child must be competent in realising the interest to which a particular claim pertains.
3) The nature of duties is relevant to children's rights. A Hohfeldian claim always has a 
correlative duty. Furthermore the duty correlated with a child's claim must be 
reasonable and achievable and the duty-holder must hold the capacity to fulfill the 
correlative duty.
4) Children's rights are special claims. A strict definition of a 'child' is not necessary in 
order for it to be conceptually possible for children to hold rights. However a broad 
definition of children is useful to identify particular aspects of their rights. Children are 
in a period whereby their capacities and competencies are rapidly evolving; therefore 
many children will hold claims to the development of core capacities. This produces 
correlative duties in others to assist in their development.
5) Finally, a strong theory of rights for children is important to understand the nature of 
the right and the shape of the correlative duty. A theory of why children have rights 
helps to effectively translate rights into practice.
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1.5 Conceptual Clarifications
In the first part of this introductory chapter I set out the thesis's aims and structure, and 
provided a summary of the papers that make up the body of the thesis. In the second 
half of this introductory chapter I provide some conceptual clarifications and an 
overview of the literature surrounding the construction of children's rights as a 
theoretical concept.
Before we begin the substantive task of answering the question 'do children have 
rights', it is important first to address two key questions, what are children and what are 
rights? In order to know whether children have rights, we need to know what we mean 
by children, whether is it possible to determine children as a separate class of right­
holders and furthermore is it necessary to do so. We also need to understand what is 
meant by rights, what are their form and justification. Answers to these questions 
appear throughout the five papers that make up the body of this thesis, however they 
are often brief due to the constraints of publication, this section will consider them in 
more detail.
1.5.1 What are children?
It should be easy to identify what we mean by children for they are everywhere in our 
social lives. We have children, we see them going to school, we teach them, we play 
with them and we were all once children ourselves. So what are children? The simple 
answer is that children are young human beings. However in digging deeper the 
question becomes a little more complicated. Is a 17 year old attending university still a 
child? If they are, in what way are they a child? In the same way as a 5 year old? Is age 
the best way to classify children, or should we use some other criteria? Considering 
these issues maybe the more appropriate question to ask is 'who are children?', which 
young people can be classified as children and what is it that is particular about them? 
Identifying who children are is essential to determining whether they have rights.
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I turn to this question briefly in the first paper presented in this thesis. In that paper I 
define childhood simply as,
The period of time before one becomes an adult, usually defined by lesser physical
and cognitive capacities, coupled with the rapid development of these capacities.
This is an intentionally broad definition of childhood, which I argue is useful when 
considering the rights of children. However it is worth investigating in further detail the 
debates surrounding children and childhood in order to understand the types of 
assumptions that often underpin claims regarding their rights. In this section I argue that 
children are defined in two ways, first by age and secondly by normative significance. 
The two often, but not always, align and overlap. The definition of children differs 
between cultural traditions and has changed throughout history. I conclude by arguing 
that for the purposes of considering whether children have rights, it is not necessary to 
have a strict definition of children. However, for the purposes of policy in regulating 
rights, it is necessary to have a clear requirement for who qualifies as a right-holder.
Age
The most common way to answer the question, 'What are children?' is by age. Children 
are young human beings and for many people it is enough that you cease to be a child 
once you cross the threshold of a certain age. According to the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC) children are those individuals under the 
age of 18. Article one of CROC defines children as;
'Every human being below the age of eighteen unless under the law applicable to 
the child, majority is attained earlier' (CROC, Article 1)
In the vast amount of cases eighteen is the age of majority.9 However the Convention 
does allow for individuals younger than 18 to be no longer considered a child if the
9 Those countries that adhere to 18 as the age of majority include for example Australia, United 
Kingdom and most countries of the European Union. However other countries hold older ages for 
liberties such as drinking alcohol, for which the age is set at 21 years in the USA and 19 years in 
Canada.
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domestic law of the state allows so. For many countries this means that children can be 
considered to  have full legal capacity w ith regard to various matters at differing ages 
(Fortin, 2005, 6). For example in Australia an individual can join the Defence Force at 16 
and 6 months, drive a car at 17 and vote in federal elections at 18. Defining children by 
age is simple and useful; it provides a clear and unequivocal point by which all 
individuals o f a given age are treated equally. The age of 18 as stipulated in the 
Convention represents an upper lim it to childhood, a threshold above which individuals 
must be treated as full citizens and cannot be denied certain rights.
Despite its ubiquity much has been made of the arbitrary nature of an age based 
definition of childhood (Archard, 2004, 85-91). The age of 18 is itself a relatively new 
threshold, previously it was common to set the age at twenty one for no other reason 
than this was the age in Medieval England that a man was deemed strong enough to 
wear full amour (Freeman, 1997, 91). Any age, whether 18 or 21, is necessarily arbitrary. 
What is special about 18 that is not captured in 17? Yet arbitrariness itself cannot be the 
sole concern. Many standards in life are arbitrary. For example there is no significant 
difference in the probability of an accident if one drives 51 km per hour rather than 49 
km per hour. Yet in suburban Australia driving at 51 km per hour is 'speeding' and 
therefore illegal.10 The lim it of 50 km per hour is arbitrary in that it is no more significant 
than 49 or 51, however it  is clear tha t to have a law against speeding there must be 
some threshold by which driving at a certain speed is illegal. There is no great harm in 
choosing 50 km /hour and therefore the arbitrary nature of the law is acceptable - 
indeed necessary. Childhood, for the law, is the same. No one seriously claims that there 
is a significant difference between an individual who is 17 and 364 days old and 
someone who is 18 years old, but in order to  maintain a distinction between child and 
adult there needs to be some age. The problem is not that the cut-off is arbitrarily 
chosen, but that age is used as a proxy for competence.
Using age as a proxy for competence is usually unproblematic. For example the harm 
that arises from excluding a competent and intelligent 17 year old from casting their 
vote, or including an 18 year old who does not yet know how the political system works, 
is in most situations very small. Especially since the 17 year old will usually be able to
10 Though in practice you do not get fined unless you are going 55km/hr. However it remains true 
that the legal speed limit is 50 km/hr not 51, 52, 53 or 54.
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vote in the next election. The problem for age-based definitions arises when we are 
dealing with individuals for whom the consequences of the competence assessment are 
much higher. For example consider a girl under the age of 16 who wishes to obtain 
contraception from her GP, her parents refuse to give their permission and she cannot 
obtain it alone as being under 16 she is deemed incompetent to consent. Despite this 
she clearly understands the nature of contraception, the consequences of unprotected 
sex and wishes to enter a consensual sexual relationship with her boyfriend. For her the 
assumption of incompetence that excludes her from autonomous action has grave 
consequences. It was this exact hypothetical that was considered in the 1986 House of 
Lords case, Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority. The case 
established the standard of 'Gillick competence' that measures a child's capacity to 
consent to medical treatment on their individual understanding of the medical 
treatment involved (Bridge, 2003; Fortin, 2005, 136). Gillick established that it is no 
longer appropriate to tie age unmovably to an assessment of competence. Gillick 
recognises that one can be legally a child but competent in making decisions about one's 
life. The arbitrary nature of the legal definition of the child is still valuable and valid, 
however it cannot be strictly used as a proxy assessment of the competence of a child. 
This observation about competence brings us to a broader issue regarding the children. 
'Child' does not just carry implicit assumptions about competence but also other 
normative judgments.
Normative Significance of Children
If we wished to resolve some of the problems related to an age based definition of 
children we could choose to adopt a strictly biological definition. That is, children are 
those human beings who have not yet developed a certain body size, physical features 
or cognitive abilities. We could even develop more complex methods for measuring the 
development of the brain and the body to decide exactly when one ceases to be a child 
and becomes an adult. Yet to do so would fail to recognise the deeper meaning society 
attaches to childhood. We do not use child just to mean those people of a certain 
biological state but also those who act or represent a certain normative state, for 
example we call adults 'children' when they act irrationally, white Americans historically 
called African Americans 'boy' and frequently other civilizations were deemed 'children
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of the Empire' during periods of colonialism. As Schapiro points out this indicates the 
existence of a deeper meaning attached to children - one of moral status (1999, 717). It 
is these types of observations that have prompted scholars to conclude that childhood is 
socially constructed.
In 1962 French historian Philippe Aries' text, Centuries of Childhood was translated into 
English. The text is influential as it was the first general historical study of childhood 
(Archard, 2004, 19). Aries' central argument was that within medieval society the idea of 
childhood did not exist. Although children were recognized to be vulnerable they were 
treated much the same as adults and did not have the special status in society that they 
currently enjoy. Therefore childhood, according to Aries, is a modern invention (Aries, 
1962, 125). There is now considerable criticism of the evidence used to support his 
thesis. Aries drew these conclusions from observations such as the depiction of children 
as scaled down adults in paintings, the clothing children wore at the time, the games 
they played and finally from evidence in the diary of Heroard, Henri IV's doctor. 
Historians now argue that he ignored other sources such as legal documents from the 
time and important evidence of artistic conventions that would lead to differing 
interpretations (Cassidy, 2007; Cunningham, 1998; Heywood, 2001; Pollock, 1983). It is 
not just that there are flaws with Aries' evidence but also that his conclusions and 
discussion are value laden (Archard, 2004, 22). Aries judged that the past lacked any 
idea of childhood, but in fact what it lacked was our present understanding of childhood. 
So although Aries was trying to argue that any idea of childhood is a modern invention 
he unwittingly laid the foundation for the fuller and deeper understanding of childhood 
that now exists in the literature - that the modern understanding of childhood is not 
solid and unchanging but is fluid and contextual. This observation has been important in 
informing the growing scholarship of socio-cultural theorists.
Throughout the 1980's many scholars grew increasingly dissatisfied with the superficial 
treatment and understanding of childhood within disciplines such as sociology, 
psychology and philosophy (Prout, 2005, 1). As a result the new school of 'childhood 
studies' emerged. The movement critiqued the previous emphasis on the inevitable 
unfolding of child development. Psychologists such as Jean Piaget claimed that children 
move through a series of developmental stages that represent a universal path from 
immaturity towards rationality and autonomy (Smith, 2002, 73). Socio-cultural theorists 
argue that there is no one route to development dependent on innate biological
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structures such as the developmental stages set out by Piaget, but rather development 
is dependent on cultural goals (Smith, 2002, 77). The way we understand children as 
incompetent and developing is not grounded in biological facts but rather socially 
constructed (McGillivray, 1997, 5). The socially constructed nature of childhood means 
that it is natural that different understandings of children and childhood will exist within 
different social contexts. The definition of who is a child, and what children are expected 
to do, will differ widely and fundamentally both between and within countries (Morrow, 
1999, 14, Heywood, 2001). For example children within Australia are expected to attend 
school until they are 16, reflecting the idea that childhood is a period of learning, 
development and play. Childhood in Australia is a period free from work and separate 
from adult decision-making. Yet for children of other countries, such as the newly 
created state of South Sudan, childhood necessarily includes work such as looking after 
cattle, assisting in collecting water and participating in family decision- making.
Socio-cultural theory also tells us something important about how children are 
constructed. The normative significance we afford to children is produced and 
reproduced through government policy, media representation, historical and 
philosophical influences and individual experiences of childhood and family (Allison, 
Jenks & Prout, 1983). Often the depiction of children can be contradictory. The trial of 
Jon Venables and Bobby Thompson for the murder of James Bulger in the United 
Kingdom in 1993 saw children represented in the media both as 'victims' and 'villains'. 
Bulger was depicted as the classic innocent child, free from the corruption of the world, 
a tabula rasa. The two boys Venables and Thompson were depicted as inherently evil 
and dangerous, a confirmation of the suspicion that all children are bad and need to be 
cured, socialized and controlled by society (Franklin, 2004, 33). Archard (2003) suggests 
that children simply reflect what adults want or need them to be. Indeed the status that 
children are accorded by adults can shape the way they children see themselves 
(Cassidy, 2007, 2012).
Children as a concept and a conception
It is important not to overstate the conclusions of socio-cultural theory. Recognising that 
childhood can be socially constructed does not mean that the biological differences 
between children and adults are irrelevant. Childhood cannot be a 'purely social'
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phenomenon (Prout, 2005, 2). There are real and identifiable biological differences 
between a 25 year old and a five year old. However the meaning we give to these 
biological facts is informed by normative assumptions of society. Children are both 
young human beings and also beings that are interpreted and understood differently 
across time and culture. Given this, it is useful to adopt a distinction suggested by David 
Archard between concept and conception. Building on the distinction between a 
concept and a conception of justice set out by Rawls in A Theory o f Justice, Archard 
suggests that childhood can be understood in a similar way. The concept of childhood 
requires that children be distinguishable from adults in respect of some unspecified set 
of attributes, whereby a conception o f childhood is a specification of those attributes 
(Archard, 2004, 27). The concept of childhood simply recognises that children differ 
from adults. A conception of childhood is to specify how children differ and why it is 
significant.11
The definition of children that I set out at the start of this section is a specific conception 
of children. The 'lesser physical and cognitive capacities, coupled w ith the rapid 
development o f these capacities' are the attributes of childhood that define this 
conception.12 Even though the definition is broad and does not specify exactly what 
these capacities are, it states that they tend to  be less than those held by adults and that 
they are rapidly developing. Therefore it must be understood as a conception of children 
and a conception informed by the project it is designed for -  in this case the 
investigation of rights. There are many aspects o f childhood that are not part o f this 
definition, but this does not make them any less valid in other contexts. As we will see 
throughout the thesis, it is the capacities and competencies of an individual that are 
im portant in deciding whether they hold a right or not. We could say that the definition
11 However unlike Rawls, who sought to argue that only one conception of justice was the correct 
one, Archard does not adopt the stance that only one conception of children is correct. However 
he does suggest that if there are better and worse ways of treating children then some 
conceptions of childhood will be more conducive to treating children well (2004, 28).
12 However I want to be clear that in adopting this definition of children I do not wish to imply 
that acquisition of the capacities and competencies we hold as adults is necessarily a better way 
of being and therefore an improvement on the state of childhood. In becoming adults we often 
lose the particular capacities or competencies we held as children, such as a child's incredible 
capacity for imagination.
26
of a child I offer here is a conception of the child as right-holder, in that it identifies the 
aspects of childhood relevant to being a person who does or does not hold particular 
rights.
Does it Matter?
Any definition of childhood can be challenged by different conceptions of childhood. 
Does this matter when we consider whether children can have rights? It would seem 
that the difficulty of adopting any definition of children would cause problems for an 
assessment of their rights. I argue throughout this thesis that the truth is quite the 
opposite. The complex nature of childhood and children does not pose a significant 
problem for a theory of children's rights. For the theory of rights that I will present here 
it does not strictly matter whether an individual falls within the bounds of 'child' or 
'adult'. This is because rights are determined by particular interests. Interests differ not 
only between children and adults but also between individual children and between 
individual adults.
What does matter is being aware of the various conceptions of children and how they 
inform the types of decisions we take regarding their rights. As Fortin points out,
'Ideas about children's rights undoubtedly reflect the nature of the society in
which they are being brought up and the type of childhood they will experience'
(2005, 10).
Differing conceptions of children will affect which rights we recognise for children. Some 
conceptions of children hinder the implementation of rights. For example if a particular 
society sees children as passive beings that are primarily in need of protection, rights 
such as Article 12 of CROC, which states that children have a right to participate in 
decisions that affect their lives, may be more difficult to implement into policy and 
practice. Yet conceptions of children can be useful too. The very same understanding of 
children as helpless and vulnerable may aid in controlling and shaping society's actions 
towards them. It may foster strong expectations that children are not neglected or 
abused and guarantee this outcome in a far more effective way than any government 
legislation. Tamar Schapiro in her article, 'What is a child', concludes that,
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'The enlightenment did away with arbitrary distinctions in status, distinctions 
based upon lineage and wealth. The danger is in concluding that all distinctions in 
status are therefore arbitrary. Some differences ought to count, such as the 
difference between adults and children' (1999, 738).
From the discussion of rights and children that will follow, it becomes clear that the 
appropriate question to ask is why the difference ought to count. I will argue throughout 
this thesis that the difference should count because it tells us something distinct about 
children, first that they have fewer capacities and competencies than adults and second 
that they are in a period of rapidly acquiring new capacities and competencies. This 
matters because this shapes the types of claims children can make and the type of 
duties that adults hold to them. In short it shapes the determination of their rights. In 
the next section I will briefly consider what we mean by 'rights' before turning to how 
children's rights have been constructed and understood in the literature so far.
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1.5.2 W hat are rights?
The question, 'what are rights?' is one that has concerned philosophers for centuries 
and is still an area of political and moral philosophy riddled with intractable 
disagreements. This is true despite the ubiquity of 'rights' throughout modern political 
and public discourse. There is disagreement on who can hold rights, children or adults, 
groups or individuals, humans or animals. Whether rights protect choices or interests, 
are universal or culturally relative. Whether rights are primarily legal instruments or 
moral creatures. There is even debate on the validity of a rights based approach at all. 13
I consider the question 'what are rights' in the section, 'Theories and Functions of 
Rights' in the first paper of this thesis. In that paper I provide a brief outline of the 
Hohfeldian framework of rights and investigate the place of children within the two 
dominant theories of rights, will theory and interest theory. Here I provide a broader 
overview of the concept of rights in general, the depths of the debates surrounding their 
function and position the papers that make up the body of this thesis within this debate.
I divide the discussion of rights into the structure of rights and the justification of rights.
I examine some recent scholarship that claims to bridge the intractable debate 
regarding rights, and finally I lay the foundations for the discussion of the rights of 
children.
Structure of Rights
The most conventional way to begin any discussion of the concept of rights is to 
separate out discussion of their structure from their justification -  that is -
13 For an overview of these debates: on children see Archard, D. (2004) Children. Rights and 
Childhood, 2nd ed, London: Routledge, on group rights see Shapiro, I and Kymlicka, W. (2006) 
Ethnicity and Group Rights, New York: New York University Press, on animal rights see Singer, P. 
(1975) Animal Liberation, London: Random House, on choices vs interests see Kramer, M., 
Simmonds, N and Steiner, H (1998) A Debate Over Rights: Philosophical Enquiries, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, on cultural relativity see Macklin, R (1999) Against Relativism: Cultural Diversity 
and the Search for Ethical Universals, Oxford: Oxford University Press, on the appropriateness of 
rights see Taylor, C (1985) 'Atomism' in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Paper 
2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 187-210.
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distinguishing the logical description of how a right is constructed from the normative 
significance it is given by various theorists. In this way rights could be seen to be a bit 
like cars; it is possible to separate the discussion of the mechanics of how a car 
physically fits together and is constructed, from discussion of why it is constructed in 
this way. While two interlocutors may both agree that cars are machines with four 
wheels that propel passengers forward, they may disagree as to whether a car's real 
purpose is to safely carry its passengers, or if it is a machine whose sole purpose is to 
maximize speed. This 'justification' for cars may then influence which parts of the car's 
construction are deemed the most important. Our safety conscious driver may argue 
that a solid structure able to travel in a stable manner is the most important, whereas 
our speed fiend may think that these aspects of construction can be compromised in 
order to make the car as aerodynamic and fast as possible. They might also add that 
these characteristics are the 'true' features of the car. For the safety conscious driver a 
Volvo is the epitome of 'carness' but for our speedster a Ferrari represents the true 
'car'. The debate over rights often proceeds in much the same way. Most rights theorists 
can identify the core structure of a right but many disagree on its justification, its key 
function. Disagreement on the function then influences what parts of the right's 
structure are considered the most important.
The internal structure of rights was elucidated in an analytical framework conceived by 
American legal theorist Wesley Hohfeld. Hohfeld (1913) argued that we often conflate 
various meanings of the term 'right', sometimes switching senses of the word several 
times in a single sentence. He sought to clarify the structure of rights in order to 
facilitate reasoning. As Steiner points out the consequences of non-univocality entail 
unacceptable costs, as rights are concepts that constrain and guide our actions. False 
assessments due to any confusion over language are harmful and unnecessary (Steiner, 
1998, 235). Therefore the examination of the structure of rights is an analytical project; 
separate from the debates regarding moral weight, function and content of rights 
(Kramer, 1998; Raz, 1984).
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Hohfeld identified eight elements that are referred to when we speak of rights.14 These 
eight are divided into first and second order elements and are relational. The first order 
elements consist of Claim, Duty, Liberty and No Claim.15 These form 2 correlative pairs. 
Therefore when there is a claim there is always a duty, when there is a liberty there is 
always no claim.16
First Order Correlatives Pairs
Claim - Duty 
Liberty - No Claim
A claim is defined by the type of action or inaction of people who bear the correlative 
duty. A claim is held by an individual and creates a duty in others to either 1) abstain 
from interference or 2) render assistance or remuneration.
As a claim and a duty form a correlative pair, a claim always has a duty. However some 
scholars dispute this correlativity axiom. For example McCormick argues that the axiom 
reduces any talk of rights to logically prior duties and therefore rights become a simple 
reflex on duties (MacCormick, 1976). However this is to misunderstand the axiom. 
Neither Hohfeldian duties nor claims are logically or existentially prior to  the other, just 
as one side of a coin is not logically prior to  its other side. The existence of each is a 
necessary and sufficient condition fo r the existence of the other (Kramer, 1998, 26).
Others argue that duties exist w ithout correlative claims and therefore the correlativity 
axiom cannot hold (Perry, 2009; White, 1982). For example we may have duties to
14 Throughout the first paper of this thesis, 'Capacity, claims and children's rights' I have used the 
term 'incidents', since publication I prefer to use 'elements' for the singular and 'pair' for the 
relations between Hohfeldian elements. I use this later terminology throughout the rest of the 
thesis.
15 Hohfeld used 'Right' instead of 'Claim' and 'Privilege' instead of 'Liberty'. I use 'Liberty' and 
'Claim' throughout this thesis, as do many other scholars. For an explanation of terms see 
Kramer, M. (1998) 'Rights Without Trimmings', in M. Kramer, N. Simmonds and H. Steiner, A 
Debate Over Rights: Philosophical Enquiries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 8)
16 Hohfeldian pairs can also be stated as opposites. For example, when there is a claim there is 
no, no claim, when there is a duty there is no liberty.
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animals and children, yet they, so this argument goes, do not hold claims against us. For 
a moment we must put aside the question of whether children or animals can hold 
claims and consider the observation that there are certainly some types of duties and 
obligations we hold that do not seem to be connected w ith a claim held by another. If 
this is true, this is not to deny the correlativity axiom, it is simply to state that the 
Hohfeldian duty is one type of obligation, it is an obligation that is always associated 
w ith a correlative claim.17 Other obligations may arise out of relationships or promises 
(Brink, 2001; Dworkin, 1986). For example I may hold special obligations to my students 
because of my role as a teacher, or I may hold an obligation to  lend a book to a 
colleague because I promised to do so. If we really think that there is no claim 
associated w ith these obligations, then they cannot be understood as Hohfeldian duties.
Unlike a claim, a liberty is specified by reference to the actions of the people who hold 
the liberties, not the correlative no claim. Liberty is defined by the absence of both duty 
and claim. For example I have a liberty to  cook myself a risotto fo r dinner because there 
exists no claim, held by another person, producing a duty not to do so. It may seem 
therefore that liberties, as the absence of claim or duty, are completely unprotected 
from other people's actions. Then why speak of them at all? Despite the absence of both 
claim and duty, acts and omissions based on a liberty can be effectively protected 
through a combination of other claims and duties (Kramer, 1998). For example consider 
that instead of cooking myself a risotto I am impatient and choose to eat at McDonalds. 
I have a liberty to eat at McDonalds every day of the week if I choose. As this is a liberty 
and not a claim, my healthy friend is under no duty to allow me to eat at McDonalds 
every day, free from interference. My friend can therefore try and dissuade me with 
logical argument, take me out for dinner, or even lie to me and tell me that McDonalds 
has shut down in order to prevent me from eating there.18 However my friend's actions 
in this respect are constrained by his other duties towards me. He cannot tie me up to a 
chair, as he has a duty not to deny me freedom of movement, nor can he tamper w ith 
my car to  prevent me driving to  MacDonald's as I have a claim over my property. 
Liberties are therefore an important aspect of our moral relations.
17 I don't seek to answer in this thesis whether all duties are Hohfeldian duties. I am inclined to 
think not and that Hohfeldian duties are one type of duties or obligations. However I cannot 
address this in full here.
18 Provided we think that my friend is under no duty not to lie to me.
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Hohfeld's Second Order elements consist of Power, Liability, Immunity and Disability. 
Again these elements form two correlative pairs.
Second Order Correlative Pairs
Power -  Liability 
Immunity -  Disability
Second Order elements specify how agents can change their own or other people's first 
order and second order elements. A power consists in one's ability to effect changes in 
other's or one's own claim, duty, immunity and power (Sumner, 1987). For example if I 
wish to no longer continue to eat at McDonalds, I have the power to waive my friend's 
duty not to physically restrain me, in order to prevent me from succumbing in a moment 
of weakness. One has a liability when one is unshielded from the bringing about of 
changes by the exertion of a power. My friend therefore has a liability as the existence 
of his duty is subject to my power to waive or enforce it.
One has immunity when one is shielded from another's power. For example a witness in 
a court has an immunity from being forced to incriminate themselves. One holds a 
disability when one lacks the ability to effect the change due to someone else's 
immunity. In the example above the court has a disability as the witness's immunity 
blocks their power. These first and second order relations can be seen in isolation as 
'atomic' elements. However Wenar argues that most rights, legal or moral, are atomic 
Hohfeldian elements bonded together in ways to create a molecular right (2005, 233). 
Figure two, overleaf, represents an adaptation of Wenar's complex molecular right as 
applied to my claim right over my computer.
This molecular right can be further qualified by other people's first order claims and 
second order powers in much the same way as the McDonald's case discussed above. 
For example, I have a liberty to use my computer but not to strike someone over the 
head with it or my immunity may not block the state's power to obtain my computer in 
a criminal case. These qualifications determine the details of the contours of my 
property right but do not affect its basic shape. In this sense, Wellman describes each 
right as having a 'defining core' surrounded by 'associated elements' (1985)
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Figure Two: Molecular nature of the property right over my computer. 19
Over this framework of Hohfeldian elements and pairs a number of classifications such 
as active or passive and negative or positive can be transposed. These classifications are 
also important in beginning to understand the different fundamentals of rights. Liberties 
and powers can be seen as active elements as they are defined by the actions of liberty 
or power-holder. X has a liberty or power to a. Claims and immunities however are 
passive elements as they are defined by the actions of the duty or disability-hoider. X
19 For Wenar's original diagram see Wenar, L. (2005) 'The Nature of Rights', Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 33(3): 223-252, p233.
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has a claim or an immunity that B a (Lyons, 1970). Another way to think of the 
distinction may be that liberties and powers are exercised while immunities and claims 
are enjoyed (Wellman, 1985, 70).
Negative or positive elements are both forms of passive elements and therefore the 
negative or positive distinction cannot be used to classify all Hohfeldian elements. A 
claim is negative when the right-holder is entitled to non-interference, the claim is 
positive when the claim-holder is entitled to some good or service. However when it 
comes to enforcing negative or positive claims the distinction becomes far less clear. It 
may take as much time and resources to run a competent legal system to protect 
negative claims as it would to provide social services to protect positive claims. It could 
therefore be said that in the context of citizens' claims to state enforcement all rights 
are positive (Holmes and Sunstein, 1999: 43).
Before moving on to the justification of rights it is useful to draw one further distinction 
- between moral and legal rights. Without a distinction one may assume that legal rights 
are the archetypal rights and this could lead to equating the law with morality. As Raz 
argues,
'It is true that one ought to keep one's promises but false that it is the law that 
one ought do so. It is (in many legal systems) true that it is the law that one may 
kill one's pets at will but it is false that one may do so.' (1984, 8)
Legal rights are rights that exist in law. Legal rights can have normative justification or 
no normative justification. For example as previously discussed, it is conceptually 
possible for the Australian Parliament to pass legislation tomorrow conferring on 
domestic pets a legal right to vote in federal elections. Such a legal right could be seen 
to lack normative justification. That is to say that it is possible to construct all types of 
legal rights. However most legal rights have normative justification, many legal rights 
are justified as they codify rights we believe exist outside the law. These rights that exist 
whether they have been translated into law or not can be called moral rights, or non- 
legal rights. In this sense moral rights are normatively justified claims.
Not all justified legal rights have a corresponding moral right. For example within the 
law corporations have certain rights as legal persons, these rights are usually justified 
through pragmatic reasons for effective functioning of the law. The rights of
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corporations as legal persons are a 'legal fiction' to judge the legality of business 
proceedings and relationships (Schane, 1986). However outside of such a legal system 
we would be unwilling to argue that the corporation holds some sort of normatively 
justified claim right.
Similarly not all moral rights should be translated into legal rights, often for reasons to 
do with the boundaries of appropriate state intervention. For example one may have a 
claim to be told the truth based on a right to respect.20 However for most instances it is 
not appropriate to translate this into a legal right, enforceable through the judicial 
system, every time someone tells a lie. This particular problem is explored in the final 
paper of this thesis where I argue that children conceived using donated sperm and eggs 
have a right to be told the nature of their conception based on their right to be treated 
with respect.
When I talk about rights in this thesis, I am talking about normatively justified claims, 
some of which should for their effective functioning be translated into law, some which 
are more appropriately seen as rights and duties between two individuals that can exist 
and function outside of the legal system. In this I take a similar position to Raz (1984, 1) 
that the best approach is to think about rights in general first and then to consider 
which of these rights should be translated into law. In this sense this thesis is a project 
of political theory and not analytical jurisprudence. Although Hohfeld's jural relations 
were originally conceived to analyse legal rights, they can also be effectively used to 
analyse non-legal rights. The Hohfeldian framework demonstrates the different 
elements we consider to be associated with the term 'right' and the ways that these can 
interact. What combination of Hohfeldian elements we consider to be a 'right' will 
depend on the function we wish rights to fulfil.
20 It could be suggested that it is not that truth telling is a form of a respectful behavior, but 
rather it is more plausible that not being deceitful is a form of respectful behavior. It is correct 
that truth-telling and not deceiving are two distinct claims, however I argue in the final paper of 
this thesis that in the context of donor conception disclosing the truth is what is required to fulfill 
the duty.
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Justification of rights
Although a combination of Hohfeldian elements make a right, not every combination 
represents what we would think of as a 'true ' right. Hohfeld's analysis provides us w ith 
the useful tools of analytical jurisprudence but rights themselves also hold moral and 
political weight. Rights serve a function and we have them for justified reasons. Broadly 
speaking there are tw o philosophical approaches to  explaining why rights should be 
protected, a deontological or status approach and a consequentialist approach. A 
deontological approach argues that there is something specific to the right-holder's 
status that means that the ir rights should be respected. Early theories of rights, such as 
natural rights theory often relied on a deontological justification. A consequentialist 
approach argues that rights should be respected because they bring about good 
outcomes, to protect the welfare or interests of the right holder.
Contemporary debate over the function of rights plays out these tw o philosophical 
approaches, indeed it has been suggested that the debate over rights is a proxy for a 
debate over normative commitments (Wenar, 2005, 25). The heated debate is between 
tw o theories and famously described as a 'standoff' (Sumner, 1987, 51). These are will 
theory and interest theory.21 The intractable nature of this standoff is no better 
exemplified in the exchange between Matthew Kramer, Nigel Simmonds and Hillel 
Steiner in A Debate Over Rights (1998).
Those that adhere to will theory, such as HLA Hart, Carl Wellman and Hillel Steiner argue 
that the core function of a right is to protect or enable an individual's will or choice. A 
right makes the right-holder a 'small-scale sovereign' (Hart, 1982, 183). In order to 
protect this choice the right-holder must have a claim that invokes a duty but also the 
power to enforce or waive it. This is because the power to  enforce or waive allows claim 
holders control over the corresponding duty and therefore full control over their right. 
This power can be broken down into three distinct steps.
21 Will theory is also referred to as choice or power theory throughout the literature. For 
consistency I only refer to it as will theory throughout this thesis. It is sometimes problematic to 
talk of these theories in general as they differ between theorists. For example Matthew Kramer's 
description of interest theory is somewhat different from that proposed by Joseph Raz. However 
the differences do not outweigh the similarities and the core function of the different versions of 
the theory remain the same.
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1. I can waive the duty or leave it in existence before any breach of my claim.
2. I can seek or not seek remedy after a breach of my claim.
3. I can waive or enforce the obligation to implement remedy for the breach of my 
claim.
Each step includes two choices, thus I as the claim-holder have six distinct Hohfeldian 
powers (Steiner, 1998: 240). As a result enforcing or waiving a claim is not a single event 
but happens in stages. Different versions of will theory disagree on whether one needs 
to have power over all or just some of these steps but the common element is that the 
claim holder must enjoy decisive control over the effectuation of their claim. Many have 
observed that this often means that will theory will not recognise the more serious 
claims as rights, such as the claim not to be enslaved or the claim not to be tortured, as 
these claims do not have a corresponding power to waive their correlative duties 
(Wenar, 2005, 239). Therefore will theory restricts the type of relationships that can be 
considered rights. The charge that will theory also restricts the type of beings that can 
hold rights is considered in the first paper of this thesis.
Those that adhere to interest theory, such as Joseph Raz, Neil MacCormick and Matthew 
Kramer, argue that the function of a right is to further a right-holder's interests. Instead 
of constraining the function of rights to the protection of an agent's choice or free will, 
interest theory seeks to encompass a wider domain. Interest theorists believe that rights 
also have an important function in protecting those things, goods and services that are 
in our 'interest'. Most importantly, those people who may lack the power to obtain 
these goods for themselves, who lack capacities or are powerless and vulnerable to 
oppression, are often those that need the protective force of rights the most. An 
interest that grounds a right in this broad definition is an interest that is deemed worthy 
of protection as it is of sufficient importance to impose a duty on another person. An 
interest is generally deemed to be worth protecting and of sufficient importance when it 
will intrinsically benefit the claim holder (Raz, 1982). Interest theory and will theory 
therefore fundamentally disagree on the function and justification of a right.
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Bridging the Divide
The debate between interest and will theory appears intractable because theorists are 
arguing over what they deem to be the true function of a right. It is in this sense like the 
debate over the true function of a car. It may be a hard task indeed to convince a racing 
car driver that a Volvo is the real 'car' and a Ferrari is not. There have been some recent 
attempts to bridge the divide between will and interest theory and to put forward a 
'third way'.
In 'The Nature of Rights', Leif Wenar presents an analytical framework that he claims 
will resolve the debate between interest and will theory. Wenar (2005, 224) claims that 
this new theory is superior to both will and interest theory, as it more closely aligns to 
the way that rights are used in common discourse. Rowan Cruft (2004) also makes this 
argument. He states that that both will theory and interest theory are revisionist 
theories of rights, in the sense that they would both necessitate us revising the way we 
currently use the term 'right' if we were to put the theories into practice (2004). To 
solve this problem Wenar puts forward a 'several functions theory' of rights that 
protects both interests and choices. He argues that only those combinations of 
Hohfeldian elements that perform one of the six specific functions (exception, 
discretion, authorization, protection, provision and performance) are rights (Wenar 
2005, 252). While Wenar's critique of the restrictiveness of both interest theory and will 
theory is valid and should be a point of concern for advocates of both theories, his 
proposed theory does not seem to truly be a 'third way'. As subsequent analysis has 
argued, Wenar's several functions theory is really an extended version of interest theory 
(Kramer & Steiner, 2007). While his analysis is insightful and useful, its true value lies in 
strengthening the already existing interest theory rather than bridging the divide and 
creating a new one.
Gopal Sreenivasan has also put forward a 'third way' theory in the paper 'A Hybrid 
Theory of Claim Rights' (2005). In doing so Sreenivasan seeks to address many of the 
shortcomings of interest and will theory. Unlike Wenar's several functions theory, 
Sreenivasan does come up with a new theory. Sreenivasan proposes a Complex Hybrid 
model of rights, stated below;
(CH) Suppose X is duty-bound to ß. Y has a claim right against X that X ß just in
case:
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Y's measure (and, if Y has a surrogate Z, Z's measure) of control over a duty of 
X's to ß matches (by design) the measure of control that advances Y's interests 
on balance (Sreenivasan, 2005, 271).
His theory does go much of the way to addressing some of the concerns regarding both 
will and interest theory. Although his theory concerns itself with the interest of the 
right-holder it cannot be said to be a simple extension of interest theory as its emphasis 
sits squarely across interests and choice (articulated here as control). Sreenivasan 
address the problem that children cannot hold certain powers themselves by 
introducing a surrogate, Z. However Sreenivasan's theory is certainly complex, so 
complex in fact that I think it fails on the first critique that those seeking a 'third way' 
are addressing. It does not seem to reflect the way in which rights are used in reality. 
Employing Sreenivasan's complex theory would entail a serious shift in how we use 
'rights' in public discourse. The disconnect with the way we use rights and the way 
theorists prescribe them may not be such a problem, however once we admit this, what 
is there to prefer Sreenivasan's theory over the more established and simpler will and 
interest theories? Sreenivasan's theory seems to lack the normative pull or weight that 
drives both the interest and will theories. For this reason it does not effectively bridge 
the divide.
Understanding of rights, both their structure and justification is fundamental for 
engaging in the debate about children's rights. As I will set out in the next section the 
question over the status of children, the function of rights and the way these play out in 
practice, intersperse and influence all considerations of rights for children. A strong 
grounding in the debates over both the nature of children and the nature of rights will 
equip us with the tools and understanding we need to begin to answer the question - 
'do children have rights?'. I now turn to how children's rights have been constructed in 
the literature so far.
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1.6 Children's Rights so far
Over the last 40 years children's rights have come a long way as both a concept and a 
reality. There is a growing body of literature considering the question of children's 
rights. In this section I will present a brief history of the development of children's rights 
as a theoretical construct. I will consider the moral status of children within traditional 
liberal philosophy and the growth of literature on children in rights theory from the 
1970's up to the 1990's. I will briefly consider the shift in emphasis after the ratification 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child from philosophical to practical and legal 
considerations and finally provide an overview of the small group of contemporary 
theorists examining children's rights. I do not intend to provide a comprehensive 
summary of all that has been written on children's rights but rather an illustrative 
narrative that follows the development of children's rights as a theoretical concept. I 
argue that although the literature is growing there are still significant questions to be 
considered. Many of these questions cannot be considered properly unless they begin 
from a more solid theoretical understanding of children's rights.
Traditional Political Theory
Children are notably absent from the western liberal philosophical tradition as a genuine 
subject of philosophical inquiry. John Locke's Thoughts on Education along with 
Rousseau's Emile are notable exceptions. Although Emile is a seminal text it is widely 
known that Rousseau was not the great defender of children in practice -  he famously 
left his own illegitimate children at an orphanage. However his words in the preface to 
Emile still tell truth today about children's place in society,
'Childhood is unknown. Starting from the false idea one has of it, the farther one 
goes, the more one loses one's way. The wisest men concentrate on what it is 
important for men to know without considering what children are in a condition to 
learn. They are always seeking the man in the child without thinking of what he is 
before being a man' (Emile, 34).
However it is not that other philosophers ignored childhood altogether; remarks 
concerning the moral and political status of children are often scattered throughout the 
work of traditional liberal philosophers. (Turner & Matthews, 1998, 1). However the
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remarks are often cursory and not very rigorous. Frequently they make illiberal 
assumptions about children's moral status. One explanation for why children receive so 
little attention throughout this literature may be that claims regarding children's moral 
status were considered obvious, in that they are considered to be trivially true and not 
susceptible to rational doubt. For example, Hobbes considered children to be 'in most 
absolute subjection' to the parent (King, 1998, 65). Hobbes assumes that children are 
not part of the social contract -  he states in De Cive,
'So let us return to the state of nature once again and consider men as though
they were suddenly sprung from the earth (like mushrooms) as adults right now'
(De Cive, 8.1, 160).
Children are therefore potential problems to Hobbes's theory of the state of nature for 
people clearly do not spring from the earth like mushrooms, fully formed. Children, for 
Hobbes, are an exception to the rational liberal agent. In a similar vein, Locke's 
contractarian theory simply presumes that children lack what adult human beings 
possess. According to Locke, children lack knowledge, moral sense and reason (Archard, 
1998, 87). Children are given a little more attention in the work of John Stuart Mill. 
However Mill's concern with explaining the status of children arises from his desire to 
ensure that the argument for the female suffrage which he sets out in The Subjection of 
Women would not be reduced to 'absurdity', by being applied to the enfranchisement of 
children (Turner, 1998, 137). In short the treatment of children in traditional liberal 
political philosophy has been that they are obviously and significantly different from 
adults and therefore do not need to be included in political theory. Consequently it was 
not considered necessary to explain why children did not hold rights.
Child liberation
There was a growing movement throughout the 1970's that it was no longer enough to 
consider the status of children as 'obvious' and simple assumptions regarding the status 
of children were inadequate. Their position in social and political life should also be 
challenged and subject to inquiry. From the growing civil rights, women's rights and gay 
rights movements arose a children's rights movement that was headlined by a group of 
scholars who called themselves, child liberationists.
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Child liberationists argued that society considerably underestimates the capacities of 
children. Foster and Freed argued that adults exploited their power over children and 
that children's inferior status should be radically reassessed (1972, 344). Other 
liberationists built upon the work of Aries (Holt, 1975; Farson, 1978). It is here that we 
see the danger of thinking that childhood fu ll stop, not just the modern conception of 
childhood, is a recent invention. Holt and Farson (1975; 1978) argue that once we 
recognise children as a social construct there is no reason to exclude them from the 
adult world. To do so would be a form of oppression and unjustified discrimination 
much like the discrimination levelled against women or African Americans at the time. 
Child liberationists therefore argue that there was no justified reason that children 
should be denied the same right as adults. Foster and Freed (1972, 347) state that a 
child should have the right to 'earn and keep his own earnings', 'to emancipation from 
the parent-child relationship when that relationship has broken down' and 'to be free of 
legal disabilities or incapacities save where such are convincingly shown to be necessary 
and protective of the actual best interest of the child'. Holt and Farson (1975; 1978) 
advocate a similar set of rights, but go further to suggest that children also had the right 
to vote, to work, to choose their own education, to use drugs and to control their own 
sexual lives. The fact that they do not exercise some of these rights is not problematic 
for child liberationists -  this is simply the part of the child's choice regarding the exercise 
of their rights.
There are major criticisms of the child liberation movement. Hafen argues that there 
were considerable risks associated with the uncritical transfer of egalitarian concepts to 
the unique context of the family (Hafen, 1976, 607). Wald argues that liberationists 
misunderstand the type of rights children held which he claims are primarily rights to 
protection (1979, 261). Predominantly it has been suggested that liberationists appear 
to ignore the evidence on developmental growth throughout childhood. Children are 
not just simply small adults; they have different capacities, competencies and interests. 
As Fortin argues,
'It seems clear, however, that the relatively slow development of children's 
cognitive processes makes the majority of children unfit to take complete 
responsibility for their own lives by being granted adult freedoms before they 
reach mid-adolescence' (Fortin, 2005, 5).
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Unlike the women's rights movement or the civil rights movement that sought to 
demonstrate that those who are subject to different treatment do not hold different (or 
at least significantly different) capacities, children are different in many real and 
relevant ways. Very young children are dependent on others. It is arguable that child 
liberationists did the children's rights movement a disservice by creating the impression 
that it is all about giving children adult freedoms and rights (Fortin, 2005, 4). Hafen's 
critique demonstrates that the immediate reaction to child liberation was to reject the 
idea of children's rights altogether. Hafen argues that children's rights could, in the long 
term, harm children's interests and destroy the family unit. Children should not be 
'abandoned to their rights' (Hafen 1976, 644). In a similar vein, Goldstein, Freud and 
Solnit (1979) argue that children have a right to autonomous parents and family 
integrity; therefore the rights of parents are intimately connected to the rights of 
children. Caught up in this is a misunderstanding that the children's rights movement is 
solely concerned with guaranteeing and achieving children's autonomy rights. This 
mischaracterises the debate. Where autonomy rights are sought they are usually of a 
very different kind from those held by adults.
Howard Cohen differs from other liberationists by acknowledging and conceding that 
children have lesser and different capacities from adults. However he argues that it is 
not true that these incapacities disqualify children from holding rights. This is because 
capacities can be 'borrowed'. Cohen argues that most adults do not have all capacities 
they need in order to exercise their rights. For example I have a right to a fair trial, but I 
do not have the legal knowledge or skills to ensure this myself; however I can engage a 
lawyer and 'borrow' their legal capacities (Cohen, 1980, 56). Cohen therefore employs a 
different version of the arbitrariness argument -  that because all adults use and borrow 
capacities, any line which uses age to afford people rights from can be shown to be 
arbitrary (Cohen, 1980, 48). Therefore there is no real threshold at which one gains a 
sufficient set of capacities and children should be able to 'borrow' the capacities they 
need through a system of child 'agents'. Child agents could advise children with a view 
to ensure that the child's right is properly exercised on the child's behalf. Yet there are 
clear questions regarding Cohen's idea of 'borrowing' capacities. Who are these 
advisors? What principles should guide the advisors - the opinions of the child or their 
best interest? Is the child free to not follow the advice the advisor gives? Archard (1993, 
26-27) provides a sustained critique of Cohen's theory. Cohen's position poses 
problems, but it successfully challenges the idea of how capacity relates to rights.
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Although the liberationists might go further than most regarding which particular rights 
they afford to children, the presence of their work within the scholastic tradition of 
children's rights represents a shift towards recognising the developing capacities of 
children. As the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child outlines, children's 
rights are not only about recognising children's capacity to contribute to their own lives 
but also to protect children from the exploitation of adults. It is not just children who 
hold rights to 'both care for one purpose and autonomy or self-determination for 
another' (Fortin, 2005, 6). This is also true for all human rights.
Children and theories of rights
The work of child liberationists has changed the agenda. It is no longer acceptable to 
completely exclude all discussion of children. Those devising a theory of rights must now 
consider the question of rights for children one way or another. As a consequence much 
of the good philosophical discussion on the question of whether children have rights 
arose from the consideration of children as a 'test-case' for the two dominant theories 
of rights, will and interest theory. Will theorists' definition of a right necessitates that 
children cannot hold rights, yet will theorists have famously had little problem grabbing 
what Kramer calls this 'nettle' boldly (1998, 69). Legal theorist, H.L.A Hart, originally 
embraced the position that will theory could not recognise children as right holders. In 
1955 Hart claimed that the use of 'right' to describe the existence of a duty to children is 
'idle use' and confuses it with other moral expressions (Hart, 1955, 82). In the 1980's 
Hart refined his position and attempted to reconcile the notion of children as right­
holders within will theory. He argued that when infants or younger children do not hold 
the enforcement or waiver powers they can be exercised on their behalf by an 
appointed representative. Even though this representative is exercising these powers,
a) the representative is bound by the consideration that their exercise of power is 
determined by what the right-holder would have done if sui juris22; and
b) when the right-holder becomes sui juris they can exercise the powers without
22 In civil law the phrase sui juris indicates legal competence, a person who is of full age and full 
legal capacity (Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary, 2001, 45)
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any transfer or fresh assignment.
Therefore it can be said that the powers remain with the right-holder throughout (Hart, 
1982, 184). Those that support Hart's revised position on children's rights (Flathman, 
1976; Ross, 1958; Simmonds, 1998, 226) believe that he offers a compelling argument 
for how legal rights can be ascribed to children even when the relevant powers of 
waiver or enforcement are exercised by adults. However it is apparent that this revised 
argument represents a departure from traditional will theory, for how can a power 
reside with a child if a) they do not have the factual competence necessary to hold the 
power and b) the power is exercised by another? The Hohfeldian analytical logic seems 
to break down at this point. In addition Hart's revision suffers from epistemic 
weaknesses due to considerable problems with the first constraint - that the appointed 
representative must act as the right-holder would have done if sui juris. Actual 
knowledge of what the child would have done if they were factually competent is clearly 
epistemologically inaccessible; we cannot know what they would have chosen or what 
they would have judged to be beneficial to them. Even the idea of retrospective 
assessment is fraught. The child as an adult is still not the child as a child and the child 
with full capacities need not be the child as an adult. Therefore despite the constraints 
laid on the representative, in practical terms the power would seem to lie with the 
representative and not the child.
Hart's concessions are not enough for most scholars and other theorists have mounted 
sustained attacks against will theory regarding the question of children's rights in order 
to demonstrate the superiority of interest theory. MacCormick's 1976 article employed 
rights for children as a 'test case' to assess each theory, arguing that will theory's 
inability to explain rights for children was sufficient evidence to reject it in favour of 
interest theory. Campbell (1992) also argues that the will theory is inadequate as an 
expression of the 'moral significance of persons' as it cannot account for children.
Campbell's paper was primarily written as a response to Onora O'Neill's (1988) critique 
of children's rights. O'Neill's opposition to children's rights is one that sits outside the 
interest and will theory debate. O'Neill argues that we should start our moral thinking 
on children by first asking what adults owe children and by specifying our obligations to 
children. She argues that there exist two types of obligations, perfect and imperfect. 
Perfect obligations are those we owe to specific children or to all children, for example
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we have a perfect obligation not to physically abuse all children and specific children we 
come into contact with. Imperfect obligations are those obligations that are not owed to 
particular children but that we cannot owe to all children. Some rights correspond with 
perfect duties but other rights correspond with imperfect duties. Consider for example a 
child's right to adequate nutrition, it cannot be that as individuals we owe all children 
this, we cannot possibly fulfil this. Therefore which children do we owe this obligation to 
(O'Neill 1988, 448)? Thinking of what we owe children in terms of rights therefore 
presents a 'blurred picture' (O'Neill 1988, 445). O'Neill's basic criticism here is that rights 
only tell us part of the story. It may even be true that we can talk about our moral 
relationship to very young children by articulating it by reference to those Hohfeldian 
elements that do not necessitate capacity or competence. For example children can 
hold immunities that protect them from the actions of others and as previously 
discussed Hohfeldian liberties can be protected by other claims and duties. Rights as 
Hohfeldian claims are not the be all and end all of morality; however they are useful and 
powerful tools in our moral arsenal. O'Neill's argument urges us to give up the idea of 
rights for children altogether and by doing this we commit her previous criticism; we 
miss part of the picture.
O'Neill's more worrying criticism is that children's main remedy is 'to grow up' and that 
rights are inappropriate tools for children, as they are powerless to claim them. Yet this I 
think, is an oversimplification on O'Neill's part of rights based thinking. Rights do not 
have to always be framed as things that are held by disadvantaged groups against a 
powerful majority. Rights can be useful ways to articulate relationships between people, 
to demarcate choices and interests and to help guide our actions towards others. A 
point I hope will become clearer as this thesis progresses.
The treatment of children in will and interest theory is considered in more detail in the 
first paper of this thesis. This debate inspired a collection of work considering the 
question of whether children have rights from a philosophical and theoretical 
perspective. Much of the work has been primarily concerned with outlining the different 
types of rights children held. Eekelaar (1986, 171-177) provides a threefold taxonomy 
for the type of rights children hold. These include rights that protect basic interests such 
as healthcare, rights that protect developmental interests and rights that protect 
autonomy interests. Freeman (1997) proposes a fourfold taxonomy, between welfare, 
protective, social justice and autonomy rights. Campbell (1992) splits rights up according
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to the person, the child, the juvenile and the future adult. Feinberg (1980) similarly 
identifies rights that are only held by adults - A rights - rights that are only held by 
children - C rights - and rights that are held both by adults and children - AC rights. It is 
tempting to engage in the activity of splitting different types of rights up in this way.23 
However strict adherence to these categories can be misleading. Furthermore by 
identifying these different categories of rights these legal theorists such as Campbell and 
Feinberg are seeking to  address the problem of a child's developing capacities and 
competencies. However simply identifying categories of rights does not properly 
address the problem since the margins of the categories are still arbitrary. We must still 
engage in the critical task of theoretically justify ing  a right rather than noting its 
similarity to other rights of a particular category.
Convention on the Rights of the Child
The development of this theoretical literature is punctuated by perhaps the biggest real 
step forward in the children's rights movement: the adoption of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC) by the United Nations General Assembly in 
1989. CROC is an ambitious document that begins w ith the assumption that children, as 
human beings, are entitled to rights.
The vulnerability of children as a group had long been recognised on the international 
stage. The Declaration of the Rights of the Child or the 'Declaration of Geneva' was 
adopted by the fifth  assembly of the League of Nations in 1924. It contained five basic 
principles that were seen to  work as guiding principles in the work of child welfare. The 
more comprehensive Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) was adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations and contained an expanded 10 principles. The 
rights listed in the Declaration did not constitute legal obligations and were therefore 
not binding on member states. The Declaration was also dominated w ith outdated 
stereotypical ideas, such as the proper roles played by mothers and fathers in the family 
(Fortin, 2005, 35). The principles were overly general and contained no recognition that
23 Indeed I do it myself in the first paper of this thesis.
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children could hold first generation political or civil rights.24 However it does represent 
the first real attempt to describe, in an organised way, a child's overriding claims.
By the 1970's there was a global push for a document that would guarantee legal 
obligations. It was believed that governments would continue to ignore their obligations 
to children unless a document was binding in a way that was sufficiently specific and 
realistic (Fortin, 2005, 37). Following a period of consultation and drafting, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child was submitted to the Commission on Human 
Rights for approval in 1989, subsequently adopted by the General Assembly and entered 
into force in 1990. CROC contains 54 articles and departs from earlier documents that 
primarily focused on a child's need for care. As such it reflects the growing recognition 
that children are not just in need of protection but active participants in social and 
political life. However CROC contains what has been called 'a strange mix of idealism 
and practical realism' (Fortin, 2005, 37). Some articles contain detailed policy provisions 
while others contain broad aspirational philosophical statements. There is concern 
regarding whether some of these articles can ever be translated into meaningful legal 
rights.
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has elevated article two - the freedom from 
discrimination, article three - the child's best interests, article six - the right to life and 
article twelve - respect for the child's view and right to participate to the status of 
general principles. None are more important than the others but it is often pointed out 
that article three concerning the child's best interests, underpins all of the other articles. 
Much of the literature following the adoption of CROC has been concerned with the 
interpretation of this key principle of the best interests of the child (see Alston, 1994; 
Hammarberg, 1990; Parker, 1994). Understandably, the focus post CROC has been on 
the interpretation and implementation of the Convention (Himes, 1995; Andrews and 
Kaufman, 1999; Tang, 2003). CROC does not provide a detailed analysis on why children 
have rights. Indeed it's not its job to do so. However this has the effect of neutralising
24 First generation civil and political rights are often distinguished from second generation 
economic, social and cultural rights. The distinction is more historical than categorical. In the post 
Cold War world most treaties now recognise that both types of rights are needed for effective 
implementation. Indeed the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) contains both types of 
rights and does not seek to distinguish between the two.
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the question of why children have rights. Most scholars can now simply point to the 
existence of the Convention to answer the prior question of, 'do children have rights'. 
The role of political theory and philosophy is to continue to critique this, to counter the 
assumption that if children do have rights then it must be those particular rights set out 
in the Convention.
Legal scholarship on children's rights is therefore primarily concerned with the 
jurisprudence of the convention. This approach takes CROC as the starting point and 
seeks to justify the rights it outlines. I think this is the wrong way around. The adoption 
of CROC by the international community has not resolved the disagreement that exists 
regarding children as right-holders. The concerns raised in earlier literature still stand. In 
fact, if anything, CROC adds an added layer of complexity to the debate. Language in 
CROC is often promising, such as reference to the 'evolving capacities' of the child, yet 
there is no clear definition in the treaty document on what these are, how they should 
be treated and how they influence the implementation of other rights. The approach I 
take throughout this thesis is 'bottom up' rather than 'top down'. I start by piecing 
together the theory of why children hold rights and then applying this to cases to 
determine how we should shape the corresponding duties. However this does not mean 
that CROC is not valuable, it will probably become clear as I refer to CROC at numerous 
times throughout the various papers. CROC serves as a reference point, a point of 
critical examination to be revised and improved upon, a basis on which to deepen our 
understanding and from which to launch normative and philosophical discussions.
Contemporary Theorists
Contemporary discussion of children's rights consists of a small group of scholars who 
consider children from a philosophical and political perspective. This work includes both 
a critique of children's rights (especially for very young children) and also thoughtful and 
thorough accounts of how we can begin to deepen our understanding of how rights 
might work for children. James Griffin offers a more contemporary argument for why 
children do not hold rights (2002). Griffin argues that the language of rights is best 
reserved for those who are capable of agency. Brighouse (2002, 45-46) however argues 
that it might be quite plausible to attribute to children rights that protect their welfare 
interests, but it is inappropriate to ascribe agency rights to children. The existence of
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Contemporary theorists who continue to promote the idea that children cannot hold 
rights based on arguments of agency, demonstrates the importance of unpacking and 
examining these arguments in more detail.
David Archard (2003; 2004) offers comprehensive treatment of the moral status of 
children throughout history and an analysis of the child's relationship with the state. He 
presents an argument for the relationship between family, children and the state. 
Samantha Brennan and Robert Noggle (1997) argue that children have basic human 
rights like adults but that they do not have the same type of 'role-dependent' rights that 
adults have. Building upon this work, Colin MacLeod (2006) puts forward an 'Egalitarian 
Provision Thesis' -  that children are entitled to an upbringing that gives them prospects 
for development and happiness equal to those of other children of their generation. In 
establishing a theory of 'role dependent' rights Brennan and Noggle (1997, 5) are 
attempting to tread the middle ground between the Equal Consideration Thesis -  that 
children deserve equal moral consideration, and the Unequal Treatment Thesis -  that it 
is justified to treat children differently from adults. It is a similar 'middle line' that this 
thesis seeks to establish -  that children are of the same moral status as adults in that 
they hold rights, but that they may not hold all the same rights as adults. Brennan and 
Noggle (1997, 7) argue that,
A person can have a role-dependent right only if she can fill the role in question.
When rights depend on roles, if you can't play the role, then you don't get the
right. So whether one has a role-dependent right is partly a function of the
capacities and abilities of the person to play the role associated with that right.
As will become clear throughout this thesis, Brennan and Noggle's theory comes close to 
what I propose. I argue that the allocation of rights turns on interests and the 
individual's competence to realise the benefit of an interest. I directly address the 
difference between my own theory and that of Brennan and Noggle's in the concluding 
chapter.
Feminist philosophers and writers also consider the rights of the child. This work 
includes critical feminist critiques of the Convention (Olsen, 1992) and of the law's 
treatment of children broadly conceived (Bridgeman and Monk, 2002). It is often noted 
that the concerns of children are similar in many ways to those of women, for example 
both groups are subject to the implications of the public/private divide which often
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obscures the interests of women and children. So in some sense it is correct to point out 
the similarities but in other ways so close a comparison is unhelpful. As previously 
mentioned children are different in their rapidly developing capacities and 
competencies. The work of Martha Minow (1986; 1995) identifies the way in which a 
feminist critique can helpfully enrich our understanding of children's rights. A feminist 
methodology identifies types of interests, such as 'the importance of connection, care­
taking, and social relationships' that might have previously been overlooked (Minow, 
1986, 3). Minow also identifies one important similarity between the children's rights 
and women's rights movement - the previously mentioned tension between equal 
consideration and special protections or treatment which 'complicate the meaning and 
shape of rights sought by advocates for women' (Minow, 1986, 14). Therefore feminist 
scholarship is useful for expanding, critiquing and challenging children's rights.
In order to build upon the work of contemporary theorists, the challenge, as articulated 
by Archard and MacLeod (2002, 4), is to;
'deepen our understanding of children's interests and to explore how the 
conceptualization of children's interest affects the character of the moral claims 
they have'.
With the exception of those just mentioned, there is a notable lack of attention being 
paid to the philosophy of children's rights since the start of the new millennium. In this 
sense, this thesis examines a question that has been addressed by some but continues 
to lack the debate and attention that other areas of human rights scholarship garners.
One way to rise to this challenge is to further investigate the relationship between 
capacity, competence and rights. Much of the literature continues to employ a simplistic 
understanding of capacity. Most theorists argue that children's incapacities will exclude 
them from holding all rights. In this way they are seeking to stop a slide towards the 
type of claims and rights made by child liberationists and to walk Brennan and Noggle's 
middle line. Yet it is often not entirely clear what aspect of a child's developing 
capacities prevents them from holding certain rights. For example when Griffin (2002, 
21) sets out his argument for restriction of children from the realm of rights he simply 
states, 'human infants are not agents', agents, he says 'have the capacities to reflect and 
choose and act'. Yet what does this really mean? Is one's capacity to choose and act the 
same as one's actual ability to choose and act? Many children do choose and act, but
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surely the problem is that they do not do so rationally. Furthermore how is it that a lack 
of agency restricts one's ability to hold rights at all? Even for those who afford children 
some rights it is not clear. Brighouse (2002) also uses ability, capacity or competences 
interchangeably to refer to acting on one's conception of the good. Do they all mean the 
same thing? Although he recognises that children learn through experience, the role of 
the development of these capacities is not fully considered (Brighouse 2002, 45-46).
To restate, this thesis builds upon the literature of rights and children to address four 
aims;
1) to present a theoretical argument for why children have rights;
2) to examine and unpack the role of 'capacity' and 'competence' in rights theory 
and their application to children's rights;
3) to apply the theory of children's rights to particular cases; and
4) to demonstrate the power of a strong theory in bringing children's rights from 
the realm of 'slogan' into reality.
In doing so it makes some claims about the idea of 'children's rights' as a separate 
category from general rights, begins to tackle the issue of children's developing 
capacities and demonstrates how understanding children's rights enriches our 
understanding of rights in general. This thesis does not represent the conclusion to the 
debate over children's rights and throughout the concluding chapter I identify directions 
for future research.
Conclusion
Although children have rights in law it is important to build a strong theory as to why 
they have these rights. This is necessary as the central question of 'do children have 
right?' remains contested. A strong theory of rights for children will aid their 
implementation by unpacking complex and long existing assumptions and providing 
pathways into new policy problems.
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This thesis presents and defends an argument that children indeed do have rights. By 
examining the problem throughout five papers it builds up a theory of why children 
have rights with particular reference to the concepts of capacity and competence. In the 
second part of the thesis I apply this theory to two distinct case studies, the right to be 
loved and the right to know one's genetic parents. The final chapter of the thesis argues 
that such theoretical consideration is important as it provides us with the tools to 
properly address practical problems for children in the real world. In this sense I am 
putting forward an argument about rights in general, that they are at their most 
powerful when they can be used to enact change and protect those things we think to 
be most important, not only on paper but also in reality.
This introductory chapter addressed two questions central to the thesis, what are 
children and what are rights. I argued that children are young human beings defined by 
their lesser and rapidly developing capacities. Children are both a concept and a 
conception and the normative significance attached to childhood is socially constructed. 
However the difficulties in defining children are not fatal to children's rights. Rights can 
be understood in terms of both their structure and justification. I outlined the 
Hohfeldian framework of rights and the two leading theories of their justification; will 
and interest theory, and addressed recent work to bridge the divide. I argued that 
understanding both the structure and justification for rights equips us with the tools to 
assess whether children can hold rights.
Finally this introductory chapter presented an overview of the children's rights literature 
so far. Although children are largely absent from traditional liberal political theory, the 
work of the child liberationists in the 1970's through to the treatment of children by 
leading rights theorists has seen a growing base of literature addressing rights for 
children. Yet too often children's rights are used as a test case for theories. The 
argument over the justification for children's rights is often seen as a proxy for the 
argument over the nature of rights in general. The adoption of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CROC) in 1989 however, represented a shift in focus towards 
interpretation and implementation. Despite this a small group of contemporary scholars 
continue to examine the rights of the child from a theoretical perspective.
Many aspects of the question, 'do children have rights' need to be considered further, 
including the relationship between capacity, competence and rights. The following
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chapters begin the investigations into the nature of rights, the way they are constructed 
for children and the role capacity and competence plays. It concludes that children have 
rights because they have interests that are of sufficient importance to be protected and 
these interests ground claims that produce duties in others to act or refrain from acting. 
It is not conceptually necessary for a child to hold the power to enforce or waive their 
claim in order to hold a right. Consequently it is not necessary for a child to be 
competent in autonomous choice to be the type of being that may hold rights. However 
a child must be competent in realising the interest to which a particular claim pertains. 
Furthermore the duty correlated with a child's claims must be reasonable and 
achievable and the duty-holder must hold the capacity to fulfil the correlative duty. 
Children are in a special category of right holders as their capacities are rapidly evolving. 
As a consequence they hold claims to the development of particularly important 
capacities that produces duties in others to assist in their development.
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Abstract Children are often denied rights on the basis of their incompetence. 
A theory of rights for children is essential for consideration of the child’s political 
status, yet the debate surrounding children’s rights has been characterised by the 
divisive concept of ‘capacity’ typified in the two leading rights theory, Interest 
Theory and Will Theory. This article will provide a thorough analysis of the 
relationship between capacity, competence and rights. Although Interest Theory 
has successfully dealt with the competence requirement for being a right-holder, the 
competence requirement still holds for the type of rights a child holds. Children’s 
interests are determined sufficiently strong to found a right when the claim-holder 
has the competence to realise the benefit to which that interest pertains. This allows 
us to recognise children as right-holders while constraining the types of rights they 
hold according to their developing competencies.
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We often assume that it is correct to deny children rights by reference to their 
lack of capacity. For example the debate about lowering the voting age in 
Australia is dominated by claims that those younger than 18 lack the capacity 
to understand the complex political system.1 We find it acceptable that there is 
a fixed age in law below which one is incapable of consenting to sex, driving 
a car or incompetent to stand trial. Many of us laugh at cartoons in the media 
depicting children asking their lawyers to negotiate higher levels of pocket 
money (Fortin, 2003, p. 10). But why? It seems that a child’s lack of capacity 
sets her apart from adults in such a way that the systematic denial of rights is 
entirely appropriate. If this is true then it is important to locate the basis of this 
capacity argument within rights theory.
Locating the correct relevance of capacity (or more correctly, incapacity) 
within rights theory will help to shed light on the nature of children’s rights.
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Many will be surprised to learn that although much of our contemporary 
political discourse is dominated by the concept of rights, there still exists a 
largely unresolved debate over whether children actually have them.2 This may 
not be as surprising to others who have observed the traditional neglect of 
children throughout moral and political philosophy.3 Exploring the relation­
ship between capacity and rights is part of the broader project of rectifying 
this neglect.
This article will offer an explanation of the proper relationship between rights 
and capacity and how this affects children as right-holders. After setting up a 
broad definition of children and childhood I will identify the ‘argument from 
incompetence’, which seeks to deny or restrict children’s rights by reference to 
their incapacity. I will then introduce some conceptual distinctions between 
capacity, competence and ableness, arguing that we need such clarity to properly 
understand the relationship between these concepts and rights theory.
The second part of the article will examine the two leading theories of 
rights -  will theory and interest theory. In will theory children are denied the 
status of right-holder owing to a focus on their incapacities whereas interest 
theory’s shift from ‘self-determination’ to the protection of interests does not 
account for the limitations a child’s developing capacities present. This article 
employs Hohfeld’s analytical rights framework to determine how a child’s 
capacity for enforcement and realisation influences the different concepts that 
may constitute a right and concludes that the Hohfeldian incident of power is 
the most relevant for the question of capacity.
Finally I will argue that while competence may not be necessary for the 
enforcement/waiver of a right, it is necessary for the realisation of a right. 
Competence plays an integral role in interest theory, one that is fundamental 
to understanding the structure of children’s rights. Rights are constrained by 
the competence of the claim-holder and the importance of their interest to 
impose upon others’ Hohfeldian liberties. Conceiving of rights in this way will 
provide us with the building blocks with which to begin more complicated 
theoretical conversations concerning the position of children within moral and 
political theory.
Concepts and Definitions
As Brocklehurst points out, there is ‘no single or agreed definition of childhood 
recognised or acted upon worldwide (2006, p. 1). The concept of childhood 
is used to identify everyone from newborn babies to young adolescents, and the 
meaning of the term differs greatly across history and cultural traditions (Aries, 
1962). The diverse nature and significance of childhood presents deep 
challenges for anyone wishing to bring analytical rigour to the subject.
2 ©  2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1470-8914 Contemporary Political Theory 1-19
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Article One of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC) defines children as ‘every human being below the age of eighteen 
unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier’ 
(UNCRC, Article 1). Much has been said about the arbitrary nature of any 
age-related definition of children (Archard, 2004, p. 85). Given the gradual 
and variable nature of human development any fixed age will be open to the 
challenge that some individuals are physically and cognitively adult long before 
they are recognised so by the state. Lowering the age from 18, however, would 
similarly draw criticism that some 16-year-olds are not yet mature enough to be 
considered adults. There will always be outliers in any age-related definition of 
childhood.
Despite the difficulty of age-related definitions, one thing is certain, the 
concept of childhood cannot be understood unless we have a concept of 
adulthood. A child is defined as one who is not yet adult. If being adult is when 
one is in full control of one’s factual capacities then childhood can be generally 
understood as a period of reduced physical and cognitive capacities coupled 
with a rapid development of these capacities. It is a time when one goes from 
total dependence as a baby to relative independence as an adult. As Archard 
states, ‘the underdevelopment of children is a biological given, a brute fact 
of human existence’ (2004, p. 25). However, the concept of childhood is not 
entirely biological but is also socially constructed. The way in which we 
understand and attach meaning to these ‘biological givens’ is created by the 
society we live in. Therefore the significance attributed to this period of 
cognitive, moral and physical development has differed greatly across history 
and continues to differ across cultures today (Veerman, 1992; Brocklehurst,
2006, p. 1).
While recognising the differing significance of childhood, I will take 
childhood simply to mean the period of time before one becomes an adult, 
usually defined by lesser physical and cognitive capacities coupled with the 
rapid development of these capacities. This definition is intentionally broad 
and does not seek to identify an age by which one ceases to be a child. The vast 
difference in capacities between a 2-year-old child and a 14-year-old child, the 
development and evolution of children’s capacities, is what any theory of rights 
must account for. It must explain how to recognise children as right-holders 
despite their differing capacities yet also taking account of the importance of 
these capacities. The approach that I propose throughout blurs the line 
between child and adult. I shall argue that rights are contingent on an 
individual’s interests and ability to realise the benefit of the interest, and 
therefore the distinction between child and adult becomes largely unimportant 
for right theory.
The most common argument employed when denying children of any age 
the rights afforded to adults is that they have reduced physical and cognitive
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capacities. For simplicity I will refer to this as the argument from 
incompetence. The argument from incompetence generally can be described 
as thus:
To hold a right one must have certain capacities, such as the capacity to 
feel pain, make choices or to think rationally. Children are in a state of 
developing those capacities and acquiring competency and therefore 
cannot hold the rights, unlike adults whose physical and cognitive 
competencies are fully developed.
The argument from incompetence can be seen throughout traditional liberal 
philosophy. Hobbes regarded children as lacking the capacity to enter into the 
social contract because of their inability to reason (1985), Locke argued that 
children were in a temporary state of inequality because of their irrationality 
(2004, p. 306) and John Stuart Mill stated with regard to his political theory 
that it was ‘hardly necessary to say ... we are not speaking of children’ (1992, 
pp. 13-14).
A version of the argument from incompetence pervades one of the leading 
theories of rights -  the will or choice theory, hereafter referred to as will theory 
(Hart, 1955; Wellman, 1995; Steiner, 1998). Will theory claims that children 
cannot be right bearers because they lack the capacity to make rational choices. 
It is widely recognised by developmental psychologists that children are not 
born with the capacity to make rational choices, and that this is a capacity that 
they develop (Piaget, 2004). Therefore the argument from incompetence, as 
espoused by will theorists, seems to be fatal for understanding children as 
rights bearers. Recent literature on the rights of children has focused on 
‘autonomy’ rights -  those rights that involve the uncoerced choices and actions 
of the right-holder according to their conception of the good life (Brennan, 
2002; Brighouse, 2002). Brighouse argues that it is not sensible to ascribe 
agency rights to children (2002). Griffin, too, in an extension of his definition 
of human rights, has argued that infants do not have rights by virtue of their 
lack of the capacity for agency (2002).
If such significance is placed on a child’s lack of capacity -  with implications 
for their moral and political status -  then it seems necessary to locate the exact 
way in which capacity, or the lack of it, is important to rights theory. To do 
this I will employ a Hohfeldian framework to examine how exactly capacity is 
relevant to will theory. I will then examine the rival alternative, interest theory, 
and argue that even though interest theory makes it conceptually possible for 
children to be right-holders, it has not completely overcome the argument 
from incompetence.
Before examining each theory of right it is useful to introduce some 
conceptual clarifications. Although the definition of childhood is sufficiently
4 ©  2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1470-8914 Contemporary Political Theory 1-19
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broad for our purposes, our understanding of capacities must be further 
refined. So far throughout this article I have been using the term capacity in 
its broadest sense, encompassing both capacity and competence. Although the 
terms capacity and competence are often used interchangeably throughout 
the children rights literature there are important conceptual differences 
between the two. Any consideration of capacity is best understood through a 
breakdown of the definitions of capacity, competence and ableness.4
Capacity can be understood as one’s counterfactual ability, and competence 
as one’s actual ability. This distinction between capacity and competence can 
be seen through the simple example of the student and the turtle. Neither the 
turtle nor the student is currently capable of speaking Russian; however, while 
the student can take Russian lessons and will one day be able to speak the 
language, the turtle will never be able to, no matter how many lessons he takes. 
In this way both the turtle and the student currently lack the competence to 
speak Russian; however, the student has the capacity to one day be competent 
(Cowden and Lau, 2011). A further layer can be added through the concept of 
ableness (Morriss, 2002, p. 80). Ableness is one’s specific competence plus 
opportunity, for example I may have the competence to get married, but I 
cannot do so because I have no one to marry. In this sense I am not able. 
Ableness encompasses the external resources and opportunities one needs to 
complete an act (Dowding, 2006, p. 325). The relationship between the three 
concepts can be seen below Figure 1.
This raises an important moral distinction between children and other 
groups of incompetents such as animals. Although a young baby and a puppy 
may both currently be incompetent, a young child will develop the com­
petencies to one day make complex moral decisions while the puppy will not.
Experience, Training or 
Development
Opportunity or Resources
Ablcncss
Figure 1: The relationship between capacity, competence and ableness
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As we will see will theory places both children and animals in the same 
category; however, a proper understanding of the distinction between capacity 
and competence shows that there is a distinction. This distinction, I believe, is 
sufficient to warrant acknowledgement in any theory of rights. It is relevant 
therefore to ask whether the denial of rights is based on one’s actual 
competence or one’s capacity.
Theories and Functions of Rights
All assertions of rights can be understood in terms of four basic elements, 
the Hohfeldian incidents (Wenar, 2005, p. 2). Hohfeld’s framework of rights is 
an exercise in analytical jurisprudence and logical reasoning, separate from 
the contentious disagreement surrounding the normative force of rights. The 
Hohfeldian framework can therefore provide us with the necessary tools in 
order to engage in a clear, reasoned argument regarding the proper function 
of rights.
The Hohfeldian rights framework unpacks the internal structure of a ‘right’ 
into eight incidents: claim, duty, liberty, no claim, power, liability, immunity 
and disability. The relationship between these can be seen below Figure 2. 
A/B can be understood as ‘When there is A, there is no B’
A -  B can be understood as ‘When there is A, there is B'
By briefly examining the four prominent Hohfeldian incidents — claim, 
liberty, power and immunity -  we can begin to pinpoint the exact issue capacity 
or competence poses for a child’s right.
In Hohfeldian terms, A has a claim that B do a if  and only if  B has a duty to A 
to do a. The Hohfeldian framework stipulates that a claim always has a 
correlative duty specified by reference to the actions of the object that bears the 
correlative duty. A’s claim creates a duty in B to (I) abstain from interference 
or (2) render assistance or remuneration (Wenar, 2005, p. 7). I have a claim to
Opposites Correlatives
Claim /  No Claim 
Liberty /  Duty
Claim - Duty 
Liberty - No Claim 1st Order
Power /  Disability 
immunity /  Liability
Power * Liability 
Immunity - Disability
2nd Order
Figure 2: The Hohfeldian rights framework
6 ©  2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1470-8914 Contemporary Political Theory 1-19
71
Capacity, claims and children’s rights
my life and therefore you have a duty not to kill me. As a claim is always 
defined by the actions of the duty bearer, neither capacity nor competency on 
the part of the claim-holder is relevant to their status within Hohfeld’s 
framework. A child’s incapacity or lack of competence does not prevent them 
from being a claim-holder.
Within Hohfeld’s framework A has a liberty to do cl if and only if A has no 
duty not to do cl. A liberty is specified by reference to the actions of, A, the 
liberty-holder. For example my liberty to ride my bike is my freedom from any 
duty to refrain from riding my bike. A liberty is not dependent on the liberty- 
holder’s actual competence or capacity to exercise the liberty even though it is 
defined by the actions of the liberty-holder (Sumner, 1987). For example, if I 
break my leg and am bound to bedrest, I am still at liberty to walk down the 
street, even though I am currently unable to exercise this liberty. In this way a 
liberty is not concerned with the liberty-holder’s competence or capacity. If this 
holds true, then a child's developing capacities and competencies do not 
preclude them from holding a liberty. A baby holds a liberty to walk down the 
street before it has developed the actual competence to do so.
A power consists in one’s ability to effect changes in other’s or one’s own 
claims and duties (Sumner, 1987). I have a power to enforce my claim to 
exclusive possession by removing a squatter from my land; I also have the 
power to waive my claim to exclusive possession to allow him to stay. 
Therefore: A has power if  and only if  A has the ability to alter her own or 
another’s Hohfeldian incidents.
Powers like Liberties are specified in reference to the actions of the holder. 
However, unlike a liberty, in order to hold a power, one must be factually 
competent (Sumner, 1987; Kramer, 1998). There is a difference between factual 
and legal competence as one can be factually competent in an act but not be 
legally authorised (Kramer, 1998, p. 69). For example one may be legally 
authorised to drive a car, but be temporarily factually incompetent to do so 
due to a broken arm. Therefore for a child to hold a power we must consider 
their competence. We are not concerned with one’s counterfactual capacity to 
alter one’s own or another’s Hohfeldian incidents but with one’s actual 
competence. For example, if I am in a coma I may have the capacity to speak 
and make decisions regarding my life and property but currently lack the 
competence to do so. This incompetence means I lack the power to waive 
my rights.
The necessity of factual competency poses a problem for children because 
they are, at any given time, at different stages of gaining both physical 
and cognitive competency. Therefore at varying points of their development 
they may not have the factual competency required to hold a power.
One has immunity when one is shielded from another’s power. A 
landowner’s immunity prevents the government from compulsorily acquiring
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their land without just compensation. Therefore: A has an immunity if  and only 
if B lacks the ability to alter A ’s Hohfeldian incidents. As an immunity relates to 
one’s protection from the exercise of another’s power, not to the immunity 
holder’s capacity or competence, therefore a child would seem to be equally 
capable of holding an immunity as an adult.
The Hohfeldian framework demonstrates that when we consider the 
essential building blocks of rights, it is the incident of power that is of 
most concern for children as right-holders. For the majority of Hohfeldian 
incidents -  claim, liberty and immunity -  a child’s developing capacities and 
competencies pose no problem. We can also observe that it is competence, 
one’s actual ability to do the act, and not capacity, that is necessary for a child 
to hold a power. Having identified that it is the Hohfeldian incident of power 
that is relevant to competence we can now examine what part power has to 
play in the two competing understandings of the function of rights, will theory 
and interest theory.
Will theory understands rights as normative allocations of freedom; they 
demarcate domains or spheres of practical choice where individuals are not 
subject to interference (Steiner, 1998, p. 238). Thus a right makes the right­
holder a ’small scale sovereign’ (Hart, 1982, p. 183). The function of the right is 
to give its holder power over another’s duty. Therefore a will theory 
right = Hohfeldian claim + Hohfeldian power. The Hohfeldian rights framework 
tells us that one must have factual competence in order to hold a power. 
Therefore for a child to be able to hold a will theory right they must be 
factually competent of the rational choice to enforce or waive one’s right 
(Kramer, 1998, p. 69).
It is this emphasis on factual competency and the necessity of the inclusion 
of power within a will theorist’s definition of a right that is fatal for children’s 
rights. Studies show that very young children do not have the competence to 
distinguish between self and others; it is clear that without such a competence 
a very young child would be incapable of making the decisions relating to the 
enforcement or waiver of their claims,5 because to make such a decision would 
necessarily involve the ability to conceive of interpersonal concepts such as 
‘claim’ (Piaget, 2004; Lansdown, 2005, p. xiii).
Will theorists have famously had little problem boldly grasping this nettle. 
As children, particularly infants and young children, are incompetent to engage 
in enforcement and waiver decisions, they cannot hold the enforcement/waiver 
powers and therefore cannot hold rights (Hart, 1955). The distinctive feature of 
children’s rights in will theory seems to be that they do not exist (Campbell, 
1992, p. 2).
Will theory’s emphasis on choice has a ‘confining effect’ on the articulation 
of children’s rights that cannot be avoided (Federle, 1994, p. 348). Children’s 
state of evolving capacities means that according to will theory they fall into
8 ©  2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1470-8914 Contemporary Political Theory 1-19
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the same category as all other non right-holders, such as the mentally 
incapacitated, animals or inanimate objects. Will theory therefore is unable to 
distinguish between children and other incapacitated groups; it fails to 
recognise that although children may not currently have the requisite 
competency, they do hold capacities -  a point that seems to distinguish them 
from those individuals who are static in their incompetence. It is owing to these 
difficulties that many reject will theory as an appropriate theory to properly 
define how we wish to use rights.
Interest theory holds that the function of a right is to further a right-holder’s 
interests. Instead of constraining the function of rights to the protection of 
an agent’s choice or free will, interest theory seeks to encompass a wider 
domain. Interest theorists argue that a right’s function is to protect those 
things, goods and services that are so intrinsically important to us that they 
are in our interest. Those people who may lack the power to obtain these 
goods for themselves, who lack competencies, are often those that need the 
protective force of rights the most.
In this way Kramer defines rights as ‘modes of protection for interests that 
are treated as worthy of protection’, and Raz states that ‘x has a right if ... an 
aspect of x’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some 
other person(s) to be under a duty’ (Raz, 1984, p. 195; Kramer, 1998, p. 79). 
Therefore an interest theory right = Hohfeldian claim that protects an interest 
worthy o f protection.
An interest deemed worthy of protection is one of sufficient importance to 
impose a duty on another person. An interest is of sufficient importance when 
it will benefit the claim-holder. However, the most important distinction 
between will theory and interest theory is that a claim protecting an interest 
does not need to be combined with the power to waive or enforce this claim. 
The power can theoretically lie outside of the claim-holder without damaging 
the conceptual coherence of the claim. A’s competency to demand or waive the 
enforcement of a right is neither sufficient nor necessary for A to be endowed 
with that right (Kramer, 1998, p. 62). For example, consider the fact that I am 
in a coma because I have suffered a violent and unprovoked beating. I am not 
able to go to the courts and seek remedy for my attack, as I am unconscious. 
However, just because I am temporarily powerless to enforce my claim to be 
free from physical assault does not mean that I have lost the claim altogether. 
In fact in this situation it may be appropriate that in the absence of my 
competency someone else will enforce the claim on my behalf. In recognising 
that the power to enforce or waive a claim can lie outside the claim-holder, we 
can acknowledge that this power can lie with the state or a designated 
institution or individual.
The separation between claim and power logically allows for the fact that a 
child lacking the competency to hold a power is not excluded from holding an
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interest theory right. As observed in the previous analysis, there is no 
competence-related impediment involved with a child holding a Hohfeldian 
claim, as these claims are defined by reference to the actions of the duty bearer. 
Therefore children are capable of holding rights if we understand rights 
as Hohfeldian claims held by an individual that pertain to a duty to either 
do or refrain from doing a particular action. The power to enforce this claim 
can be held by the right-holder or another designated entity. This claim 
constitutes a right when it is based on an interest of sufficient importance to 
impose duties on others.
From here the conclusion drawn by interest theorists is that by shifting the 
focus of rights to interests the argument from incompetence is overcome. 
Children can now hold rights unconstrained by concerns regarding competence 
or capacity (MacCormick, 1976; Campbell, 1992; Kramer, 1998). Campbell 
concludes that a child’s lack of development does not pose a problem for 
children holding rights. He argues that lack of development is really just a 
‘superficial point of theory’; the incapacities of the child and the implications 
this has for protecting a right are really a political question (Campbell, 1992, 
p. 12). Federle, too, despite her belief in its inadequacies, claims that ‘in this 
regard, the interest theory appears most promising to children’s rights theorists 
because it proposes to resolve the problem of having a right without the present 
ability to exercise it’ (Federle, 1994, 352).
I argue, however, that interest theory has not accomplished this. A proper 
understanding of the relationship between competence and interest theory 
demonstrates that a child cannot hold a right without the present ability to 
exercise it. A child’s developing capacities and competencies are not just a 
superficial point of theory. The next section of this article will argue that 
although interest theory may have shown that competence is unnecessary to 
qualify as the type of thing that could hold a right, it may still be necessary to 
realise a particular right.
Realising Rights and Imposing Duties
To hold an interest theory right one must have interests. There is much debate 
about whether other beings, such as animals, have interests and therefore 
rights. However, I do not seek to enter into this argument here. I take an 
interest simply to mean something that is presumptively beneficial to the claim- 
holder (Raz, 1984, p. 205). The thin evaluative stance of interest theory 
assumes the basic distinction between beneficial and detrimental (Kramer, 
1998, p. 93). This is not to say that the boundaries of what constitutes a 
presumptively beneficial interest are not controversial; there will always be 
(and rightly so) debate regarding the edges of what is beneficial. However,
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a controversial fringe does not logically preclude that such beneficial interests 
do exist. Most importantly it seems relatively uncontroversial that children 
have interests that are of intrinsic benefit to them, such as a baby’s interest in 
receiving adequate nutrition. If we accept that children are beings that have 
interests then a child (so far) can hold an interest theory right.
From this first step the clearest way to identify the role competence 
plays in interest theory is by examining the different ways in which a right 
comes not to be fulfilled. Disregarding the intentional choice of the duty-holder 
to breach their duty or the choice of the right-holder to waive a duty, 
why would a right not be fulfilled? I identify three situations where this may be 
the case.
A right cannot be fulfilled when the external environment precludes either the 
right-holder or duty-bearer from fulfilling their duty or exercising their right, 
respectively. For example, a government may wish to fulfill its duty to provide 
young children with adequate food and nutrition; however, the country suffers 
a debilitating drought. Although the government wishes to fulfil its duty, it is 
prevented from doing so.
A right cannot be fulfilled when the duty-holder does not have the 
competence to fulfil the duty. For example we may state that children have a 
right to be loved by their parents, yet a mother who suffers from severe 
postnatal depression may be incapable of loving her child (Cowden, 2011).
A right cannot be fulfilled when the right-holder does not have the 
competence to realise it. For example the claim that one has a right to work 
may produce a duty in the state to assist those who are unemployed to find 
employment. This would not hold for a new born baby who lacks the 
competence to work at a job.
Do any or all of these extinguish the existence of the right, or do they simply 
point to its abrogation? The first situation, that of the drought-stricken 
country, benefits from consideration of the concept of ableness set out at the 
beginning of this article. Ableness encompasses two parts -  competence plus 
external resources. The government of the country may have the competence 
to deliver food to its child citizenry, as it has a functioning agricultural 
industry and a bureaucracy for effective distribution. However, the existence 
of a drought deprives the government of the external resources and 
opportunity to do so. This situation presents a complicated and important 
question for those concerned with the implementation of rights. However, 
as it is about external circumstances and does not address the issue currently 
at hand, that of the claim-holder’s competence, I will not consider it further. 
I will focus on the second and third situations. We will first examine the 
relevance of a claim-holder’s competence to realise a right, and then 
consider how this can create duty-holders who are incapable of fulfilling 
their duty. I argue that interest theory necessitates that the right-holder have
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the competence to realise the right in order for the interest to be of sufficient 
importance to impose duties and restrict the liberties of others.
As we saw above, the claim-holder is able to realise the content of their claim 
when they have both the competency, as in the actual ability, and the ableness, 
as in the external resources and opportunity, to do so. By putting aside the 
necessity of external resources we have singled out the requirement of 
competence.
The competence required to realise a claim is distinct from the previously 
discussed competence required to hold the power to waive or enforce that 
claim. For example, I realise my claim to vote when I fill out the ballot 
paper. I enforce my claim to vote, however, when someone breaches their 
duty to allow me to vote and I take them to court. I waive my right to 
vote when 1 decide not to attend the polling booth. If the state legislates 
against me voting, I have lost my power to enforce or waive my claim, but 
not my competence to realise it. Therefore the competence relating to the 
power to enforce or waive one’s claims can be unrelated to the competence 
required to realise one’s claim. The second part of this article demonstrated 
that interest theory allows the power to enforce a claim to reside outside 
the claim-holder; therefore the competency to enforce or to waive is no 
longer necessary to hold a right. What interest theorists have not done 
is to demonstrate that the competence to realise the claim is also 
unnecessary.6
When the claim-holder does not have the competence to realise the content 
of their claim, the claim is unfulfilled. The reason for this lies at the core of 
what it means to protect an interest -  that it is presumptively beneficial to the 
claim-holder. From this, it follows that if a child does not have the competence 
to realise the benefit to which the claim pertains, the interest may not qualify 
as of sufficient importance to be protected. To illustrate this we can consider 
whether a blind man has a right to illumination. A blind man can have no 
interest in the lights being on so he can read the newspaper, whereas an able- 
sighted person may do. If we consider the thin evaluative stance of 
presumptively beneficial, the presence or absence of light can have neither 
benefit nor detriment to someone who cannot detect it. As the blind man 
cannot see, he cannot realise the benefit of the light, and therefore can have no 
interest on which to ground a claim. Without the relevant competence he has 
no right to illumination.7
Consider an alternative example: assume I have a deep and intense interest in 
flying without the assistance of external mechanisms; it is of constant concern 
to me, and it occupies my thoughts day and night. The fulfillment of this 
would greatly enhance my intrinsic well-being. Flying without assistance seems 
at first glance to be presumptively beneficial. I also assert that this claim 
produces a positive duty in others to help me to realise it. However, we know
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that it is impossible for me to fly without assistance, because I lack not only the 
competence to currently achieve it but also the underlying capacities to ever be 
able to do so in the future. Furthermore, unlike the example of the blind man, 
to impose a duty on others to help me achieve my interest in flying is to impose 
a duty on others that they can never fulfill, a situation I will return to below. 
It therefore seems that the competence of the claim-holder to realise the claim 
is extremely relevant to whether or not it constitutes a right. To return to our 
original example, a newborn cannot hold a right to gainful employment, 
because they lack the competence to work at a job and therefore cannot realise 
the benefit to which their claim pertains.
The impossibility of fulfilling one’s duty leads us to the second important 
feature of an Interest theory right. According to interest theory, rights ground 
requirements for action in other people (Raz, 1984, p. 208). An interest, 
therefore, must be of sufficient importance to impose a duty on someone 
else. If we are protecting the right-holder’s interests by imposing normative 
constraints on other people’s Hohfeldian liberties, then these actions of 
constraint must be justified (MacCormick, 1976). The constraints must be 
reasonable and achievable. It is not just the competence of the claim-holder 
that is relevant but also the cost of fulfilling the duty imposed on the 
duty-holder.
Let us consider again the blind man’s prospective right to illumination. 
Although the blind man lacks the competence to realise the benefit of the right, 
the correlative duty would still be possible to comply with. In other words the 
potential duty is still achievable -  for example, if we considered the blind man’s 
interest as worthy, we could dictate that we must turn the light on for him and 
enforce this duty. Now consider two people in a room, an able-sighted person 
who wishes to go to sleep and the blind man who wishes to keep the light on. 
The sleeper’s liberty to sleep in the dark would be constrained by their duty to 
keep the light on. The cost of the duty, in depriving the able-sighted person 
of their liberty to sleep in the dark, seems to outweigh the negligible benefits 
the blind man could derive from illumination. Therefore, the assessment that 
the blind man’s interest in illumination is not of sufficient importance to 
impose a duty rests not only on the blind man’s lack of competence to realise 
the interest, but also on the disproportionate costs imposed on the potential 
duty-holder’s liberties.
Determining whether one holds a right under interest theory is therefore a 
balance between (a) the claim-holder’s interest, (b) the claim-holder’s 
competence, and (c) the cost to others of bearing the duty. This relationship 
can be examined by further breaking down the types of claims. All claims are 
passive as they require action or inaction on the part of the duty-holder, not 
the claim-holder. Claims can broadly be seen to fall into four categories, those 
claims that produce a duty of non-interference (N1 and N2) and those claims
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that produce a duty to provide goods or services (PI and P2). All of these 
claims necessitate competence within the claim-holder.
Nl: Claims producing duties of noninterference protecting the actions of 
the claim-holder.
These are claims of noninterference from others to protect the action of 
the claim-holder, for example, 1 have a claim to walk down the street 
without someone preventing me. For this to be a claim based on an 
interest of sufficient importance, the claim-holder must have the 
competence to realise the claim. If I am temporarily incompetent and 
cannot walk down the street because I have broken my leg, I am still at 
liberty to do so, but my lack of competence means it is of insufficient 
importance to impose a duty on others, as I will not be able to realise the 
benefit to which the claim pertains.
N2: Claims producing duties of noninterference protecting the state of 
being of the claim-holder.
These claims do not protect actions by the claim-holder, but instead 
protect the claim-holder’s state of being, for example, the right not to be 
tortured. We do not decide whether to feel pain or not; rather it is 
something that refers intrinsically to the state of being of the agent. 
However, a claim-holder must be competent of feeling pain. For example, 
if I cannot feel pain, I do not suffer if someone pokes me with a needle 
repeatedly. I may have a claim against this person for other reasons, such 
as violation of my bodily integrity, but it cannot be based on a right to be 
free from pain.
PI: Claims producing duties of action to enable actions of the claim- 
holder.
These are claims of assistance in enabling the claim-holder’s actions. For 
example, a child’s claim against the state to receive adequate education 
in order to vote; or, in the hypothetical case above, my right for others to 
enable me to fly. Much like N l, a claim-holder must have the competence 
to realise these claims or else they impose duties that can never be 
fulfilled. They become unreasonable constraints on the Hohfeldian 
liberties of others.
P2: Claims producing duties of action that protect the state of being of 
the claim-holder.
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These claims protect the claim-holder’s state of being but still require a 
level of competency. Consider a child’s claim to be provided with 
adequate healthcare or to clean water. The child must be competent of 
deriving benefit, and the water is of intrinsic benefit to the child, because 
they have the competency to use it to extract nutrients and convert 
them into energy.
In this broad classification all four types of claims necessitate a certain 
level of competency on the part of the claim-holder. In situations NI, N2 
and P2, a duty-holder can still fulfill the duty imposed on them even if the 
right-holder is not competent of realising the right. However, in each 
situation the imposition of a duty would not serve an interest worthy of 
protection. More importantly, in the case of PI the duty-holder would 
simply not be able to fulfil their duty if the right-holder was not competent of 
realising the right. All rights necessitate a level of competency on the part of 
the right-holder, and some rights necessitate that this competence be linked 
to autonomy.
Interest theory may have shown us that there is no conceptual need for 
competence in order to qualify as a right-holder. However, the theory 
necessitates that the right-holder have the competence to realise the right in 
order for the interest to be of sufficient importance to impose duties and 
restrict the liberties of others. This assessment is of particular relevance when 
considering whether children hold rights. The limited and evolving capacities 
and competencies of children of all ages do not preclude them from being 
recognised as a person capable of holding rights. However, the evolving 
competencies of individual children are relevant to the question of which 
specific rights they hold. Interest theory, thus understood, demonstrates that a 
child’s capacities and competencies are an essential part of their rights claims. 
Therefore a child only holds a right when they have the competence to realise 
the benefit to which the claim pertains.
Conceiving of the relationship between capacity, competency and rights in 
this way lessens the importance of the distinction between child and adult in 
rights theory. In order to decide whether one can hold rights and which rights 
they have, it is not crucial to know whether one falls directly into the category 
of child or adult, but rather what interest, constrained by the competencies, 
that individual holds. This aligns to recent work on the enfranchisement of the 
child, as Lopez-Guerra has argued:
A person ought to have the right to vote if she has this capacity in the 
minimum degree required for voting -  that is, to the extent where she can 
understand what an election is about and complain for not being allowed 
to participate. (Lopez-Guerra, 2010, p. 21)
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Similarly persons that do not have the required competency to vote, ‘cannot 
suffer the harms of disfranchisement’ (2010, p. 20).
The accrual of rights is not linear to the accrual of competencies -  for an 
individual’s competencies and interests may fluctuate throughout their life. This 
may in turn challenge the idea that there exists a static full set of rights for adults. 
Just as rights change for children as they gain or lose competencies, the same may 
be true for adults. However, children still present a distinct case from others with 
reduced competencies, such as the elderly and the mentally incapacitated, for two 
reasons. First, children are in a unique period of development; they acquire 
competencies at a rate unparalleled in other stages of life. Because of this rapid 
change, if we are not clear on exactly how competency interacts with rights, we 
are in very real danger of disenfranchising those who should be enfranchised. 
Second, as children are not in a static state of incompetence, unlike the mentally 
disabled, they may hold rights to develop competencies in the future, which will 
produce new and different duties. To put children in the same basket as animals, 
the mentally disabled, or the elderly, as many traditional liberal philosophers 
have done, is to overlook the differences in their state of being, a grave mistake 
that may be of detriment to members of all groups.
A clear understanding of these concepts -  capacity, competence and rights -  and 
the relationship between them provides us with a clear framework, the necessary 
tools if you like, in order to properly tackle the contemporary challenges to 
children’s rights, for example how to translate these rights into a legislative regime, 
or to protect the future interests of the current child. The framework of rights 
presented above allows us to recognise children as right-holders, but still constrain 
the particular types of rights they hold according to their competencies.
Conclusion
Throughout this article I have demonstrated the relationship between capacity, 
competency and rights, an important project due to the continuing prevalence 
in rights theory of the argument from incompetence. I have argued that 
children are capable of holding rights, if we understand rights as Hohfeldian 
claims that pertain to a duty to either do or to refrain from doing a particular 
action. The power to enforce this action can be held by the right-holder or 
by another designated entity. This claim constitutes a right when it is based on 
an interest worthy of protection. An interest is worthy of protection when the 
right-holder has the capacity to realise the benefit to which the interest 
pertains, and the cost of fulfilling the duty is not unreasonable.
Interest theory has successfully removed the conceptual impediments to 
children being right-holders by determining that it is not necessary to have the 
capacity to enforce a claim in order to hold a right. However, it has not shown
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that it is unnecessary to have the capacity to realise a claim. I have argued that 
one’s competency to realise the interest to which the claim pertains is necessary 
for that claim to constitute a right and to justify the cost of the duty imposed 
on the liberties of others.
Understanding claims in this way allows us to conceive of a theory of children’s 
rights that properly enunciates the relationship between an individual’s compet­
encies and their rights. It in turn lessens the importance in rights theory for a clear 
definition of childhood. Understanding the relationship between competence and 
rights is necessary for the specific challenges the rights of children present us, such 
as their rights to develop future competencies.
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Notes
1 The Australian.
2 For children’s status as right-holders see David Archard (2004); Tom Campbell (1992); 
Neil MacCormick (1976); Onora O'Neill (1988); Laura Purdy (1994).
3 For an interesting discussion on how children have been neglected throughout political theory, 
see Turner and Matthews (1998).
4 In this section I am indebted to the work of J.C Lau. These distinctions and how they play out in 
relation to children are further explained and developed in forthcoming work by Cowden and 
Lau (forthcoming).
5 For will theory the relevant factor is not that cannot simply articulate a choice but that they ‘lack 
the requisite autonomy, in the moral much more importantly than in the merely physical sense of 
the term’ (Goodin and Gibson, 1997, p. 186).
6 Goodin and Gibson do argue that competence is still necessary to interest theory, but for a 
different reason. They assert that competency in autonomy and the capacity to have plans for the 
future are integral to the construction of an interest. Even if children cannot articulate these 
plans, they are easily discernible to the duty-holder (Goodin and Gibson, 1997, p. 195).
7 Singer takes a similar position when stating that a man cannot have a right to have an abortion. 
‘A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could 
possibly make any difference to its welfare. A mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in 
not being tormented, because it will suffer if it is’ (Singer, 1974).
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The Language of 'Capacity7 and 'Competence' in Children's 
Rights *
It is a fa c t about us, and a fa r  from  superficial one, being reflected as it  is in our most 
fundam ental legal institutions -  that we tend to regard infants who are likely to develop 
the cognitive capacities o f persons as at least more closely approximating the moral 
status o f persons than non-persons. Consequently any theoretical view which utterly  
denies the rights o f moral personhood to normal human infants, no m atter how strong 
its philosophical arguments, is in our society a t present and fo r  the foreseeable future, 
not likely to be adopted.
- Buchanan and Brock1
Abstract
The terms 'capacity' and 'competence' play a central role in moral and political 
philosophy by determining the moral status of a subject. More specifically, they play a 
central role in determining their rights, especially in the literature on children's rights. 
Despite the ir importance, these terms are often used interchangeably, or not defined at 
all. This leads to confusion regarding their application and significance, particularly when 
using the terms to determine the rights of the child. In this paper, we propose a 
distinction between capacity and competence that w ill help to address and clarify the 
debates in the literature. We then introduce the additional concepts of ableness and 
latent capacities. In the final parts of the paper we reply to the series problem of 
capacity and the argument from constant competence. We argue that these concepts, 
distinguished in this way, can help to address fu ture  research within the field of 
children's rights.
The authors would like to thank David Archard, Christian Barry, John Bengson, Keith Dowding, 
Katrina Hutchinson, Fiona MacPherson, John Maier, Peter Morriss and Leif Wenar for their 
helpful feedback on earlier versions of this paper. An earlier version of this paper was presented 
to Social & Political Theory group, Australian National University, thank you to all attending for 
their in depth and useful criticisms.
^Ilen  Buchanan and Dan Brock, Deciding for others: the ethics of surrogate decision making. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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Part One
The use of capacity and competence
The terms 'capacity' and 'competence' are often used interchangeably. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines capacity as 'the ability or power to do or understand 
something' and competence as 'the ability to do something successfully or efficiently' . 2 
At first pass these definitions seem to be sufficiently similar in order to justify their 
interchangeable use. It has even been observed that the only difference between the 
concepts is professional discourse; medical practitioners will give an assessment of an 
individual's capacity, while the legal system will determine whether they are competent 
or not.3 Since this distinction is only one of convention, it is argued that the terms can 
and indeed should be used interchangeably.4
Using terms interchangeably is common and usually does not present a problem for 
everyday use. However, this does not hold true when the terms are used throughout the 
literature of rights and in particular in relation to the rights of the child. By a right, we 
mean a claim, held by a singular claim-holder, which produces a duty in others to either 
refrain from doing or do a particular action.5 Capacity and competence are central to the 
decision over whether an individual holds a right or not, and children often inhabit the 
boundary between competence and incompetence, capacity and incapacity. Although 
the terms are also used to determine the rights that adults hold, we focus here on the 
rights of the child as they offer a clear example of the prevalent use of the terms. For 
example an adolescent may be denied the right to give informed medical consent, a 
young child may be prevented from holding liberty rights to drive a car, or a political
2'capacity' and 'competence', (2010) The Oxford English Dictionary. OED Online. Oxford 
University Press, available at http ://dictionary.oed.com/
3 Tom, Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001) p.69; Thomas Grisso and Paul Appelbaum Assessing Competence to Consent to 
Treatment: A Guide fo r physicians and other Health Professionals (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998) p . l l.
4 Scott Y.H. Kim, Evaluation of Capacity to Consent to Treatment and Research (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) p.18.
5 Joel Feinberg, 'The Nature and Value of Rights', The Journal of Value Inquiry, 4 (1975): 243-257, 
p. 251; Cowden, M, 'Capacity, Claims and Children's Rights', Contemporary Political Theory, (2011 
forthcoming).
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philosopher may find children of insufficient mental capacities to cast a vote. The terms 
'capacity' and 'competence' therefore are important as they can determine what rights 
(if any) a child holds.
The problematic use of capacity and competence has led to problems within the 
children's rights literature, including lack of clarity and talking past each other. For 
example, in 'Deciding for Others', Buchanan and Brock consider the threshold an 
individual must meet in order to have a right to medical decision making. They state that 
in order to be competent in decision making one must have:
1) the capacity for understanding and communication,
2) the capacity for reasoning and deliberation.6
This may seem an adequate description, but upon closer examination it only serves to 
produce further questions. It cannot be that competence in decision making is merely 
the same as having the capacity for understanding, communication, reasoning and 
deliberation. There seems to be a great difference between a 14-year-old girl who has 
the capacities for understanding and communication, and for reasoning and 
deliberation, but who has never been able to exercise these capacities, and someone 
who is clearly a competent negotiator, such as Henry Kissinger. The 14-year-old may 
have the capacity to understand and communicate but has never learnt how, nor had 
the opportunity to express these capacities. Can she properly be considered competent? 
This seems to be a very different type of competence from a person who has extreme 
experience in understanding and communicating with others, reasoning and 
deliberating, such as Kissinger.
Therefore having the capacities to do an act may not be enough to do the act that one 
wishes to be competent in. However, if the conclusion is that Kissinger is competent in 
decision making and our 14-year-old girl is not, on what ground is that determination 
made? Does it follow that she would not be allowed to choose for herself? Even if she is 
not competent in the same way as Kissinger, she has capacities that a 6-month-old baby 
does not. Surely we still want to say that there is something different about the girl that 
sets her apart from other incompetents. But do we treat these as differences in capacity
6 Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock, Deciding for others: the ethics of surrogate decision making. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.45
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or competence, or both? This is not simply an issue of semantics. It leaves us without 
the adequate tools to properly conceive of the relation between capacity and 
competence and therefore understand how the concepts should operate regarding 
rights for children.
This kind of use is not particular to Brock and Buchanan. The meaning of a single term 
also varies between theorists leading to a certain amount of talking past each other. 
Such an example of talking past each other is apparent in the exchange between Schräg 
and Cohen in the 1970s regarding the capacity for children to vote.7 However, close 
examination of the debate reveals that throughout the exchange they each meant 
something different when they talked about 'capacity'. For Schräg, capacity required 
rationality as evidenced by understanding political concepts, which seems to imply some 
sort of proven ability. However, for Cohen, capacity involved 'rationality plus 
intelligence', things that are internal to the subject. As such, they failed to properly 
engage with each other in their discourse, which has consequently led to 
misunderstandings in the development of the literature on the political capacity of 
children.
The problems arising from a lack of definition are not limited to philosophical debates. 
One of the key principles of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CROC) is that of 'evolving capacities'. Article Five of the Convention states that children 
have a right to begin involvement in the exercise of their rights in a manner 'consistent 
with the evolving capacities of the child'. Article Five makes no mention of age as the 
determining factor for the child to exercise rights on his or her own behalf, but rather 
recognises the 'demonstration of the requisite skills, knowledge and understanding is 
crucial to the exercise of rights'.8 The importance of the principle of evolving capacities 
is therefore central to realising a child's right to participation. Despite this the principle 
continues to be one of the most widely violated -  Why? One answer may lie in the lack 
of clarity on exactly what a child's capacities are, how they acquire them and what 
threshold must be met into order to qualify. The leading document in this area
7 Francis Schräg, 'The Child's Status in the Democratic State,' Political Theory 3, 4 (1975): 441- 
457., Carl Cohen, 'On the Child's Status in the Democratic State: A Response to Mr. Schräg,' 
Political Theory 3, 4 (1975): 458-463.
8 Gerison Lansdown, The Evolving Capacities o f the Child. (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 
2005) p.4.
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frequently uses the terms 'capacity' and 'competence' interchangeably without 
reference to any possible distinction between the two .9 In order for people to fulfil their 
duties and assist children in the realisation of their rights we must be clear exactly what 
these evolving capacities are.
It is therefore necessary to establish a clear definition of capacity and competence for 
two reasons. First to provide a more precise set of concepts in order to help to prevent 
talking past each other in political discourse, and second to assist use of the terms in 
practical contexts such as the UN CROC guiding principle of 'evolving capacities'. These 
terms, understood in the way we present here, may also present a useful framework for 
future research on the rights of children.
In part two of the paper we offer a primary distinction between capacity and 
competence by way of the example of the student and the turtle. This distinction is then 
generalised through the use of a conditional analysis. Having presented a distinction 
between the terms, we then introduce the additional term of ableness. Part Four of the 
paper will deal with two potential objections to our distinction: first, the series problem 
of capacity, and second, the argument from constant competence. Finally we return to 
how these distinctions and terms can be useful in the debates regarding children's rights 
and present context for future research.
We do not wish to say that others have used the terms capacity and competence 
incorrectly. Indeed, other scholars may have used the terms consistently within their 
own schema, but we simply wish to point out that the lack of consistency between 
scholars and the interchangeable use of the terms are problematic when considering 
their application to children's rights. Furthermore, this is not intended to be a complete 
analysis of the terms capacity and competence but simply a useful stipulative distinction 
between the two terms that will be of help when working within a feasible framework of 
rights.
9 Gerison Lansdown, The Evolving Capacities o f the Child. (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 
2005) pxi
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Part Two
A case of capacity and competence: the student and the turtle
Consider first a case of a student and a tu rtle .10 Both the (human) student and the turtle  
are unable to speak Russian -  neither of them can articulate the correct tones and 
accents required to be a Russian speaker. However, given the right training and enough 
practice, the student can eventually speak Russian. That is, he has what it takes to 
become a competent Russian speaker. Notice that the turtle , no m atter how much 
training it receives, will never be able to speak Russian. The crucial difference is that the 
student already has the right physiological and neurological equipment to process and 
understand the language, whereas the tu rtle  does not, and will not. From this we can 
say that the student has the capacity to speak Russian but not the competence, but the 
turtle  lacks not only the competence but also the capacity to speak Russian.
There is a clear difference between a student's inability to speak Russian, and the 
turtle 's. That difference lies in the student's potentia l mastery of Russian. In what 
follows, we will use a form of conditional analysis to  show how the terms capacity and 
competence relate. The simplest form of conditional analysis (CA) would be as fo llow s:* 11
(CA) Someone S is able to Action A if S would likely A if S tried to  A.12
We say here that S would likely A to  allow fo r unforeseen and extraordinary instances of 
failure. Agents might be unsuccessful at certain actions contingent on how we describe 
those actions, but they might also be unsuccessful fo r reasons outside the ir control. We
10 This example is adapted from Lewis' illustration of an ape speaking Finnish, although the points 
we aim to make are quite different: David Lewis, 'The Paradoxes of Time Travel', American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 13(1976): 145-152.
11 Our understanding of a conditional analysis here draws heavily from the philosophy of action 
literature. We are aware that conditional analyses are not perfect—they suffer from problems 
regarding modalities—but we cannot solve those problems here. We employ a conditional 
analysis here because it does the work required to find a practical solution to how we can 
understand 'capacity' and 'competence', but we could easily vary our account to reflect an 
alternate theory from philosophy of action, such as a probabilistic analysis.
12 For debates surrounding different versions of conditional analysis see Donald Davidson, Essays 
on Actions and Events, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Christopher Peacocke, Being 
Known (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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might think that the student would be able to speak Russian if he tried to, but perhaps a 
muscle spasm causes him to mispronounce a word or two. We would not, on this 
account, say that the student is unable to speak Russian because of such factors. As 
such, we might think that, under ordinary conditions, if an agent would be likely to 
succeed in an action, then that is sufficient to say that they are able to perform that 
action.
How can we use a conditional analysis to understand capacity? Let us refer to the 
example above again. Roughly speaking, we distinguish the student from the turtle by 
features internal to each. At first pass, the capacity to do X, for our purposes, refers to 
the potential to do X. That is, the agent has the capacity to do X when the agent has the 
requisite set of skills internal to them for X-ing, but perhaps has not exercised those 
skills yet. To have a skill set required for a capacity is to possess the requisite skills 
necessary to be able to exercise that capacity. The capacity to speak Russian, therefore, 
attaches to the existence of the physiological abilities within the student to speak 
Russian. As the student has the appropriate language centre in his brain, can move his 
mouth in the correct way to intone Russian words, and is able to hear and interpret 
sounds from others, we would say that he has the capacity for speaking Russian. The 
turtle, however, does not have the mental or physical apparatus for language, and so 
lacks the capacity to speak Russian.
Let us clarify what we mean by 'internal features'. From the above example, internal 
features are those which are innate to the agent and are also necessary for the agent to 
do the task in question. We take these to be physiological features, such as the wiring of 
the student's brain, his auditory system and the ability of his mouth muscles to move 
appropriately to intone Russian words. These features, however, are not present in the 
turtle. So, the turtle lacks the requisite internal features, and therefore the capacity to 
speak Russian. Nevertheless, as we will discuss shortly, some features external to the 
agent may also be relevant, such that the student might have the capacity to speak 
Russian (in terms of having the relevant internal features or skill set) but still be unable 
to speak Russian on account of not having anyone teach him, or because he is currently 
asleep, or because he has temporarily lost his voice. So, the student's cognitive and 
physiological properties count as internal features, because they necessarily facilitate 
the student speaking Russian and are innate or ordinarily present in the student.
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With this understanding of the term, let us now state the conditional analysis for 
'capacity'. In order to construct a conditional analysis for capacity, we do two things: 
first, we optimise all external conditions. External conditions include training, 
experience, resources and opportunity and mental states, such as the knowledge arising 
from this training, and also the intention to act. Secondly, we hold fixed everything else 
and see whether the agent would be able to perform the action. In this way we are 
isolating that which is internal to the agent. Therefore a conditional analysis for capacity 
can be stated as:
(Cap - CA) S has the capacity to A if, optimising all external conditions and
mental states, S would likely A if S tried to A.
Despite the optimisation of external conditions such as training, experience, resources 
and opportunity and mental states such as 'know how' and intention, the turtle would 
still be unable to speak Russian, while the student would be able to. On this analysis, 
then, the student has the capacity to speak Russian, while the turtle does not. To see 
this, we have isolated those features internal to the subjects. Therefore one has the 
capacity to A if, optimising all external conditions and mental states, one would A if one 
tried to A.
A conditional analysis of competence
In our story, neither the student nor the turtle can actually speak Russian. Competence 
to do A, on our account, attaches to the combination of internal capacity and mental 
states bringing about the actual demonstrable ability to do A. Once the student has had 
enough lessons, he will be deemed a competent speaker. We say that the student is 
competent if he can fluently speak Russian on command. In this way, competence 
usually requires that the agent has (or gains) the experience of doing A, and can 
successfully A when he wants to. That is, the student has to have the requisite mental 
states necessary to understand the Russian language, knowledge about how to speak 
Russian and the intention to speak Russian when he wants to speak Russian. 13 
Effectively conversing in Russian, then, requires the student to have not only the right
13 This is a first glance of our understanding of competence. A more nuanced consideration is 
discussed below.
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physiological apparatus, but also the requisite mental states to do so. Notice that we say 
that the student is not competent until he can effectively converse in Russian. That is, 
the agent must be generally successful at A-ing in order to be deemed competent. 
Knowing how to A, then might be necessary for competence in A, but it is not sufficient.
We can perform the same conditional analysis for competence by holding fixed that 
internal to the agent and also their mental states and optimising external conditions of 
resources and opportunity. A conditional analysis for competence can be stated as:
(Comp - CA) 5 has the competence to A if, optimising resources and opportunity, 
S would likely A if S tried to A
Notice that we do not specifically refer to success. However, that S could A if S tried to A 
implies that S has successfully done A. Our meaning of competence, then, aligns with 
the dictionary definition outlined at the beginning of the paper as involving a success 
condition. The student would not be deemed a competent speaker of Russian unless he 
could successfully speak Russian if he wanted to. That is, to be competent is not to be 
acting out of accident.
However, does this imply that previous knowledge of how to A is required for 
competence? Not necessarily: an agent may become competent on their first try of an 
act. For example, a young boy growing up a landlocked country may never have seen a 
large body of water, let alone know that one could swim in it. Suppose that on his first 
visit to the coast he sees people swimming, and he also jumps in and swims successfully 
on his first attempt. If he intends simply 'to do what the other swimmers do', then he is 
not acting out of accident. This demonstrates that competence can also be learned: the 
boy did not have the experience of swimming, but he can gain competence by observing 
the other swimmers and successfully mimicking what they do.
The conditional analysis demonstrates an important point regarding competence -  it is 
task- specific. In order to assess if the agent is competent we must examine their 
conditional analysis in relation to each task. If an agent is competent at driving a car, this 
does not mean that they are competent at driving a truck. Competence is always
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competence fo r some task, or competence to do something.14 Whether or not an agent 
is competent at a particular task will depend on how we describe the task in question.15
Clearly, the competence to do one task may be related to the competence to do another 
task under a different description. If I am competent at running a four-minute mile, then 
I am also competent at running a four-minute mile on Sundays, and I am presumably 
also competent at running a five-minute mile. Interesting cases arise, however, where 
the competence to do X may be related to the capacity to do Y. Suppose that I have had 
piano lessons for a while and I can play 'Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star' perfectly. I have the 
capacity to play it: I have the coordination and skills to read music, and I know where 
the keys are on a piano. And because I can actually play it, I am competent in playing 
'Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star'. In some sense, then, I can be said to be a competent 
pianist. But this only applies at quite a general sense. I might be able to play 'Twinkle, 
Twinkle, Little Star' perfectly, but perhaps I have not learnt how to play something more 
complicated, such as Beethoven's 'Moonlight Sonata'. Perhaps learning how to play 
'Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star' is something that one needs to learn to play before 
'Moonlight Sonata'. In this way, being competent at 'Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star' helps 
me develop the capacity to become competent at something else, like 'Moonlight 
Sonata'.
What becomes important is the level of description and analysis in which we discuss 
what we have the capacity and the competence to do. In other words, what we are 
interested in here is the relevant task -  if we are interested in competence simpliciter it 
might be sufficient if I can play 'Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star'. But if I am interested in 
competence qua concert pianist then obviously 'Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star' will not cut 
it, and we may have to look at other tasks to determine competence.16
14 Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock, Deciding for others: the ethics of surrogate decision making. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.18.
15 See, for example, Donald Davidson, 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes,' The Journal of Philosophy 
60 (1963): 685-700, or John McDowell, Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge, (Marquette 
University Press, 2011) pp.34-36.
16 Applying a contextualist argument here should not be particularly difficult. We can be 
contextualists about all sorts of things, such as language and knowledge, so it follows that we 
could also be contextualists about abilities: David Lewis, Philosophical papers, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987) chap. 13.; David Lewis, 'Elusive knowledge', Australasian Journal of
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So far, our discussion has outlined the difference between capacity and competence. 
Capacity relates to the internal physiological features of an agent that are necessary for 
her to A, while competence requires that an agent have the capacity to A, but can also A 
with some consistent success. The conditional analysis of capacity and competence 
highlights what is meant for each: capacity relates to an agent's internal features, 
whereas competence relates to the agent's successful exercise of those features. This 
should already indicate that capacity and competence are not interchangeable.
Part Three
External conditions and Ableness
Our discussion so far has examined what we mean by 'capacity' and 'competence'. An 
agent has the capacity to A when they have the requisite skill set internal to them to be 
abie to A. Competence to A, on the other hand, relates to an agent's ability to exercise 
that skill set to successfully A. Having shown that there is a simple intuitive distinction 
between competence and capacity, we now further fine-tune the meaning of 
'competence' by examining the distinction between competence and ableness.
Pete Morriss offers a distinction between power as ability, and power as ableness. 
Ableness, on his account, roughly relates to the presence of external features necessary 
for an agent to successfully do a particular action. So, for example, a piano player who 
has the requisite coordination and training to play the piano has the capacity to play the 
piano. We would also say that the pianist is competent if they are successful at piano 
playing more often than not, and that they were able to do so, on cue, if a piano were 
available. However, in the absence of a piano, the pianist is unable to play. But this is 
not because he is defective in his piano playing skills, but rather because he lacks the 
opportunity or resources necessary to play the piano. This shows that the difference 
between capacity to do A and ableness to do A is contingent on whether the relevant 
factors are internal or external to the agent. 17
Philosophy 74 (1996): 549. Particularly the discussions on what it means for something to be 
'flat'.
17 However, if the piano were suspended in the air, the pianist's vertigo would negate his ability 
to play, but not his competence. Even so, we are simply trying to give a general account of the
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Following the structure of the previous section, we could do a conditional analysis on 
ableness as follows:
(Ableness - CA) S has the ableness to A if S would likely A if S tried to A
Notice that the conditional analysis for ableness is the same as the original form of CA 
outlined at the beginning of the previous section. This is because an agent is able to 
perform an action when he has both the capacity and competence to do it, and also is 
not impeded by any external factors. That is, ableness to A necessarily requires an agent 
to be competent to A, and in order to be competent to A the agent necessarily has to 
have the capacity to A. Consequently, the relationship between the three concepts can 
be seen as so:
Ableness
f
Competence
!
Capacity
External
Conditions
Mental States 
(knowledge and 
intention)
Figure One: Relationship between capacity, competence and ableness
concepts, and as such can bracket off extreme examples such as this for the moment: Keith 
Dowding and Martin van Hees, 'Freedom, Coercion and Ability', in Matthew Braham and Frank 
Steffen (eds.) Power and Freedom: Conceptual, Formal and Applied Dimensions, (Springer, 2008) 
pp. 303-4.
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This establishes a symmetrical relationship between capacity, competence and ableness. 
Capacity requires an agent's internal physiological abilities or skill set, while competence 
involves the agent's internal physical and mental states. Ableness, then, is the 
aggregation of the agent's internal physical states, mental states and the presence of 
the right external conditions.
There are some circumstances, however, where ableness seems to be not so distinct 
from competence and capacity. A man who has lost both of his arms, for example, has 
not only lost the competence to pick up heavy objects, but he has also lost the capacity 
to do so, as he no longer has the skills internal to him to develop the competence in 
lifting heavy objects (viz. the requisite motor skills, muscles and ligaments). However, if 
the man is given bionic arms, he can once again lift heavy objects. 18 At first, being able 
to lift heavy objects with bionic arms might seem to an instance of ableness. However, 
he is being given the underlying capacity to be competent in acts such as heavy lifting. 
Having arms is usually considered a capacity, as they are physiological features of the 
agent. The bionic arms merely replace the agent's own arms in allowing him to be 
competent in lifting heavy objects, if he so desired. Given the relationship between 
capacity and competence, in that capacity is necessary for competence, we would argue 
that if the bionic arms are necessary for the agent to be a competent object-lifter that 
they would be an instance of capacity.
Instances of ableness, on the other hand, are those that would truly be external to the 
agent such as opportunities or resources such as money. In order for the man to lift 
heavy objects, he must already have the capacity to lift heavy objects, and as we have 
claimed, that capacity exists in his having arms. If there were no heavy objects around, 
we would say that the man is unable to lift heavy objects, even if he had bionic arms. 
The bionic arm example seems to be an unusual case as arms (and the capacity to lift 
objects) are ordinary features of agents. 19 However, on our account, the distinction 
stands. Therefore, on our account, an agent has the capacity to A when she has all the 
requisite features and skills internal to her to A, and the potential to do A. Competence
18 We are grateful to William Bosworth for the suggestion of this example. 
19 Another example may be cochlear implants.
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is one's actual ability to A.20 By 'actual ability', we mean the successful, intentional 
exercise of that capacity to A. Finally, ableness is one's competence to do A in the 
presence of external resources and opportunity to do so.
Part Four
The Series Problem
So far, we have defined capacity, competence and ableness. On our account, capacities 
are necessary for an agent to be competent. However, it is obvious that not everyone 
has all capacities at all times. An objection to this understanding of capacity, then, is that 
it could continue ad infinitum, in that one needs the capacity to have a capacity, and so 
on.
Consider driving a car. On our analysis, the ableness required to drive a car is to have the 
requisite skills and coordination to drive a car, as well as any relevant external factors, 
such as being licensed and having the freedom and opportunity to take a car out 
whenever one chooses. To be a competent driver is to have the actual ability (that is, 
successful exercise of a capacity) to drive a car, as evidenced by taking driving lessons 
and acquiring the skills to do so. To have the capacity to drive a car is to have the skill 
set necessary to learn to drive (such as the relevant hand-eye coordination or cognitive 
potential to understand road rules), whether or not one has actually driven yet. For 
example, an unlicensed sixteen-year-old has the capacity to drive a car, but has yet to 
take lessons to gain the competence.
Yet what do we say of a toddler who is learning how to stand? A toddler certainly does 
not yet have the relevant motor skills to drive a car, but he will develop these motor 
skills over the course of a normal life. Does this mean that we should say that he has the 
capacity to drive a car, if he will develop into the sixteen year old with the relevant 
coordination and motor skills to learn to drive a car? If so, why stop there? If we say that 
the toddler has the capacity to drive a car (on the basis that he has the capacity to
20 Our use of competence is equivalent to Morriss's definition of 'ability'. We use the term 
'competence' for two reasons. First, it is already used throughout the rights literature and second 
the term ability is not sufficiently distinct from capacity. See Peter Morriss, Power: A 
Philosophical Analysis, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002)
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develop the capacity to be a competent car-driver), we could continue along this path 
and say that since a zygote has the capacity to develop limbs, it has the capacity to drive 
a car. Or even, a group of four cells without a form has the capacity to drive a car, 
because it will one day turn into a zygote, which becomes a child, which becomes the 
sixteen year old that can learn how to drive. But it is absurd to claim that a group of cells 
has the capacity to drive, on the basis that it has a causal connection to some (distant) 
future agent with the competence to do so.
So, here are the six potential agents for our case:
1. Licensed driver who has a car
2. Licensed driver who does not have a car
3. 16 year old who has not yet had driving lessons
4. Toddler who is learning how to stand
5. Embryo, in utero
6. Group of four cells, in utero
How do we distinguish between them? Morriss identifies this problem in his analysis of 
ability but simply dismisses it as irrelevant for most discussion. He states that:
'there is, at least in principle, the possibility of an infinite chain of 
abilities: one can have the ability to acquire the ability to acquire the 
ability to...I doubt, though, whether we usually want to look beyond 
second order abilities.'21
We could, in theory, simply follow his argument, and stop at the second level of series, 
but this seems to be unsatisfactory and ad hoc. What we offer in the following is a 
principled approach to addressing the series problem, which is more robust than 
Morriss' response.
21 Peter Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analysis, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2002) p. 58
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Consider again the conditional analyses we gave above for capacity, competence and 
ableness. Here, despite the optimisation, the only potential agents who would be able 
to drive the car would be the two licensed drivers and the 16 year old. We consequently 
isolate those features internal to the subjects, their capacity. The toddler, embryo and 
group of four cells cannot drive the car as they lack the requisite capacity.
Likewise, our understanding of competence also yields the right results. If we optimise 
external conditions of resources and opportunity, the agents that are competent are 
only the two licensed drivers. The other potential agents are not. Further, the same sort 
of analysis can also be done for ableness: when we no longer optimise external 
resources and opportunity, the only agent who could do the act of driving a car would 
be the licensed driver who has a car at hand.
This conditional analysis neatly aligns with our earlier working definitions of capacity 
and competence and it also draws a distinction between the capacity held by the 16- 
year-old and that of the embryo. It indicates that the 16-year-old holds what we may 
call 'capacity proper', but the embryo does not. If we return to our example of the turtle 
and the student, the crucial difference there was that the student would one day be 
able to speak Russian. It still remains true that the toddler, embryo and group of four 
cells will one day become something that can drive a car, but, as we have just 
demonstrated through the conditional analysis, they do not have capacity proper. 
Instead, we can call the capacity of the toddler, embryo and group of cells a 'latent 
capacity' -  the capacity to acquire a capacity.
What makes a capacity latent is that it is a pre-existing capacity that requires 
development or enhancement in the agent to become a capacity proper. The embryo 
has a latent capacity to drive a car because, under optimal circumstances, it will develop 
into the kind of thing that can drive a car. Latent capacities can also themselves be 
tiered, such that the group of cells has the latent capacity to become a toddler, even if it 
cannot become a toddler yet. The relevant feature, then, for latent capacities, is 
temporal: the agent will likely develop into something that holds the relevant capacity 
we are interested in. Consequently, a conditional analysis for latent capacities would be 
as follows:
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(Latent Cap - CA) S has the latent capacity to A if, optimising all external 
conditions and mental states, S would likely develop into something that could A 
if, at that time, S tried to A.
However, it may be countered that the series problem still exists, as the capacity to have 
a capacity could continue ad infinitum. Even so, we may acknowledge that although the 
series exists, it is not problematic for our purposes. What we are interested in is the 
capacity to drive a car, not the capacity to have a capacity to drive a car. That, strictly 
speaking, is a different capacity. To have a capacity to A is not the same as A. This is 
evidenced by the fact that not all latent capacities manifest into actual capacities. We 
can envisage that, as a toddler, an agent may have the capacity to become many things: 
an Olympic athlete, an astronaut, or an academic. But, over time, some of those 
possibilities become closed to the agent.22 Perhaps she is severely injured and will no 
longer be able to achieve a high level of sporting prowess, or perhaps future 
preferences, external factors and interests will steer her in a particular direction away 
from sports. In some sense it might be true that the toddler has the capacity to become 
an Olympic athlete, but what is really being expressed in 'the toddler has the capacity to 
become an athlete' is shorthand for 'the toddler has the latent capacity to have the skill 
set required to become an athlete', where, as we have stipulated, to have a capacity is 
to have a particular set of skills to be able to perform a particular task. As such, while we 
can concede that capacity-speak gives rise to a seriesion, it is still possible to 
differentiate between capacities proper and latent capacities and, insofar as latent 
capacities give rise to seriesion, we can also argue that it is not a vicious series.
Recognising the nature of latent capacities and their relationship with capacities proper 
we may amend our earlier diagram. See figure two overleaf.
22Keith Dowding, 'Can Capabilities Reconcile Freedom and Equality?' The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 14 (2006): 323-336
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Figure Two: Relationship between ableness, competence, capacity and latent capacity
The objection from 'constant competence'
On our conception of competence, to be competent at A is to have the capacity to A, as 
well as the successful exercise of using those capacities to A. Clearly, an agent is 
competent if they are A-ing successfully. However, competence does not have to 
necessarily be demonstrated to be present. But if an agent can be deemed competent in 
A without actually doing A, what motivates us to say that they are competent? It seems 
that it would be difficult to distinguish between cases where an agent is competent at A 
and merely not A-ing, and cases where they cannot A at all.
Our response is as follows: Consider the Aristotelian distinction between the actuality of 
capacities.23 Schellenberg describes it as follows:
23 Aristotle, De Anima, 11.5, 417a22-417a30
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'We can distinguish between an English speaker's innate capacity to 
speak a language, her capacity to speak English when she is sleeping 
(first actuality), and her capacity to speak English when she is talking 
English (second actuality). The distinction between first and second 
actuality is the distinction between the developed capacity to do 
something and the execution of this doing... First actuality is not itself 
an activity, but only a capacity to act. Therefore, Aristotle understands 
it as a kind of potentiality. ' 24
Translating Aristotle's actualities into our terminology, the agent is a competent English 
speaker on both accounts. This is demonstrated when the speaker actually speaks 
English (the second actuality). Regarding the first actuality, our account would say that 
as long as the speaker still has the right capacities and could speak English (successfully) 
if he were awake, he would remain competent. One's competence is not extinguished 
simply because one is not exercising it .25 We attribute competence to agents once they 
have demonstrated that they can consistently do the action in question, regardless of 
whether they are currently performing that action. Our piano player, for instance, is still 
competent at playing the piano even when there is no piano available to him.
However, competence can come and go, but not as sporadicaUy as the above discussion 
might suggest. An athlete, for example, might be able to run a four-minute mile when 
she is at the peak of her training, but not at other times of the year. What can we say 
about this case? It seems that we can distinguish between the athlete being unable to 
run the four-minute mile at the peak of her fitness because she is not wearing the 
correct running shoes, and the athlete being unable to run the four minute mile because 
she has lost her fitness. In the first case, we would argue that the athlete still retains her 
competence at running the four-minute mile in a general sense; she does not drop in 
and out of competence. Instead, on our analysis, what is going on is that she merely 
lacks the ability due to the absence of appropriate running shoes. Presumably, if she had 
the right running shoes, then, given her training, she would be able to run the four-
24Susan Schellenberg, 'Action and Self-Location in Perception', Mind 116 (2007): 622-623.
25 To think that this is the case would mean that English speakers would be dropping in and out of 
competence in a conversation, depending on whether it was their turn to speak or not, and this is 
absurd.
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minute mile. If she is somewhat consistently successful at the four-minute mile once she 
has trained, then we can say that she is generally competent at running a four-minute 
mile, even if it is not the case that she could spontaneously do it.
In the second case, however, where the runner is out of practice, she has temporarily 
lost the competence to run the four-minute mile. On our conditional analysis, even if we 
optimised her resources and opportunity to run a four-minute mile, she would not be 
able to do so. However, given that she still has the relevant skills and features to 
potentially run a four-minute mile, she retains the underlying capacities that could once 
again be developed into competence to run a four-minute mile with the relevant 
training. Furthermore, competence can be lost in cases where the underlying capacities 
to do that action are also lost. The extreme elderly, for example, often lose the required 
motor skills to drive a car. In this case, given that capacity is necessarily required for one 
to be competent, we would say that they have lost the capacity to be a competent 
motorist.
Part Five
Application to the rights of the child
In the first section of this paper, we outlined the confusion that lies with definitions of 
capacity and competency. They are ill-defined and often used interchangeably. We 
highlighted how a lack of clarity can have implications for how rights are afforded to 
children. Having outlined our definitions of latent capacities, capacities, competence 
and ableness we can now return to examine what these distinctions can offer for our 
understanding of children's rights. Our account allows us to clarify what is distinct about 
the terms capacity and competence in a way that avoids the confusion plaguing the 
literature on these terms.
Let us briefly return to the examples set out at the beginning of the paper. Brock and 
Buchanan outlined the threshold an individual must meet in order to have a right to 
decision-making. With the distinction between 'capacity' and 'competence' now in 
mind, we can begin to differentiate between the type of decision making abilities held 
by someone like Henry Kissinger or a 14-year-old girl. We can now say that Kissinger is
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competent decision maker as he not only has those internal elements necessary for 
decision making, but also the mental states such as knowledge, intention and 
experience. However the 14-year-old girl may be said to hold the capacities for good 
decision making but may have not yet acquired the competence. She has those 
elements internal to her for good decision making but may lack the experience. 
Furthermore, the distinctions allow us to distinguish between the 14-year-old girl and a 
six-month-old baby who does not yet even have the capacity for good decision-making. 
However, the six-month-old has the latent capacity for good decision-making. These 
sorts of distinctions show us that we must be clear on which threshold we award rights. 
For example if a right to consent to medical treatment necessitates rational decision 
making, is it necessary that the right holder has the competence, the capacity or merely 
the latent capacity for decision making? The stipulative distinctions between these 
terms offered provide us with the tools necessary to engage in this type of debate. They 
help us to avoid the lack of clarity that often plagues the allocation of rights.
Likewise, we can use the conditional analyses to illuminate the discussion between 
Schräg and Cohen on the allocation of voting rights. If we understand the capacity to 
vote as the internal physiological and mental features of the agent to enable him to 
vote, then this allows us to gain ground in understanding the discourse between Schräg 
and Cohen. Here, what is confused in their discussion is simply that each had a different 
understanding of the requisite mental states that the agent must possess in order to 
have capacity. As such, we can use our notion of capacity to isolate the disagreement 
between Schräg and Cohen in greater detail.
The final implication for children's rights is the recognition of latent capacities. The 
recognition of the development of latent capacities into capacities proper and then into 
competencies aligns with the language used in the United Nation Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CROC). Article 5 of CROC discusses the 'evolving capacities' of the 
child. Recognition of the child's capacities as evolving allows us to make a crucial 
distinction between a child and other incapacitated groups. Other incompetent groups, 
such as the mentally disabled and animals, lack latent capacities because their capacities 
are static. Identifying latent capacities allows children to inhabit a separate and distinct 
moral sphere, which clearly has implications for their rights.
Latent capacities may also produce a special set of duties in others to act in a way to 
help develop these capacities and eventually assist in the acquisition of competencies.
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For example, we believe that a child's latent capacities to understand language and to 
talk produce in others duties to foster these latent capacities into capacities proper and 
further into competence in the spoken language. Furthermore, the existence of latent 
capacities may mean that although a child is currently incompetent, actions could be 
taken towards that child to violate or even destroy that future competence.26 Therefore, 
in addition to duties to foster a child's capacities, we may have duties to refrain from 
actions that will 'close off' opportunities or competencies for the adult that child will 
become.
However, if a child has a right to be competent, how do we choose which competencies 
they have a right to develop? It may be the case that there is a narrowing effect from 
the development of latent capacities through to ableness. For example we may have a 
large number of latent capacities, from which only some develop into capacities. From 
these capacities, the nature of experience may mean we only acquire a few 
competencies. For example, from one's capacity to learn all kinds of languages, one 
might only ever gain competence in English and Italian. The nature of the availability of 
external resources and opportunity will further narrow one's ableness or opportunity to 
speak these languages. If we have a duty to enable the development of competencies it 
is not clear which competencies should be acquired, does a child therefore have a right 
to be competent in playing every instrument in the orchestra, or speaking every 
language? 27 Understanding latent capacities as a distinct category allows us to begin to 
identify problems that must be resolved.
Our account is not a simple extension of the Potentiality Principle. The 'Potentiality 
Principle' is an attempt to show that infants and children are 'persons' in a morally 
relevant sense. The Principle can be stated as follows:
(P): A being that now is not a person, but has the potential to become a person 
(a being who will, under normal circumstances develop the capacities necessary 
and sufficient for personhood) should be accorded now the moral status, and 
rights, of a person.
26 Joel Feinberg, 'The child's right to an open future', in Feinberg, J, Freedom & Fulfilment:
Philosophical Essays, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) pp.76-97
27Claudia Mills, 'The Child's Right to an Open Future?', Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (2003):
499-509
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The difference between the principle and our account lies in the all-or-nothing approach 
that is taken by the principle: either one is a moral agent if one is a full person, or one is 
not a moral agent if one lacks the relevant moral import. Consequently, an infant must 
have the same moral status as other people (namely adults) or the same moral status as 
incompetents (namely animals and the severely mentally retarded). It is ridiculous to 
conclude that one's potential to become a person means they should have the same 
rights as if they were a person. Borrowing from Stanley Benn's example, if Sarah Palin is 
potentially the President of the USA, this does not mean she should be afforded the 
same status and rights as the current President of the United States.28 Our point in this 
paper is not to state that those who have latent capacities and are not yet competent 
are the same morally as those who are competent, but rather that the complex way that 
capacities and competencies interact means that those with latent capacities are simply 
morally different from both those who are not competent and those who are 
competent. Respect for an individual's latent capacities now is very different from 
respect for the competent individual they will become.
It is this distinction that perhaps comes closest to offering an answer to the concern 
expressed by Brock and Buchanan in the passage quoted at the start of this paper.29 
Recognising a child's latent capacities allows us to maintain that 'infants who are likely 
to develop cognitive capacities of persons as at least more closely approximating the 
moral status of persons than non-persons'. Children who hold latent capacities are 
neither completely competent nor lacking the capacity to be competent in the same 
manner as other incompetents.
It should now be clear that the distinctions between 'latent capacities', 'capacities' and 
'competencies' will assist those engaged with children's rights. First, the distinctions 
provide us with the requisite tools to properly identify the threshold that is needed for 
the allocation of individual rights. Second, the distinctions can prevent talking past each 
other when engaged in debates. Finally, the terms and identification of latent capacities
28 Stanley Benn, 'Abortion, Infanticide and Respect for Peoples', in Regan, T (eds) Matters of Life 
and Death, (New York: Random House, 1980)
29 It also neatly aligns to a similar sentiment expressed by Goodin & Gibson, that affording some 
rights in some sense to those who are not fully competent is a way of showing respect to their 
status as beings that will one day be competent. Robert Goodin and Diane Gibson 'Rights, young 
and old' Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 17 (2002): 202
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can assist us in properly identifying special duties we hold towards children due to the 
constant development of latent capacities into capacities proper and capacities into 
competencies. These features are an area for fruitful future research.
Part Six 
Conclusion
Throughout this paper we have offered a distinction between capacity and competence. 
A capacity is the counterfactual ability to do A. One has the capacity to A when one has 
all the relevant skills internal to that person to A. Competence is one's actual ability to 
A. By actual ability, we mean the capacity to A plus the relevant mental states (such as 
knowledge and intention) necessary for successfully doing A. We then fine-tuned this 
framework by introducing the additional concepts of ableness and latent capacities. 
Ableness is one's actual ability (viz. competence) to do A plus the availability of external 
resources and opportunity to do so. Latent capacities refer to the capacity to develop a 
capacity.
The project of distinguishing between these terms is not an isolated case of semantics; it 
has implications for how we understand children's rights. The distinction provides a 
useful tool to engage in debates regarding the requisite threshold children may have to 
meet in order to be awarded rights. The precise use of language is relevant in 
philosophical debates but also in policy making. The current literature on children's 
rights is plagued by inconsistent and often imprecise use of these terms which can lead 
to talking past each other. Finally, the articulation of latent capacities has significance 
for the direction of future research. Because children are neither wholly incompetent 
nor fully competent, they inhabit a separate moral sphere defined by their latent 
capacities. These latent capacities may produce particular duties to foster these 
capacities and not to violate future rights these latent capacities may produce. Although 
at this stage we do not propose to offer an account of what particular rights should be 
applied to children, we argue that our definition of the terms equips us with the 
requisite tools to make these assessments. In doing so, we address and remove the 
confusion that currently pervades the literature regarding children's rights.
109
Reference List
Beauchamp, T and Childress, J. Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001).
Benn, S. 'Abortion, Infanticide and Respect for Peoples', in Regan, T (eds) Matters o f Life 
and Death, (New York: Random House, 1980).
Buchanan, A and Brock, D. Deciding fo r others: the ethics o f surrogate decision making. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
Cohen, C. 'On the Child's Status in the Democratic State: A Response to Mr. Schräg,' 
Political Theory 3, 4 (1975): 458-463.
Cowden, M, 'Capacity, Claims and Children's Rights', Contemporary Political Theory,
(2011 forthcoming).
Davidson, D. 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes,' The Journal o f Philosophy 60 (1963): 685- 
700.
Davidson, D. Essays on Actions and Events, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
Dowding, K. 'Can Capabilities Reconcile Freedom and Equality?' The Journal o f Political 
Philosophy 14 (2006): 323-336.
Dowding, K and van Hees, M. 'Freedom, Coercion and Ability', in Matthew Braham and 
Frank Steffen (eds.) Power and Freedom: Conceptual, Formal and Applied Dimensions, 
(Springer, 2008).
Feinberg, J. 'The Nature and Value of Rights', The Journal o f Value Inquiry, 4 (1975): 243- 
257.
Feinberg, J. 'The child's right to an open future', in Feinberg, J, Freedom & Fulfilment: 
Philosophical Essays, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) pp.76-97.
Goodin, R and Gibson, D 'Rights, young and old' Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies 17 
( 2002): 202
110
Grisso, T and Appelbaum, P. Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment: A Guide fo r  
physicians and other Health Professionals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)
Kim, S. Y.H. Evaluation of Capacity to Consent to Treatment and Research (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010).
Lansdown, G. The Evolving Capacities o f the Child. (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 
2005).
Lewis, D. Philosophical papers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
Lewis, D. 'Elusive knowledge', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 549.
Lewis, D. 'The Paradoxes of Time Travel', American Philosophical Quarterly, 13(1976): 
145-152.
McDowell, J. Perception as a Capacity fo r Knowledge, (Marquette University Press,
2011).
Mills, C. 'The Child's Right to an Open Future?', Journal o f Social Philosophy 34 (2003): 
499-509.
Morriss, P. Power: A Philosophical Analysis, 2"G ed. (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2002).
Peacocke, C. Being Known (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
Schellenberg, S. 'Action and Self-Location in Perception', Mind 116 (2007): 622-623.
Schräg, F. 'The Child's Status in the Democratic State,' Political Theory 3, 4 (1975): 441- 
457.
I l l
Chapter Four
Children's Rights and the Future Interest Problem
Mhairi Cowden
Under review at: Journal o f Social Philosophy
Children's Rights and the Future Interest Problem 1
Abstract
In this paper I introduce the future interest problem of children's rights. Actions can be 
taken towards children that do not harm their present interests but can harm or 'close 
o ff the interests they may have in the future. I argue that the usual solution to this 
problem -  Feinberg's 'Right to an Open Future' -  is insufficient. Instead I argue that 
children have a present right to develop their latent capacities and this produces strong 
negative duties not to interfere with this development. In fact, the future interest 
problem is not about future interests at all, but present interests to develop future 
capacities. I then examine whether this right can also produce positive duties to assist in 
the development. In doing so I investigate the case of congenitally deaf children and 
cochlear implants. I conclude that children have a right to assistance in the development 
of core capacities essential to normal human functioning.
1. Introduction
In thinking about how parents and society act towards children we are more often than 
not concerned with protecting their future. This includes equipping children with the 
right skills and knowledge to live a fulfilled and happy life when they are adults. It also 
includes protecting children from actions that will 'close off' or harm this future. For 
example, ensuring adequate child nutrition is not simply about the child's current state 
of hunger and health, but also their future physical development. Laws about child 
labour are as much concerned with ensuring a child's opportunity to receive education 
for their future life as it is about their present experience of labour. These interrelated 
twin goals of developing capacities and protecting futures appear consistently 
throughout government policy and legislation regarding children.
However within the tradition of rights theory, protecting the future of an individual in 
terms of rights has presented certain challenges. Those who argue for children's rights 
usually frame rights in terms of the interest theory approach, arguing that children have 
rights because they have interests worthy of protection. Interest theory works best
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when protecting clearly identifiable present interests. Children, however, are in a 
process of developing their interests. This may lead to situations where actions taken 
towards children may not necessarily harm their present interests but can certainly 
impact the interests they are likely to develop in the future. This is particularly a 
problem when we are discussing rights that depend upon a certain capacity or 
competence in the right-holder, in order for the right to be enjoyed.
In this paper I will first outline in more detail the interest theory account of children's 
rights and what I will call the 'future interest' problem. The future interest problem is 
the question of how interest theory should characterise actions taken towards a child 
that can impact on the future interests, capacities, or rights of the adult that child will 
become. Having detailed the problem in section two, section three of the paper will 
then briefly consider the way the problem has been dealt with in the past. I argue that 
past discussion of the future interest problem is lacking in two ways. First, it 
mischaracterises the temporal nature of the right by placing rights with the future adult 
and not the present child. Second, it frequently under-conceptualises the nature of 
these rights, failing to answer why they deserve to be thought of as rights.
In the fourth section of the paper I argue that these types of future interest rights are 
held by children now, not by their future adult selves, and that this produces a present 
duty of non-interference in the child's development of capacities. This is because the 
interests to be protected are not future interests but present interests in the 
development of future capacities. I then consider whether this right can also ground a 
positive duty to assist in the development of these capacities and in doing so I examine 
the well-known case of cochlear implants for congenitally deaf children.
Although this paper cannot provide a complete analysis of how all rights of this type 
may operate, the consideration of the cochlear implant case presents a useful 
framework and brings into focus some of the challenges in protecting the development 
of children's capacities through rights theory.
2. The Future Interest Problem
International law, treaties and national legislation such as the United Nations 
Convention of the Rights of the Child (CROC), The African Charter on the Rights and
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Welfare of the Child and the Children Act (2004) of the United Kingdom, clearly 
demonstrate that children have legislated rights. However the reason why they have 
rights is considerably less clear. Most scholars hold that interest theory provides the 
best approach to children's rights (Campbell 1992; MacCormick 1976). Interest theory 
holds that the function of a right is to further a right-holder's interests. Kramer defines 
rights as 'modes of protection for interests that are treated as worthy of protection' and 
Raz states that 'x has a right if...an aspect of x's well being (his interest) is a sufficient 
reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty' (Raz 1984, 195; Kramer 
1998, 79). These interests ground claims that produce duties in others to at or refrain 
from acting.
Interest theory argues that it is not logically necessary for the power to enforce or waive 
a claim to reside within the right-holder themselves. Children, therefore, can hold rights 
even if in cognitive terms they lack certain decision-making abilities, because they have 
interests sufficiently important to be worthy of protection. At the most basic level 
children have an interest in living that produces duties in others not to kill them. Despite 
the fact that a young child may not be able to enforce these claims personally, they can 
be enforced by others on their behalf.
Yet interest theory does not allow children to hold all rights that adults might possess. 
For many rights an interest is only of sufficient importance to produce duties in others 
when the right-holder has the competence to realise the benefit to which that interest 
pertains (Cowden 2012, 9). This is particularly true when the realisation of that right 
involves autonomous action. To use a somewhat fanciful example, if I have a desire to 
fly without mechanical assistance, this cannot be an interest worthy of protection as I 
will never be able to realise the benefit to which the interest pertains. More realistically, 
when the realisation of a right involves rational decision making, one may not be able to 
hold that right until one possesses the relevant competence. In this way we constrain 
the rights of children so as to exclude decision-making activities such as voting. This 
manner of differential allocation of rights is grounded in the proposition that we cannot 
have a claim-right to things we have no competence to realise. That proposition is not 
just a feature of children's rights but of rights generally: as Singer points out, it seems 
unreasonable to argue that a man has a right to an abortion, as he lacks the capacity to 
ever become pregnant (Singer 1989).
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The importance of capacity and competence in interest theory is therefore a problem 
for children as right holders. Interest theory functions best when there is an identifiable 
present interest, and this entails that the interest is directly and presently applicable to 
the right-holder. Children, however, are not static in their capacities like most adults, 
but are in a constant process of developing them." As the growing literature on child 
development from Jean Piaget onwards demonstrates, capacities such as literacy, 
intellect or counterfactual reasoning, are developing rapidly throughout childhood 
(Piaget 1972; Whitehurst & Lonigan 1998; Beck & Guthrie 2011). The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child also recognises this feature: Article Five outlines 
that the exercise of a child's rights should be in close relation to their 'evolving 
capacities' (CROC). Children therefore are constantly developing and evolving new 
capacities - their capacities are not static but fluid. This adds a temporal problem to the 
interest theory of rights presented above which so far often relies on the present 
capacities and competencies an individual holds.
If children will have capacities in the future that they do not have now, it follows that 
they may have rights in the future that they do not have now. This may result in 
problems. For example, consider the case of a young pre-pubescent girl who has not yet 
developed the capacity to have children nor developed the secondary sex characteristics 
that \ead to the enjoyment of sex.1" According to the logic set out above, because she 
lacks the capacity for bearing children and sexual enjoyment she can have no legitimate 
interest in those activities and therefore, lacking this interest, she can have no claim 
against interference by others that deprives her of them. At first this may seem 
unproblematic. Why should she presently have a right to protect her non-existent 
capacity to have children? However, in the extreme case does this mean that a young 
prepubescent girl has no right against genital mutilation? Practices of female 
circumcision can certainly prevent women from ever developing the capacity to enjoy 
sex, and the complications or infections that may arise from such practices can 
sometimes render women unable to conceive (Annas, 1995). Of course there may be 
other interests that the young girl presently holds that would generate a right not to be 
subjected to genital mutilation, for example the right to bodily integrity or the right to 
be free from pain and harm. However it is not just these rights that we intuitively 
believe are being violated, it is also the deprivation of some future interest - that of 
having children or enjoying sex -  that we believe is at play.
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If rights are to be useful for children we must be able to demonstrate how they protect 
the development of interests a child will have in the future. This is not isolated to what 
may be taken as extreme cases such as female genital mutilation. Choices and actions 
are made towards children every day that impact on their future interests. Therefore we 
are left with the question of how to account for future interests in the world of rights 
theory. Neatly stated: if an interest an individual may have in the future can be harmed 
by actions in the present, does that individual have a right to protect their future 
interests now?
3. Potential solutions
This issue has not been completely ignored throughout rights theory. However it may be 
the case that the problem of developing capacities and interests throughout the life of 
an individual has received little attention as it is less of an issue for the traditional liberal 
agent - the fully developed rational adult.IV Much of the discussion of what I have called 
the 'future interest' problem derives from the work done by Joel Feinberg in his 
consideration of a child's right to an open future (1980). In this section I will consider 
Feinberg's proposition of rights in trust and also briefly consider the discussion by other 
scholars on this issue.
Feinberg
The most influential account of the future interest problem has been Feinberg's article 
'The Child's Right to an Open Future' (1980). Feinberg suggests that children hold 'rights 
in trust' for their future interests. These rights in trust look like claim-rights to 
autonomous action but can't be currently exercised by children as they lack the present 
capacity. According to the theoretical rights framework I set up above this would mean 
they weren't actually rights at all. However Feinberg says that these autonomy rights 
refer to rights that are to be saved for children until they are capable of exercising them, 
and therefore need to be considered proper rights because violation or breach now 
could destroy the child's ability to realise their right in the future. As Feinberg explains;
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'the violating conduct guarantees now that when the child is an autonomous 
adult, certain key options will already be closed to him' (1980, 126).
Feinberg calls these 'anticipatory autonomy rights' as they ensure that the future 
autonomous adult will be able to choose freely. For example Feinberg argues that an 
infant who is currently incapable of locomotion has a right in trust to walk freely down a 
public footpath. This produces a duty not to interfere with the child's future means of 
locomotion or, to put it crudely, not to cut off her legs (1980, 126). What is supposedly 
special about these 'rights in trust' is that they impose duties on others before the right­
holder is capable of exercising the right herself. Therefore for our purposes the young 
prepubescent girl would hold a right in trust for her future fully sexual self. The right 
would protect her from any action, such as genital mutilation, that could interfere with 
her future self's enjoyment of sexual and reproductive autonomy.
There are two main areas of concern with Feinberg's theory. First that the right lies with 
the future adult and secondly that is difficult to quantify what constitutes an 'open' 
future. The construction of Feinberg's rights in trust for the future adult is problematic. 
In Feinberg's example of the child who cannot yet walk, what is actually being violated is 
the future adult-self's interest in being able to choose whether to walk down the street 
or not. Feinberg seems to be suggesting that since an infant will develop the capacity to 
walk down the street; this creates a right held in trust. In this it appears that really what 
Feinberg is constructing is a right held in trust by the child-self in order to protect the 
future liberties of the adult-self. One has a Hohfeldian liberty to walk down the street, it 
is a Hohfeldian liberty that can be exercised or not according to the choice of the liberty- 
holder. For this reason it appears what is being protected is not the future adult's right 
at all, but the future adult's ability to exercise a liberty protected by a right that is 
actually held by the child.
Not only does this construction seem to confuse the relative importance and difference 
between claim and liberty, the interests of the present child seem completely absent. It 
is not important what the child has an interest in, only the future liberties of the adult. 
This again seems to be missing something we want to get at, namely that the present 
child has relevant interests too. The child is not just a vehicle for getting the 
autonomous self to adulthood but a person with interests and claims themselves. In the 
female genital mutilation example, it is not just the future women's choice of whether 
to have children or not that we are concerned with protecting, but also the present girl's
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interest in developing. This seems to suggest that the future interest problem isn't about 
future interests at all but present interests to develop capacities into the future.
Putting aside the temporal problem to do with the construction of these types of rights, 
even if we are willing to accept Feinberg's idea of rights in trust, there is still a further 
issue to do with how we conceptualise an 'open future'. If we are to take the idea of an 
'open future' seriously we must determine exactly how open that future must be. 
Arneson & Shapiro interpret the 'open future' as requiring individuals to acquire 'to the 
greatest possible extent' the capacity to choose between 'the widest possible variety of 
ways of life' (1996, 412). Archard and Mill, however, have argued that a truly open 
future is both impossible to achieve but also undesirable (Archard 2003; Mill 2003). First, 
how can one quantify everything that is possibly available to the child? And even if one 
could, some choices necessarily preclude others. For example, if a child were to become 
a professional ballet dancer, the physique required would preclude them from 
competing in a heavy weight boxing competition. The preparation and training it takes 
for either of these futures would also be incompatible; one only needs to look at the 
training hours of young athletes to see that it would be virtually impossible for them to 
also pursue careers as professional musicians. Life and the choices we make are path 
dependent. Therefore it is impossible to keep options truly open in the way Arneson and 
Shapiro suggest. Furthermore the duty to expose children to these options and to keep 
their futures 'open' could produce unreasonable burdens on parents (Archard 2003, 32). 
Yet perhaps most importantly, is it really in a child's interest to have all possible futures 
open to them? It may be sufficient to say that a child has a right not to have significant 
life choices closed to them and that they have a right to a particular or possible future 
(Archard 2003, 32). Claudia Mills raises a similar objection arguing that what is really 
important for children is the meaning gained from an in-depth experience, not a shallow 
'smorgasbord' approach to all careers, religions and futures on offer (Mill 2003). The 
problem, then, is that Feinberg doesn't tell us what this open future actually consists of, 
and why a child might have an interest in it. So not only is there a problem with his 
analytical construction of the right but also in his specification of why it is a right.
Feinberg's work has been incredibly influential. Much of the work addressing the future 
interest problem concentrates on either directly critiquing Feinberg, propping up his 
position or applying his theory to new cases, especially in the case of new reproductive 
technologies^ Yet the work of Feinberg is not the only solution offered, in contrast to
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Feinberg, John Eekelaar argues that the right should not lie with the future adult but 
with the current child. Eekelaar argues that all children,
'should have an equal opportunity to maximise the resources available to them 
during their childhood (including inherent abilities) so as to minimise the degree 
to which they enter adult life affected by avoidable prejudices incurred during 
childhood' (1986, 170).
Children, on this argument, have a right that produces a duty on society (including their 
parents) to ensure that they are no worse off than most other children in their 
opportunities to realise their life chances (1986, 170). These he calls 'developmental 
rights'. Eeekelar's account seems to be far closer to the construction and sentiment we 
are trying to capture. However it is still underdeveloped. For example what counts as 
equal opportunity, what kind of duties does the right create and what kind of interest 
grounds it? Although Eekelaar's account is on the right track it needs to be further 
fleshed out in order to properly address the concerns raised earlier.
To sum up: although the future interests problem seems to be a real issue in the 
definition of what constitutes an interest sufficiently important to ground a right, the 
usual solution to such problems is to appeal to Feinberg's work. Although 
groundbreaking, Feinberg's 'rights in trust' are lacking as they place the interest and 
right with the future adult and not the current child, contrary to our intuitive 
understanding. Other discussions of this issue places the right appropriately in the hands 
of the child but up to this point have not been adequately conceptualised. In the next 
section of this paper I offer a way of constructing these rights and develop an account of 
why children have an interest in their future capacities.
4. Reconciling Rights and Future interests
In order to reconcile rights and future interests I argue that children have an interest in 
developing the capacities that, if they were not interfered with, the child would normally 
develop. This places the interest correctly with the existing child and not with the future 
adult. I argue that a child has an interest in the development of capacities now, and that 
this interest therefore founds a claim that produces a duty in others not to interfere or 
prevent the present development. In order to overcome the future interests problem for
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children's rights we must first show why the right belongs with children now and not 
with the future adult they will become, and second why it is that such construction 
should be a right. These two questions are inescapably interlinked and I will deal with 
these two concerns together in order to support my assertion of a child's right to 
develop capacities.
It may be worth more clearly articulating why we need to offer a reason for placing the 
right with the present child and not the future adult. There may be those that doubt that 
it is this really a problem we need to overcome. Archard claims that there is no 
difference between placing the interest with the current child or the future adult as 
arguably they are one and the same person. He argues, discounting the metaphysical 
issues posed by Parfitvl, that,
'child and adult are merely distinct temporal stages of a single individual. Child and
adult have thus the same interest in development' (2003, 33).
This may be true, but only serves to displace the underlying question. When asking 'why 
does a child have an interest in developing in the future?' we cannot simply answer -  
'for the same reason that adults do'. This simply begs the bigger question as to why 
anyone, including a child or adult, has an interest in developing in the future.
I argue that the interest can be isolated in the following way. First, it seems 
uncontroversial that children (and adults) have an interest in being in the future, in at 
least a future state -  that is to say, existing. Therefore it cannot be true that we cannot 
have interests in future states. As stated earlier, at the most basic level a child has an 
interest in life and therefore others have a duty not to end this life. It is true that some 
individuals may have lives so full of pain and suffering that they may consider non­
existence better than existence, and so have no interest in any future state at all. Yet 
these individuals represent an exceptional case with a distinct theoretical literature.v" In 
any case, the existence of such individuals does not falsify the proposition that one can 
presently have interests in future states. It is therefore conceptually possible to have 
interests not just in the present but also in the future.
Why then do children have interests in specific future states such as being able to bear 
children? As Mills demonstrated it cannot be that we have a right to all possible future 
states, as this would be unreasonable and undesirable. Instead I argue that these rights
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exist on the following basis; children have an interest in being free from interference in 
developing core capacities.
Capacities and Competencies
Children have an interest in developing capacities due to their potential to develop. At 
the start of this paper I claimed that many children's rights are dependent on the child 
as right holder holding the requisite competence to realise the benefit of the interest. At 
this point it is worth taking some time to explain in more precise language what is meant 
by capacity and competence. The terms are often used interchangeably throughout the 
literature surrounding children's rights but there is a useful distinction to be made 
between the concepts.
Cowden and Lau argue that we can understand the distinction by considering the 
difference between a human student and a turtle. At the moment neither the English 
speaking student nor the turtle can speak Russian. However if the student takes 
intensive Russian lessons he may be able to speak fairly competent Russian in a matter 
of months. The turtle, however, no matter how many lessons he is given, will never be 
able to speak Russian. In this sense the student and the turtle both currently lack 
competence in speaking Russian, but the student has the capacity to speak Russian 
while the turtle does not (Cowden and Lau 2011, 7). Capacity, therefore, is a 
counterfactual ability. One has the capacity to A when one has all the relevant skills 
internal to that person to A. Competence, on the other hand, is one's actual ability to A. 
Competence is the capacity to A plus the relevant mental states (such as knowledge and 
intention) necessary for successfully doing A. There are also two additional identifiable 
concepts -  latent capacities and ableness. Ableness refers to the competence of the 
agent plus external conditions to actually do the act. For example a piano player may be 
competent in playing the piano but must actually have a piano present in order to do so. 
Latent capacities, however, consist of the capacity to develop a capacity. In this sense a 
baby may not yet have the capacity to speak Russian as they do not yet have the internal 
skills (such as cognitive functioning) to learn any language at all, however they do have 
the capacity to develop the capacity to be competent in Russian. It is the acquisition of 
these latent capacities and capacities proper that set children apart. The relationship 
between these four concepts can be seen below in Figure One.
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Figure One: Relationship between ableness, competence, capacity and latent capacity
With this distinction of terms now in mind let us consider the prepubescent girls interest 
in developing the capacity and competence to bear children. The capacity to have 
children refers to the relevant skills internal to a person, such as the secondary sexual 
characteristics, fertile gametes and a well nourished body. One's competence to have 
children refers to knowledge and intention, in this case the knowledge that conceiving a 
child involved sexual intercourse.vl" Ableness to fall pregnant refers to external 
conditions such as the necessity of a willing, fertile man. Our prepubescent girl therefore 
lacks the capacity to have children in the strict sense, as she lacks the secondary sexual 
characteristics. However, unlike a man for example, who also lacks the secondary sexual 
characteristics, our prepubescent girl has the primary sexual characteristics. She 
therefore has the capacity to develop the capacity to become pregnant. This second 
order capacity we can call the 'latent capacity'.
Genital mutilation (or more controversially puberty inhibiting drugs) can destroy the 
child's latent capacity to bear children. We can therefore say that the girl, by virtue of 
her latent capacities, has a present interest in being free from interference in these 
latent capacities and this produces a duty in others not to act in such a way that will
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destroy them. Furthermore actions that interfere with the development of latent 
capacities into capacities proper would constitute a violation because it is a form of 
harming. Genital mutilation is not simply an action that removes a capacity that a child 
has not developed yet, therefore causing no detriment, it is an action that actively 
removes the child's latent capacity -  their potential to develop the capacity to bear 
children or enjoy sex. By essentially keeping children in a state of childhood one harms 
their interests by removing their potential to leave it
Therefore the young girl has a right to develop her capacity to bear children free from 
interference actions (such as genital cutting) from others. This is because she holds the 
latent capacity to acquire this capacity and interference with this process of 
development would constitute harm. At this point the arguments laid out above present 
a case for why children have a present right to develop capacities that produce strong 
negative duties of non-interference. In the next section I consider whether this can be 
extended to include positive duties such as assistance in developing capacities.
5. Positive Duties
The arguments laid out above seem to work well in cases where a child can be expected, 
all other things being equal, to develop the relevant capacity, such that the relevant 
right produces strong negative duties of non-interference. But does this type of claim- 
right also produce positive duties to assist in development of certain capacities? In many 
cases children are not going to develop certain capacities by themselves and yet we 
think they have some sort of claim to assistance in this development. Let us now 
complicate the picture of a simple negative right to develop capacities with a case that 
has received much attention in the area of children's rights - that of congenitally deaf 
children and cochlear implants.IX
Consider a child who is born with congenital deafness. Such children have structural 
differences or damage to their inner ear usually caused by genetic factors, and are 
unable to hear from birth. Congenitally deaf children are not only without the ability to 
hear, but often also have severe difficulties in learning the written and spoken 
language/ Written and spoken language is essential for modern life, something that we 
may consider that children have a right to develop. However, it is not enough simply to
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impose a duty of non-interference with respect to those with congenital deafness, since 
they will not develop the capacity to hear, speak and understand the spoken language 
unaided. In this case the congenitally deaf child is most unfortunately cast into the same 
category as our turtle, while lacking the underlying capacity to develop the capacity for 
hearing (or in the turtle's case speaking) and thus having no antecedent rights.
Yet unlike the case of the turtle, congenitally deaf children can be given cochlear implant 
surgery that will allow them to hear. Studies show that cochlear implants given to 
children allow these children to develop the same level of spoken and written skill as 
other hearing children. The failure to give congenitally deaf children cochlear implants 
could then produce a future interest problem, as it is an omission that could interfere 
with the development of capacities in the future. Just as genital mutilation may prevent 
girls from bearing children in the future, so does the failure to give a child cochlear 
implants irreversibly prevent them from fully participating in the written and spoken 
language. The difference is that while secondary sexual characteristics will develop on 
their own, for congenitally deaf children hearing will not. Therefore simple negative 
duties of non-interference are insufficient to guarantee the right.
It would be easy to leave the discussion here by concluding that future interests can 
produce only rights with concomitant duties of non-interference that are relatively easy 
to fulfill. Yet this would be counterintuitive -  it seems that so long as society is capable 
of assisting those with congenital deafness, it may be under a duty to do so. Why, then, 
do we have rights that ground not only non-interference with the development of our 
future capacities but also assistance in development of these capacities? We must show 
that children not only have an interest in retaining the latent capacities they already 
have, but also in acquiring capacities proper they would not develop unaided.
One option may be to adapt the work done by Norman Daniels on the importance of 
'normal human functioning' in health care allocation. Daniels argues that we have a duty 
to restore individuals to the level of 'normal human functioning' or 'species typical 
normal functioning' to guarantee equality of opportunity to access Rawlsian primary 
goods.Xl Normal human functioning or normal species functioning is a concept that 
originated in the field of biology, in particular through the work of Christopher Boorse 
(1977). Daniels adapted the concept to specifically mean 'functioning that is exhibited by 
a majority of member of a species' (Daniels 1985; Satz 2006, 232). Daniels argues for the 
distribution of health care resources according to a baseline of functioning considered
125
normal for the human species. He deals primarily with questions of distributive justice -  
what kind of health care services will exist in society, who will get them and on what 
basis (1985, 2). However his answers to these questions draw on some important 
principles about what we think is important in treating people and these principles may 
be just as applicable in the context of rights theory. In fact Daniels himself argues that 
his distributive justice theory of health care can be seen to support and properly sculpt 
right-claims, for,
'such a theory would tell us which kinds of rights claims are legitimately viewed
as rights. It would help us specify the scope and limits of justified right claims'
(1985, 5).
Therefore, by applying the concept of normal human functioning, we can argue that 
children have a right to core capacities that are essential to normal human functioning. 
This right produces duties of assistance in others to help children develop or acquire 
these capacities. Since the capacity to hear is essential to developing the competence to 
understand, speak and write the written language, it can be considered a core capacity 
essential to normal human functioning. A child therefore has an interest in cochlear 
implants in order to acquire the core capacity for hearing. This is true despite the claim 
that congenitally deaf children lack the latent capacities to develop the capacity to hear 
unaided.
Critics have argued, however, that the normal human functioning approach focuses 
overly on mode of functioning and not functional outcomes (Satz 2006). For example 
consider Hannah who has been born with partial upper arms. She can type with upper 
arm prostheses but finds them painful so prefers to type with her feet. Critics claim that 
a normal human functioning approach would see normal as typing with one's upper 
arms and therefore seek to restore this rather than recognise the alternative functioning 
outcome of feet typing (Satz 2006, 224). I don't think this is a fair criticism. I have used 
the concept of normal human functioning in terms of capacities. A right to a capacity 
does not impose any obligation to use that capacity. It may be correct that Hannah has 
the choice to feet type if she wishes, however it may also be correct that if she chose 
otherwise that other people would therefore hold a duty to assist this. What becomes 
important is ensuring that right-holders have the core capacities to make the types of 
choices they wish about functioning and that they are not denied the capacity for 
normal human functioning.
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6. Constraints on these rights
One advantage of adopting a normal human functioning model for determining core 
capacities and rights, is that we are now well placed to answer some of the challenges 
posed to the alternative model -  Feinberg's right to an open future -  that were 
introduced at the beginning of this paper. The two criticisms leveled against a child's 
right to an open future were that a truly open future imposed unreasonable obligations 
on parents and the State and that even if it were possible to ensure a truly open future, 
the outcome is probably undesirable (Mills 2003, 499). I will deal with these two 
objections in turn.
Mills argues that the 'inescapable finitude of life' renders it is impossible to truly keep 
our options open (2006, 499). Even if we are able to approach this kind of openness, the 
type of duties it would impose on parents are simply unreasonable. It would necessitate 
taking children to all sorts of sporting activities, allowing them to learn several 
languages, several musical instruments and even gain experience and knowledge of 
each spiritual tradition, something, she points out, all too many parents do try to 
attempt! This smorgasbord approach does indeed seem unreasonable and the reason 
lies with interest theory itself. An interest only constitutes a right when it is sufficiently 
important to impose duties on others. Although it may be true that if you speak both 
English and Spanish you may gain a benefit, it is easy to imagine that the additional 
benefit would decrease with each language one learns, since there are relatively few 
areas of human life that would actually be improved by such pan-linguism. Therefore 
the benefit a child would get from being exposed to all of these things would simply not 
constitute an interest of sufficient importance to ground a right.
The normal human functioning model further narrows this requirement. This paper has 
established a child's right to develop their latent and capacities proper. However most 
of what Mills is concerned with in her objections are clearly competencies, not 
capacities. There is an argument to be made that in guaranteeing the development of 
certain latent capacities and capacities proper, an individual will be in the position to 
acquire and develop competencies as they choose. The normal human functioning 
model also tells us which capacities a child has a right to. These are clearly the capacities 
that allow the child to achieve normal human functioning; therefore this type of right
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would not impose the type of unreasonable duties discussed by Mills. The right to the 
core capacities, however, must still have correlative duties that are reasonable and 
achievable. For some capacities, such as hearing, the duty (cochlear implant surgery) is 
achievable. For other capacities we may not yet have the technology to assist in the 
same way. Furthermore there may be many other capacities we would like a child to 
have but which do not fall within this core of normal human functioning. These might 
include the capacity to become a great leader, or the capacity to be creative and use 
one's imagination/" However, no matter how desirable we might consider these to be, 
we would not consider that a child has a right to them. Capacities that are impossible to 
achieve, or are not always clearly in the child's interest, or that would impose 
unreasonable duties, are not capacities that would ground rights.
The second objection listed by Mills was that a truly open future is undesirable because 
being exposed to this 'smorgasbord' approach misses what is truly valuable about these 
experiences; the child would become a 'Jack of all trades and Master of none' (Mills 
2006, 506). As Raz points out, it is not about the number of choices one has but the 
quality of these choices. It becomes clear by the capacity-based rights model offered 
above that what we are concerned with is not the number of options per se but one's 
ability to achieve any of these options in the most basic sense.
Therefore by adopting a normal human functioning model to guide our judgment about 
what rights a child has, we impose certain constraints that neatly align with one of the 
core principles of interest theory -  that the interests that ground rights are those 
sufficiently important to justify imposition of duties on others. There may be capacities 
that we would like children to have and competencies we would like them to develop or 
we might even see as beneficial to have. However these are not necessarily rights if they 
are not sufficiently important to impose duties on others to guarantee them /"1
The previous discussion concludes that children have a right to develop certain core 
capacities. This right produces a duty of non-interference in those capacities children 
will normally develop and also in some cases a positive duty of assistance. These 
capacities are in the child's interest to develop, due to their latent capacities and also 
the benefit of acquiring these capacities to achieve normal human functioning. 
However, if we are to hold this statement to be true in regards to congenitally deaf 
children and the cochlear implant case, we must address some further 
counterarguments.
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7. Some Objections
The question about cochlear implants is not one of rights theory alone. There is a history 
of strong objection to cochlear implant surgery by those in the Deaf community.XIV These 
objections can broadly be broken into three issues. First that Deaf people have an 
equally high quality of life as hearing people and therefore deafness is not a disability. 
Second, that trying to 'cure' Deaf people through cochlear implant surgery sends a 
strong message to society that their lives are less valuable; and finally that if Deafness is 
understood as culture and not as a disability then Deaf parents have a right to bring up 
children in their own cultural tradition - that is, without cochlear implants.
Due to constraints of space in this paper I am going to only deal with the first objection. I 
don't deny that there may be genuine concerns arising from the second objection, which 
can be broadly called the argument from 'Expressivism' (Edwards 2004). The concerns in 
the third objection deserve to be dealt with thoroughly elsewhere. The approach I take 
here gives us the answer that Deaf parents should not be able to refuse cochlear 
implants for their children. This argument is one based wholly on the consideration of a 
child's right to develop certain core capacities and does not consider cultural identity. 
There may be cultural considerations that override this capacity based right. However 
even the most ardent of advocates admit that there are 'genuine and difficult' concerns 
regarding the rights of parents to choose a cultural identity for their children that may 
substantially reduce their opportunities (Sparrow 2005, 140). The argument offered 
below is an account of one such concern.
Deafness as a disability
Throughout the 1980's and 1990's many Deaf communities began to argue that 
deafness should not be understood as a disability. They argued that those living within 
the Deaf community are not disadvantaged, that in fact they benefit from access to the 
community support. Davis writes,
'Deaf pride advocates point out that as Deaf people they lack the ability to hear, 
but they also have many positive gains: a cohesive community, a rich cultural
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heritage built around the various residential schools, a growing body of drama, 
poetry and other artistic traditions, and, of course, what makes all this possible, 
American Sign Language' (Davis 1997, 12).
The reporting of a good quality of life despite popular assumptions is not unique to deaf 
people. There also exists a broader 'disability paradox'. The problems can be essentially 
stated as,
'Why do many people with serious and persistent disabilities report that they 
experience a good or excellent quality of life when to most external observers 
these people seem to live an undesirable daily existence?' (Albrecht & Devlieger 
1999, 977).
Albrecht and Devlieger's study reported how those facing severe disabilities had a high 
quality of life despite often lacking the capacities necessary for normal human 
functioning. Therefore, Deaf advocates argue, if Deaf people consistently report a high 
quality of life, applying the 'normal human functioning' model gives a false standard of 
what is necessary to live a good life. Participating in Deaf culture is just as valuable.
In addition, many consider that any disadvantage that the Deaf community experience is 
the product of an unaccommodating society. For example the community in Martha's 
Vineyard, Massachusetts has a high rate of hereditary deafness. In the late 19th century 
one in every 155 people on the island were deaf, almost 20 times the average for similar 
sized communities (Groce, 1985). As a result the majority of the community could speak 
American Sign Language and deaf people participated fully in all forms of political and 
social life. The Deaf communities claim that this example shows how 'disability' 
disappears with social adjustment (Sparrow 2005,137). The proper approach should not 
be to 'fix' the target of discrimination in society, but society itself. As Roslyn Rosen, 
President of the National Association of the Deaf, has stated,
'In our society everyone agrees that whites have an easier time than blacks. But 
do you think a black person would undergo operations to become white?' (Davis 
1997, 12)
It follows from this line of argument that deaf children do not need cochlear implants, 
but that they do need proper support societal support.
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Protecting core capacities
Essentially, the objection raised above argues that demonstrating that Deaf people have 
a high quality of life shows us that children do not have an interest in cochlear implant 
surgery to acquire a capacity to hear. In this final section I argue that this is not the case, 
we can hold these two claim simultaneously -  Deaf people have a high quality of life and 
children have an interest in acquiring the capacity to hear.
It may not be the case that our specific goals in life, whatever they may be, will always 
be achieved less readily if we fall short of normal human functioning. However it is the 
case that achieving normal human functioning has a tendency to make our lives go 
better, at the very least it provides us with the opportunity, the equality of access to our 
goals, or as Daniels puts it, to the Rawlsian primary goods. It is an unfair comparison to 
compare the individual as they would be as a hearing person and the individual as they 
would be as a non-hearing person. We can, however, compare the category of non­
hearing people and the category of hearing people. Although non-hearing people may 
live self reported high quality lives, it still remains true that they face numerous 
challenges to their lives that hearing people do not face. The same applies for the 
broader disability paradox. The study by Albrecht & Devlieger demonstrates that those 
with a disability often adapt to their situation. However, this relative happiness is again 
asking the wrong question. It is not whether one can live a good life with the disability 
but whether having a certain core capacity would be in a child's interest.
In addressing this it becomes clear that we cannot just have a cultural understanding of 
deafness. Even if society were changed so it was even easier for Deaf people, those who 
could both sign and hear would still be at an advantage. When considering the Martha's 
Vineyard argument, it is worth pointing out that at the time in the 19th century, the 
major industries for the island were farming and fishing, occupations where oral or 
written communication skills were not necessary for success. It is questionable whether 
such a seamless integration would be still possible today. It cannot be denied that 
competence in understanding, speaking and writing the spoken language is an 
advantage in modern life and that the capacity to hear is essential to acquiring these 
competencies. Denial of cochlear implants to children may therefore constitute 
counterfactual harming. According to Feinberg the counterfactual test harm exists if B's
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interest is in a worse condition than it would be had A not acted as he did (1986, 149). It 
is even possible to improve B's condition while still counterfactually harming her. 
Suppose I go to see the doctor with a serious throat infection and instead of prescribing 
me antibiotics he sends me away with painkillers. The painkillers make me feel better 
but do not address the infection. By failing to prescribe me antibiotics my doctor has 
adversely affected my interests even though I am better off from his actions than I 
would be had he not acted at all. Not allowing a child access to cochlear implant surgery 
can be seen as counterfactual harming in this sense. A child may be happy and healthy 
growing up deaf and using sign language but their interests are still harmed by the loss 
of opportunity to acquire the core capacity of hearing.
Although, as was pointed out earlier, it is impossible to keep oil options open for a child, 
this does not mean that talk of open or closed options or choices is completely 
meaningless when applied to individual cases. For example, choosing to give a child 
cochlear implants leaves open the options of a) developing skills in the spoken language, 
b) taking the implants out and choosing to be deaf once the child has reached the age 
that they can do so, and c) learning sign language and participating in deaf culture. 
Research does suggest that it may be more difficult to acquire competence in sign 
language while simultaneously learning spoke language, but it is not impossible (Crouch 
1997). This breadth of choice is considerably more 'open' than those that would be 
available if cochlear implants surgery were not undertaken. Although the child will have 
access to Deaf culture as described above, without the implant it is highly unlikely that a 
deaf child will be able to learn the spoken and written language and that their ability to 
participate in majority society will be severely restricted (Sparrow 2005, 140).
Despite individual stories and evidence that one can live a valuable life in the deaf 
community, when considering the rights of the child, it is still in their interest to have 
the capacity to hear. Ensuring that children have the capacity still allows for the option 
of removing the cochlear implant later in life. Therefore it seems possible to hold the 
two claims simultaneously, first that Deaf people have a high quality of life and second 
that it is in the interests of children to acquire the capacity to hear. This interest of 
children to acquire this core capacity should be taken into account when considering 
claims that Deaf parents have a right to bring their children up in their own cultural 
tradition.
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Conclusion
This paper has presented the future interests problem of children's rights. It examined 
the dominant solution to the problem - Feinberg's right to an open future - but found it 
insufficient. Such a right does not acknowledge the importance of the interests of the 
present child and fails to properly distinguish what constitutes an open future. The 
paper then offered an alternative understanding of the future interests problem. I 
argued that it was not about future interests but about present interests in developing 
capacities. The right belongs to the child now, as children have an interest in developing 
their latent capacities. Others have a duty not to interfere or destroy a child's latent 
capacities.
I then examined whether the right not only had a correlated duty of non-interference 
but also a duty to assist in the development of certain capacities. In doing so I 
considered the controversial case of cochlear implant surgery for congenitally deaf 
children. I argued that children have a right to assistance of the development of their 
capacities, but not of all capacities. A useful way of determining which capacities are 
sufficiently important to constitute a right is the adoption of the normal human 
functioning model. Children therefore have rights to certain core capacities that allow 
them to achieve normal human functioning.
Finally I considered some objections to my position on cochlear implants presented on 
behalf of the Deaf community. Although I cannot present a full analysis of the 'deafness 
as culture' argument here, I have argued that the right to cochlear implants as 
established by a child's right to the acquisition of certain core capacities, presents a 
compelling case. Any cultural objection will have to overcome this argument in a more 
substantial way in order to establish that Deaf parents have a justified power to bring 
their children up within a cultural identity that clearly restricts the development of core 
capacities. The difficulties presented in this paper surrounding the cochlear implant case 
are indicative of the difficulties in protecting the capacities and futures of children. 
However, if there ever were a goal for rights, especially children's rights, this would 
seem to be it.
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Science & Medicine, 63(1) 21-31.
Vl Parfit raises objections surrounding the supposed moral significance of the continuation of 
identity. Why are problems involving the same person over time given more moral weight than 
different people? See, 'Reasons and Persons' (1984) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
v" See Feinberg, Joel (1986) 'Wrongful Life and Counterfactual Element in Harming', Social 
Philosophy and Policy, 4, 145-178; Shiffrin, Seana V, (1999) 'Wrongful Life, Procreative 
Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm', Legal Theory, 5, 117-148.
Vl" Of course one could fall pregnant by accident without knowing these things, however if one 
wanted to fall pregnant and did not know how the likelihood of them being competent in doing 
so, or doing so by accident, is very low. See reference to accidental competence in Cowden, M &
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Lau, J.C. (2012) 'The Language of Capacity and Competence in Children's Rights', unpublished, 
available from mhairi.cowden@anu. edu. a u
lx For more detailed work on the congenitally deaf children and cochlear implant case see 
Sparrow, Robert (2005) 'Defending Deaf Culture: The Case of Cochlear Implants', The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 13(2) 135-152; Dolncik, E (1993) 'Deafness as Culture', The Atlantic Monthly 
September, 37-52; Lane, H and Grodin, M (1997) 'Ethical issues in cochlear implant surgery: an 
exploration into disease, disability, and the best interests of the child', Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
Journal, 7, 231-51.
x There is significant evidence establishing that children who receive cochlear implants benefit in 
the form of improved language comprehension and production. See Tomblin, J. Bruce, Spencer, 
Linda, Flock, Sarah, Tyler, Rich and Gantz, Bruce, (1999) "A Comparison of Language Achievement 
in Children With Cochlear Implants and Children Using Hearing Aids", Journal of Speech,
Language, and Hearing Research Vol 42, 497-511. Geers, Ann E., Nicholas, Johanna G., Sedey, 
Allison L, (2003) 'Language Skills of Children with Early Cochlear Implantation', Ear & Hearing, Vol 
24(1) pp465-585. Svirsky, Mario A,. Teoh, Su-Wooi, Neuburger, Heidi (2004),' Development of 
Langauge and Speech Perception in Congenitally, Profoundly Deaf Children as a Function of Age 
at Cochlear Implantation', Audiology & Neurotology, Vol 9, pp224-233.
Xl Note that at this stage I do not deal with the question of whether individuals have rights to 
have their capacities raised beyond the normal human functioning level, i.e. if we can not only 
make someone hear but make them hear better than anyone else. However for a good discussion 
of human enhancement see Savulescu, Julian and Bostrum, Nick (eds) Human Enhancement, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
xii Capacities like these are set out in Nussbaum's 'capabilities' list. Nussbaum, Martha (1997) 
'Capabilities and Human Rights', Fordham Law Review, 273-300.
xm There even may be some capacities which we deem to be normal human functioning but we 
wish to prevent from developing, for example many children who have gender disorder are given 
puberty stopping drugs to prevent the development of secondary sexual characteristics. I cannot 
deal with this in full here but it may be a fruitful place for future research.
XIV Here I follow other scholars and use the capitalised 'Deaf' to indicate the broader Deaf 
community and culture and the lower case 'deaf' to indicate the loss of hearing purely in the 
medical sense.
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It is often stated in international and domestic legal documents that 
children have a right to be loved. Yet there is very little explanation of 
why this right exists or what it entails. Matthew Liao has recently 
sought to provide such an explanation by arguing that children have a 
right to be loved as a human right. I will examine Liao’s explanation 
and in turn argue that children do not have a right to be loved. The 
first part of the paper will be concerned with showing that Liao cannot 
support his empirical claims. I will then argue that loving cannot be a 
duty, and that even if we were willing to concede that it is, love is not 
always accompanied by loving treatment. Finally, I consider two alter­
native interpretations of the right to be loved and argue that even given 
these, children do not have a right to be loved.
Keywords: rights; children; love
Introduction
In 1972, Foster and Freed wrote in their article ‘A bill of rights for chil­
dren’ that ‘a child has a moral right and should have a legal right, to 
receive parental love and affection’ (Foster and Freed 1972, p. 347). Such 
a legal right now exists in Israel, Japan, Mozambique and the United 
States, and appears in the preamble of United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CROC); ‘a child should grow up in an atmosphere of 
happiness, love and understanding.’1 The assertion that children have not 
only a moral but a legal claim to love, with all the State power of enforce­
ment that entails, seems to ask a lot more of the child/parent/State relation­
ship than we currently conceive. The right itself is backed by scant 
philosophical debate.2 Philosophical justification is needed, considering that 
the right presents significant issues for both the theory of rights and the 
moral and political status of children. Is love an appropriate concept to 
include in our international and domestic legal documents? Can we really 
impose a duty on others to love? Is protecting parental love the best way
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to protect children? The questions surrounding a child’s right to be loved 
go the heart of what it means to have a right.
Matthew Liao has recently directly addressed this issue (Liao 2006). He 
seeks to provide a philosophical argument for why a child has a right to be 
loved. In this paper, I will examine Liao’s argument and in turn argue that 
children do not have a right to be loved. The first part of this paper will 
consider Liao’s argument and examine the scientific literature -  the study 
of ‘maternal deprivation’ in humans and non-human primates, the study of 
social isolation of monkeys, and recent neuroscientific studies linked to 
deprivation in both human and non-human primates -  that he uses to sub­
stantiate the central empirical claim. I argue that this literature fails to sup­
port the claim that love is a primary essential condition for a good life.
The second part of the paper will argue that, even if the empirical claim 
could be substantiated, ‘loving’ cannot be a duty. Loving cannot be a duty 
because the structure of rights necessitates that there be a real and achiev­
able corresponding duty. There are significant problems with conceiving of 
emotions as duties. The emotional component of love may be an unachiev­
able duty. I argue that the emotional aspect of love can be logically sepa­
rated from treatment we deem desirable for the child, and in some cases 
the emotion of love may bring about undesirable treatment. If the proposed 
right cannot fulfil its desired function, the justification for its existence may 
be severely undermined.
Having shown the central explanation for a right to be loved to be lack­
ing, the final part of the paper will consider two alternative conceptions of 
the right to be loved; namely, the right to be loved as a manifesto right, 
and the right to be loved as a claim-right against the State. Even given 
these alternatives I conclude that the real objectives of the child’s right to 
be loved can be achieved through other clearer rights and that, accordingly, 
it still cannot be said that children have a right to be loved.
Liao’s argument and empirical nonsense
It should be stated first that throughout this paper I, like others, make two 
assumptions. I assume that rights exist and that children are right-holders. 
Objections to either of these assumptions may halt the discussion of a 
child’s right to be loved before it has begun. However, debate regarding 
the existence of rights and children’s status as right-holders has been thor­
oughly examined elsewhere3 and I will not revisit it here. Matthew Liao 
states that children have a right to be loved as a human right on the 
grounds that human beings have rights to those conditions that are primary 
essential for a good life. This is because ‘[b]y their nature rights secure the 
interests of the right holders by requiring the duty-bearers, to perform cer­
tain services for the right-holder or not to interfere with the right holder’s 
pursuit of their essential interests’ (Liao 2006, p. 422). If we attach
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meaning and importance to the end (a good life) then we must attach 
importance to the ‘primary essential’ means used to achieve this end. In 
this Liao draws on James Griffin’s defence of human rights (Griffin 2008). 
As children are human beings they therefore have rights to those conditions 
that are primary essential for a good life. Liao (2006) defines parental love 
as:
to seek a highly intense interaction with the child, where one values the child 
for the child’s sake, where one seeks to bring about and to maintain physical 
and psychological proximity with the child, where one seek to promote the 
child’s well-being for the child’s sake, and where one desires that the child 
reciprocate or, at least, is responsive to, one’s love. (p. 422)
This love need not only come from the child’s biological parents but can 
include other individuals such as foster parents and nannies. The ‘highly 
intense’ aspect of this definition is designed to show us that love also has 
an emotional component that permeates all our dealings with the child. 
Parental love, defined in this way, is an essential condition for a good life 
for children, therefore, children have a right to be loved.
Liao’s argument can be broken down to four steps:
• Human beings have rights to those conditions that are primary essen­
tial for a good life.
• Children are human beings.
• Parental love, that is,
(a) seeking a highly intense interaction with the child;
(b) seeking to bring about and maintaining physical/psychological 
proximity;
(c) seeking to promote the child’s well being for the child’s sake;
(d) valuing the child for its own sake; and
(e) desiring reciprocity of love;
is a primary essential condition for a good life.
• Therefore children have a right to parental love.
From this we can see that Liao’s argument rests on the claim number three, 
that parental love, broadly defined as above, is a primary essential condi­
tion for a good life of children.
Interestingly Liao (2006) explicitly wishes to argue that it is an empiri­
cal claim (p. 423). If this claim is not backed by evidence then Liao’s 
conceptual framework of a right to be loved may stand but the content of 
the particular right will not. Liao seeks to substantiate this empirical claim 
by demonstrating that without love children suffer severe negative conse­
quences. In doing so he draws upon several broad branches of scientific 
literature: the study of ‘maternal deprivation’ in humans and non-human
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primates, the study of social isolation of monkeys, and recent neuroscien­
tific studies linked to deprivation in both human and non-human primates. 
However none adequately support this empirical claim. It is beneficial to 
look closely at these studies as they not only expose the flaws in Liao’s 
empirical claim, but also have implications for the broader concept of a 
right to be loved.
Maternal deprivation
The broad base of literature that Liao draws on is the study of ‘Maternal 
Deprivation’. Liao (2006) argues that
[cjhildren who did not receive love but only adequate care, became ill more 
frequently, their learning capacities decreased significantly, became decreas- 
ingly interested in their environment, failed to thrive physically by failing to 
gain weight or height, suffered insomnia, were constantly depressed, devel­
oped severe learning disabilities . . .  in one study, 37% of these infants had 
died by two years of age, compared with none in the adequately mothered 
control group, (p. 423)
This does seem to be very strong evidence. It claims that adequate care 
was controlled for, and that lack of love was the only relevant explanatory 
variable. The results are not only emotional but also measurable such as 
weight and height and most seriously, death. The evidence comes from a 
1945 study by Rene Spitz entitled Hospitalism: An Inquiry Into The Gene­
sis O f Psychiatric Conditions in Early Childhood and a 1946 study by 
Spitz and Wolf entitled Anaclitic depression -  an inquiry into the genesis 
o f psychiatric conditions in early childhood. These are classic studies, part 
of a collection of work in the 1940s and 1950s that reformed the way in 
which foster homes operated and led to further understandings of child­
hood, development and socialization (Emde 1992). However they are inad­
equate to support the claim that love is a primary essential condition for a 
good life in children.
The literature on Maternal Deprivation is not restricted to the 1940s, in 
the 1960s and 1970s the concept of maternal deprivation came under con­
siderable criticism (Ainsworth 1962; Rutter 1981; Yarrow 1961). Reviews 
of the literature identified complex differences between ‘insufficiency of 
interaction implicit in deprivation’ and the ‘discontinuity of relations 
brought about through separation’ (Ainsworth 1962, p. 99). Michael Rutter 
has suggested that the literature is in fact dealing with three distinct 
syndromes and the use of the phrase ‘maternal deprivation’ is misleading 
(Rutter 1972). Rutter suggests that they should be broadly characterized as 
acute distress from loss, experiential/nutritional privation and bond priva­
tion. This neatly demonstrates the different variables that are at play in 
Liao’s analysis.
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Acute distress
Acute distress is suffered by young children removed from their families, 
often at the time of admission to hospital. Rutter (1972) argues that separa­
tion causes distress only in children older than six months, which indicates 
that distress is due to interrupting an important bond at a time when chil­
dren have difficulty maintaining a relationship through absence. This syn­
drome is best understood as the study of ‘loss’. In the study, ‘Anaclitic 
depression’, children who had been with their mothers were separated from 
them for three to four months. The children showed a range of symptoms 
such as weeping, screaming, weight loss and insomnia which Spitz and 
Wolf (1946) diagnosed as anaclitic depression (p. 313). The symptoms 
stopped when the child was restored to the mother. The only mention of 
love is in reference to the depression following the loss of their ‘love- 
object’, referring to the subject of their attachment.
In this way ‘Anaclitic depression’ is a study of the effects of the loss of 
a mother or mother-substitute, not the effects of an unloving mother or 
mother-substitute. In addition, experimental studies have shown how dis­
tress may be reduced by provision of toys, or by increased quality of care 
and changes in the hospital admission process (Rutter 1972, p. 242).
It is clear that separation from a ‘love-object’ is different from a lack of 
love as defined by Liao. We would not be inclined to say that while our 
mother was travelling overseas that we were no longer loved by her. The 
acute distress suffered from separation seems to indicate the existence of a 
close relationship from which the loss of the missing person presents a 
cause for mourning, not the complete disappearance of love. Furthermore 
the distress can be alleviated through high quality institutional care. If lack 
of love could be reduced to separation alone, it would seem to imply the 
extreme claim that all children have a right to their parents’ physical pres­
ence around the clock. The study of the distress from loss does not encom­
pass Liao’s claim that children who are not loved suffer negative outcomes.
Experiential/nutritional privation
Rutter’s second syndrome, experiential/nutritional privation, bears directly 
on Liao’s claim that children suffering from a lack of love will fail to 
thrive both physically (reduced gains in height and weight) and cognitively 
(learning difficulties and disabilities). The study, ‘Hospitalism’, is an 
enquiry into the effects of prolonged institutionalization in infants. It com­
pares two institutions, an institutional Nursery where infants had access to 
the mother and a Foundling Centre where the infants did not. The study 
observed that the mothers provided intense stimulation for the infants in 
the Nursery, which was lacking in the Foundling Centre. It concluded that 
the infants in the Foundling Centre consequentially suffered physically and
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emotionally in their development (Spitz 1945, p. 70). ‘Hospitalism’ was a 
study of deprivation of stimulation, where the lack of development in these 
children is due to insufficient human interaction, rather than a lack of love. 
In fact Spitz argues that the care and attention given to the children by their 
mothers in the Nursery did not constitute love (p. 65).
Review of the literature shows that physical developmental impairment 
is reversed by ‘increasing social, tactile, and perceptual stimulation without 
altering any other aspect of institutional life and without altering the child’s 
separation from his family’ (Rutter 1972, p. 244). This seems to account 
for many of the observations in ‘Hospitalism’. The children in the Found­
ling Centre did not have toys and were often placed alone in their cot for 
most of the day (Spitz 1945, p. 63). These children were deprived not only 
of any proper visual stimulation but also of any human interaction. In con­
trast the children in the Nursery not only had access to their mothers but 
were able to observe play in adjacent cubicles. These important differences 
led to controversy over whether the observable negative symptoms were 
attributable to the absence of a mother figure (what Liao might have tenned 
‘lack of love’) or to ‘environmental deprivation’ (Ainsworth 1962).
Liao’s use of the study of rhesus monkeys shows the stark nature of the 
problem (Dodsworth and Harlow 1965). Liao argues that infant monkeys 
raised in maternal privation settings have hampered social cognitive and 
emotional development (Dodsworth and Harlow 1965, p. 90). The study, 
‘Total social isolation in monkeys’ does not talk about ‘love’ nor seek to 
measure the effect of an unloving relationship, but specifically seeks to 
measure the detrimental effects of social isolation. The young monkeys 
were separated from their mother at birth and raised in bare wire cages, 
they were devoid of any maternal contact or opportunity to form affectional 
ties with peers. In addition some monkeys were in total social isolation, 
having been housed from birth until 12 months in a stainless steel chamber 
with no contact with any animal or human. They were then released into 
playrooms with two normal ‘control’ monkeys. The symptoms exhibited 
were hostility to the outside environment, self-harm, repetitive rocking 
movements and inability to interact with normal monkeys. On release, the 
two that were in total social isolation went into emotional shock and 
refused to eat. One died five days later and the other was force fed. The 
autopsy showed that the infant monkey died of ‘emotional anorexia’ (Dods­
worth and Harlow 1965, p. 90). This case shows the extreme nature of 
experiential privation, but as it is concerned with highly specific sensory 
stimulation, it is of limited application to questions about the effects of lack 
of love.
It is important to note that the necessary visual, physical, and experien­
tial stimulation can be given by someone who is not the primary care-giver 
or parent. This seems to indicate that experiential privation affecting physi­
cal development can be separated from the formation of attachment and
145
Critical Review o f International Social and Political Philosophy 331
bonds between child and care-giver. For example, more recent studies have 
focused on how lack of physical stimulation can affect the biochemical pro­
cesses of growth hormone (GH) secretion, leading to psychosocial dwarf­
ism (Liao 2006, p. 423). The studies conducted into the effects of maternal 
touch and massage on young infants as a stimulant for growth continue to 
support the conclusion that the physical stimulation can be provided by 
someone who does not necessarily ‘love’ the child (Champoux et al. 1989; 
Wang et al. 1996). In the study by Scafidi et al. (1990) the tactile and 
kinaesthetic stimulation was provided by the investigator or a nurse trained 
in the procedure.
It is apparent from these studies that visual/physical and experiential 
stimulation is important for the proper social and physical development of 
a child. However in many cases someone who is not party to a loving rela­
tionship with the child can provide this stimulation. Despite showing that 
these elements are important for a child’s development it fails to demon­
strate why they would need to be provided as part of a loving relationship 
in order to have the same positive consequences.
Bond privation and antisocial disorder
Empirical studies demonstrate the more serious long-term effects of bond- 
privation. While studies of Acute Distress showed the short-term effects of 
disruption in the bond creation phase, studies such as those by Hodges and 
Tizzard (1989) and Kahler and Freeman (1994) look at the long-term 
effects of the lack of bond formation. Children who are prevented from 
forming bonds when young often exhibit antisocial behaviour throughout 
their adult lives. Kahler and Freeman studied the cognitive and social 
development of Romanian orphans. There study however was complicated 
by the added variable of experiential and nutritional privation as over 
100,000 children were ‘warehoused with minimal food, clothing, heat or 
caregivers’. Hodges and Tizzard (1989) sought to control for the lack of 
visual stimulation by providing toys and interaction to the children who 
were growing up in an institutional setting.
Recent neuroscientific research has shows the chemical effects of the 
disruption of bond formation. In studies of infant rhesus monkeys and non­
human primates, changes in the mother’s foraging habits or differing rear­
ing conditions could: ‘[d]ysregulate the development of the brain biogenic 
amine neurotransmitter systems such as norepinephrine (NE), dopamine 
(DA), and serotonin (5HT); and the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) 
axis; cause the development of adrenal glucocorticoid responses to be mod­
ified in negative ways’ (Champoux et al. 1989; Higley et al. 1991, 1992; 
Heinz et al. 1998; Coplan et al. 1988).
Changes in the complex neurochemical systems can have serious 
effects: serotonin and norepinephrine are widely recognized to be related to
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feelings of well-being (anti-depressants raise serotonin and norepinephrine 
levels), dopamine is associated with our ability to experience pleasure and 
glucocorticoid responses are strongly linked with stress.
This appears to be the strongest support for Liao’s claim, for it seems 
that there is considerable evidence that the failure to form bonds in early 
childhood is linked to antisocial, attention seeking behaviour and a reduced 
ability to form lasting relationships later on in life. It should be noted how­
ever that this disruption in the bond-formation constitutes a very different 
arrangement from the previous cases. If we are to identify what is meant 
by ‘lack of love’ we must be clear whether this is a child who is denied an 
opportunity to form a bond with their carer, a child who has formed a bond 
but who is routinely separated from their carer, or a child who has not 
formed a bond with their carer but the carer states that they ‘love’ the 
child. It should also be highlighted that bonds may not be the same thing 
as love; it is generally recognized in attachment theory that attachment is 
not synonymous with love or affection (Prior and Glasser 2006). What 
these studies seem to demonstrate is that the formation of an uninterrupted 
bond with the child’s care-giver is an important part of their social develop­
ment, and disruption of this bond formation can lead to negative affects on 
the child’s neurotransmitter systems.
Is this lack o f love?
From this evidence we can conclude that short-term separations cause dis­
tress, but can be countered by improving institutional care and stimulation. 
Experiential or sensory privation can lead to a lack of physical and cogni­
tive development but this can be reversed by increasing stimulation which 
need not necessarily be linked to the primary care-giver. Finally, children 
who grow up in institutions or are exposed to multiple changing care-givers 
can suffer lasting social consequences from the lack of bond formation in 
early childhood. The use of ‘love’ in Liao’s claim must therefore be 
replaced by these different variables. It may be disingenuous to state that 
‘lack of love’ will result in these negative consequences with no qualifier 
that what is being measured is different in each study. Many writers have 
rejected the use of ‘love’ on the grounds that it introduces ‘mystical and 
immeasurable elements’ (Rutter 1981, p. 18). The controversy over whether 
variables such as privation, distress and lack of ‘bond’ development can 
properly be understood as ‘lack of love’ serves to highlight that love is 
problematic to measure, as we often believe it to involve intangible ele­
ments.
The literature therefore fails to measure the effects of a lack of love in 
the way Liao suggests that it does. It fails conclusively to show that the 
desirable treatment identified by Liao, the provisions labelled (a) to (e) 
above, are essential conditions for a good life. What has been demonstrated
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is that intense social interaction, sensory and experiential stimulation is nec­
essary for young children’s normal development and long-term socializa­
tion. This could be interpreted as fulfilling provision (a) ‘seeking a highly 
intense interaction with the child’ and (b) ‘maintaining physical and psy­
chological proximity’. Yet the second finding of the literature, that separa­
tion from a ‘love-object’ will cause distress, can only obliquely be 
understood as fulfilling provision (c) ‘promoting the child’s well being for 
the child’s sake’ if we accept that a child’s wellbeing includes always being 
free from distress. There is no support in the literature for provisions (d) 
‘valuing the child for its own sake or (e) ‘desiring reciprocity of love’. It 
seems that these are assumed to be self-evidently primary essential condi­
tions for a good life.
Liao has not made a serious case that there is a right to be loved, rather 
than just a right to some of the (a)-(e) provisions. The empirical evidence 
alone however has not shown us that there is no such thing as any right to 
be loved, if sufficient empirical evidence is found the right may still stand. 
In the second part of the paper I address the conceptual problems with the 
right, demonstrating that even with sufficient scientific literature the right 
does not exist.
Loving is not a duty
Even if the studies are not adequate to support the empirical claim that 
parental love is an essential condition for a good life it still may be that the 
structure of the child’s right to be loved is correct. That possibility raises 
the question: if there was sufficient scientific literature to back up the claim 
that parental love was an essential condition of a good life -  what form 
would this take as a right?
Rights, especially in a legal sense, are generally understood to be 
Hohfeldian claims. The Hohfeldian framework stipulates that a claim 
always has a correlative duty and is specified by reference to the actions of 
the people who bear the correlative duty (Hohfeld 1964). For example, I 
have a claim to my life and therefore you have a duty to refrain from kill­
ing me. A’s claim creates a duty in B (1) to abstain from interference or (2) 
to render assistance. The duty to love must therefore contemplate the exis­
tence of ‘love’ as an action. If we return to the definition of parental love 
we can observe that, with the exception of the desire for reciprocity, all of 
the elements (seeking a highly intense interaction, maintaining physical/ 
psychological proximity, promoting the child’s interests and valuing the 
child) are actions that the duty-holder would take towards the child. As 
actions we can rightly understand them as duties.
However these actions could be simply defined as desirable treatment. 
Although such desirable treatment could be the consequence of one’s love, 
it could also arise without love being present. For example, the carer of the
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child, such as a nurse or nanny, may promote the child’s interests for the 
child’s sake while not feeling love for the child. They may recognize that 
the child’s interests are important and should be respected. Therefore there 
is a distinct difference between desirable treatment simpliciter and desirable 
treatment that arises from a place of love in the duty-bearer. If we accept 
Liao’s definition of parental love as it stands then really what we wish to 
say is that a child has a right to these specific actions that constitute desir­
able treatment.
However Liao does not wish to limit the scope of the right only to the 
actions and behaviour of the lover. He argues that the ‘highly intense’ nat­
ure of parental love indicates that parental love is not just ‘behavioural or 
attitudinal but has emotional components’ as well (Liao 2006, pp. 422- 
423). According to Liao the duty holder must not only show ‘the appear­
ance of the emotions appropriate for the circumstances, but actually have 
the genuine emotions appropriate for the circumstances’ (p. 427). Therefore 
desirable treatment simpliciter is insufficient. In order to fulfil a child’s 
right to be loved the duty-bearer must provide the desirable treatments plus 
the internal emotion. It must come from a place of love. This would be like 
saying I have a right to bodily integrity whose fulfilment requires people to 
want not to stab me, not just to restrain themselves from the action.
There is an alternative interpretation of the Liao’s definition of parental 
love, that the first three elements of parental love, (a)-(c), are conative 
rather than affective. Liao’s definition of parental love is seeking highly 
intense interaction with the child, seeking to bring about and maintaining 
physical/psychological proximity and seeking to promote the child’s well 
being for the child’s sake. In this interpretation a parent will have fulfilled 
their duty of parental love by trying and seeking to achieve these ends, they 
will be blameless if in trying to fulfil both the actions and the emotional 
aspect, they achieve neither. I am dubious of this interpretation for the rea­
son that although it may offer a more charitable and achievable interpreta­
tion of the duty, I do not believe it is what Liao means. If the duty were 
truly conative then a parent’s unsuccessful attempts would be enough to 
fulfil their obligations. What a child would have a right to is the striving 
and seeking to love rather than the actual outcome of love. Why then was 
Liao at all concerned with showing that the presence of love is of benefit 
to the child? It is clear from the discussion that what Liao wishes to protect 
is the actual presence of the (a)-(e) provisions plus the emotional content. 
Furthermore, provisions d and e are clearly not conative and require the 
duty-holder actually to desire reciprocity and to value the child for their 
own sake.
Therefore, in placing the conative interpretation aside, to argue that the 
emotional component is necessary is to argue that one has a right not only 
to the desirable treatment but also to the proper motivation. There are clear 
problems with defining parental love in this way, the most pressing being
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that if the duty does not just consist of actions but also of motivation, can 
the duty always be properly discharged? In order for the emotional compo­
nent to be necessary, it too must be a primary essential condition for a 
good life; in other words the desirable treatment alone must be shown to 
be insufficient. I will consider these two objections in tum (1) can loving, 
an emotion, be a duty?; and (2) is the emotional component an essential 
condition for a good life?
The command problem
A duty will necessarily constrain the liberties of the duty-holder. The 
actions of constraint must not only be justified by the claim but also be rea­
sonable and achievable. MacCormick (1982) infers that ascription of a right 
to an individual presupposes that there is some act or omission, perfor­
mance of which will satisfy, protect or advance some need, interest or 
desire of that particular individual. It is not clear that the emotion of love 
is an action that can be performed by all duty-bearers as emotions are tradi­
tionally assumed to occur without conscious control. They cannot be com­
manded. How then can the duty-holder reasonably discharge their duty?
Liao argues that it is untrue that emotions can never be commanded 
and sometimes they are successfully commanded. He argues that one can 
give oneself reasons to have particular emotions therefore demonstrating a 
level of control (Liao 2006, p. 426). In addition to these internal controls 
we can place ourselves in external circumstances we know will bring about 
certain emotions. Internal controls may include practices such as giving 
ourselves reasons to feel warmth and affection towards a child or removing 
impediments to feeling this emotion. For example, recognizing the fact that 
the unplanned nature of a pregnancy was not the resulting child’s fault may 
remove impediments to loving the child. Liao argues that external controls 
might include getting enough sleep to help one be more affectionate 
towards the child. This example seems somewhat counterintuitive -  that by 
simply having a good night’s sleep one may wake up in the right place to 
experience the emotion of love. It is certainly true that it is easier to be 
affectionate and caring when one is not sleep deprived but surely this is 
true for all duties, whether they are to love or to help my little sister with 
her homework and patiently explain concepts such as ‘rights’. Sleep may 
help with the expressions of love but it does not have effect on the motiva­
tion, the underlying love emotion.
Though the example of being suitably rested may be an ill-chosen one 
for Liao’s purposes, it indicates the broader problem with this approach. I 
have serious doubts about whether Liao is actually offering an explanation 
of how one can command an emotion. It seems that these are simply condi­
tions by which it is easier to fulfil one’s duties. We have already dealt with 
the interpretation of conative duties. It may well be that parents have a
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moral obligation to try and love a child, many of us may be happy to con­
cede this, however this is a distinct from a duty to actually love the child.
Liao is only talking about commanding the presence of love in any 
given time. It may be appropriate to draw a distinction between two ways 
in which emotions manifest themselves. There is the emotion we may feel 
in a particular moment and the overarching feeling of emotion that is 
always present. For example, there is a difference between the intense love 
I feel for a child when she takes her first steps or says her first words, and 
the emotion I feel when I get up at 3am to attend to her screams. In the lat­
ter case I may still have the overall feeling of love for my child but I may 
not feel the intense feeling of love in that moment. The conditions that 
Liao sets out refer to cultivating the feeling of love in a particular moment 
in order to act in a loving and caring way towards the child. They do not 
seem to be concerned with building a loving relationship or the overarching 
feeling of love. I would argue that this is probably the case because it is 
harder to control or even know how one would control this broader type of 
emotion.
Therefore it still seems unclear that the emotion of love is an appropri­
ate object of a duty as loving is not an action but a reason for action. In 
this I am making a double claim. A claim about love -  that it is not only 
about actions -  and a claim about rights -  that they are only about actions 
or inaction.
What does love add?
1 have demonstrated the problems with conceiving of loving as a duty; 
now I will turn to the question of whether the emotional component of 
Liao’s parental love is necessary. It is unclear what sort of relationship 
there is between the emotion of love and desirable treatment. Why is the 
desirable treatment necessary to fulfil the duty but not sufficient? Liao is 
essentially making two claims, first that the desirable treatment (provisions 
(a) to (e)) are primary essential conditions for a good life and secondly that 
the internal emotion of love is a primary essential condition for a good life. 
If we return back to the empirical research cited earlier we can observe that 
there is no mention of the necessity of the internal emotion of love from 
the duty-bearer. How then, is the presence of the internal emotions within 
the duty-bearer beneficial to the right-holder? What does love add?
In order to test this we can take the example of an individual who 
behaves as if they loved a child, provides the child with the desirable treat­
ment but in fact does not feel the internal emotion of love towards that 
child. They pretend to love the child. Does this pretence fulfil the duty to 
love the child? Liao (2006) argues no, that a child in such a situation 
would be unable to develop certain ‘primary essential capacities such as 
knowing how to love others and having a positive conception of self’ from
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receiving pretended love alone (p. 429). His reasoning is that in practice it 
is hard to pretend to love someone for more than a short period of time 
and that soon the child would realize that it is pretence. This however is an 
argument demonstrating that discovering deceit and pretence will vitiate the 
fulfilment of the duty. It does not answer the question about whether the 
duty is being fulfilled during the period of pretence.
If the child is unaware of the love does this change the way we think 
of the duty being fulfilled? Although a baby may be able to observe the 
external expressions of love it is unlikely that they can perceive or under­
stand the internal emotion of love that may be present in their parents. 
Given this, does it matter if the love is real or pretend? The analogous situ­
ation, Liao argues, would be where I am owed 5 dollars by my friend x. I 
have a claim to the 5 dollars therefore friend jc has a duty to pay me back. 
X  however repays me using a fake five-dollar note. Liao argues that jc has 
not truly fulfilled her duty. Even if I successfully use the fake note to buy 
something and never realize that it was fake, the element of deceit will 
constitute an abrogation of the duty as there is something morally wrong 
taking place. Therefore my knowledge of the deceit or pretence is not rele­
vant to the fulfilment of the duty.
In the example of lending money I believe the opposite is true. Friend jc 
had a duty to pay me back; he did so as the money fulfilled its purpose 
and I was able to purchase something. X  has fulfilled his duty to me, how­
ever in doing so he may have breached a duty to others, for example to the 
government not to forge its currency. We can understand the morality of 
his actions as separate from the claim and duty relationship that constitutes 
a right. Similarly if 1 pretend to love a child and the child is unaware that 
my actions do not come from a place of love, they may still receive all the 
benefit that the right was created to achieve. I find the suggestion that is it 
morally wrong to show affection and care for a child even though you do 
not feel the internal emotion of love, somewhat jarring. For most cases, we 
are not discussing the deceit of someone who really hates a child but pre­
tends to love it -  such as an evil stepmother in a fairytale -  but instead 
consider a dedicated health care professional or foster parents who despite 
all their conscientious efforts, feelings of duty and respect, do not feel the 
emotion of love towards their child. Liao has failed to show that the inter­
nal emotion is necessary; he has not demonstrated that the desirable treat­
ment by itself is insufficient.
There is an assumption that (1) love will always be coupled with these 
beneficial treatment and that (2) it will not be coupled with negative treat­
ment. Both of these assumptions are flawed. The emotion of love may not 
always be coupled with beneficial actions; for example many parents may 
not think it is appropriate (one may imagine for cultural, societal or per­
sonal reasons) to be physically or psychologically close to their child, how­
ever this would not necessarily mean that they love their child less. We
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could also conceive of a situation where one would love a child in silence 
and isolation such as a mother with postnatal depression. Similarly autistic 
parents may be incapable of these outward expressions of love. In both 
cases it seems intuitively wrong to claim that the children are not loved.
Not only can love be present without the desirable treatment, but the 
emotion of love may produce undesirable treatment. As we have observed, 
love is an emotion that often produces loving actions -  yet it can also pro­
duce harmful ones. The family courts are unfortunately littered with cases 
where horrible things are done to children in the name of love. Children are 
routinely beaten by parents who love them. A child’s relationship with their 
parents is often defined by power and too often this power can be abused. 
Even in instances where parents may not be intentionally harming the child, 
actions done from a place of love in order to benefit the child may be harm­
ful. For example, the Victorian-era father who beats his child while saying 
‘This is going to hurt me more than you’ need not be lying. Or parents who 
spoil their children with the sweets they never had when young, but who 
therefore cause the children to become diabetic. Many parents have fol­
lowed bad childcare advice not through viciousness but through love, 
believing that what they were doing was for the good of the child. In such 
cases it would be difficult to argue that the parents did not love their child 
and therefore impossible to show that a duty had been breached.
Jeremy Waldron identified a similar situation in the case of marriage 
and posited the idea of rights as either ‘fall-backs’ or ‘constant constraints’ 
(Waldron 1988, p. 629). Waldron argues that often the bounds of love and 
affection will be enough to generate the type of treatment one wishes. For 
example, money is shared between partners because they wish to be gener­
ous not because of a claim-right to equal property. However the existence 
of these claim-rights is still necessary, despite the fact that a partner may 
not need to ‘stand on them’. They are necessary as ‘fall-backs’ if the rela­
tionship collapses. Fail-back rights are coupled with rights that act as ‘con­
stant constraints’. These constantly constrain the actions of the partners. 
For example, a wife may have a claim-right to bodily integrity that con­
stantly imposes a duty on her husband not to beat her. Liao seems to 
understand a child’s right to be loved as a claim-right of constant con­
straint, that parents should constantly love their child because they have a 
duty to do so. In fact it may be better to conceive of the relationship as 
such -  most often parents love their children and provide them with desir­
able treatment and children in this situation have no need to assert or stand 
upon their claim-rights. However sometimes love may produce undesirable 
outcomes or fail to produce desirable outcomes and children’s claim-rights 
to desirable treatment will need to be claimed and enforced. Throughout 
both situations there are claims of sufficient strength such as the right not 
be abused that constantly constrain parental behaviour. Consider how this 
may work in practice in family courts; if a child’s claim against their
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parents is cast in terms of love, then it is too easy for ‘bad’ parents to 
counter criticism with the retort that they in fact love their children. Focus­
ing on the actions rather than their motivations allows a clearer diagnosis 
of what is wrong with the relationship -  it is not the failure of loving emo­
tions, but the failure to translate these into beneficial actions towards the 
child.
The fact that love can go wrong does not disprove that it can be good, it 
simply demonstrates that ‘love’ as an emotion is not universally connected 
with desirable treatment and Liao’s (a)-(e) provisions. We have seen that 
children can benefit from caring treatment and intimate interaction without 
the emotional connection and, further, that actions resulting from this emo­
tional connection may in fact be detrimental to a child. Therefore the internal 
emotion of love is neither necessary nor sufficient for the child’s best inter­
ests and does not constitute a primary essential condition for a good life.
Some alternatives
The conception of a child’s right to be loved outlined above clearly demon­
strates empirical, structural and normative problems. However are there any 
conceivable alternative ways in which we can conceive of a right to be 
loved? Before dismissing the right to be loved altogether I wish to address 
here two alternative interpretations, namely: the right to be loved as a man­
ifesto right and the right to be loved as a claim-right against the State.
Love as a manifesto right
Joel Feinberg has argued that there is a well established practice in interna­
tional law where statesmen often speak of ‘rights’ when they are really 
concerned with the natural needs of deprived human beings. For example, 
take the assertion that orphans need a good upbringing. We know that in 
many places there are not enough resources immediately available to bring 
about this outcome. In these cases there are no determinate individuals who 
could actually hold the duty to provide the orphans with the goods they 
need, the claim therefore is not against anyone but an entitlement to some 
good (Feinberg 1970, p. 252). The statesmen are therefore, by referring to 
these basic needs as ‘rights’, are urging us to see them as worthy of sympa­
thy and consideration even though they cannot now be treated as rights 
proper that bring about duties within other people. Feinberg is willing to 
speak of these basic needs in a special ‘manifesto’ sense of a right and rec­
ognize that they need not be correlated with another’s duty. Manifesto 
rights are ‘the natural seeds from which rights grow’ (Feinberg 1970, 
p. 252). A child’s right to be loved may therefore be considered a 
‘manifesto right’, a fair use of rhetorical license. Understanding the right to 
be loved as a manifesto right would mean that the corresponding duty is
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not imperative. Without the necessity of a duty and duty-holder, many of 
the objections I have raised would no longer be relevant.
There are significant objections against allowing manifesto rights to be 
recognized as rights in any sense. For example, if rights do not necessitate 
a duty then we begin to lose the very political and moral weight that 
rights-talk holds. Rights may become nothing more than important goals. 
However the idea of a child’s right to be loved as a manifesto right can be 
countered without entering into potential objections of the concept, because 
the right to be loved cannot constitute a manifesto right. The important 
aspect of manifesto rights is that they are ‘laws that ought to be made’ or 
in Feinberg’s language, the seeds from which rights proper will grow. 
Manifesto rights are not considered ‘real rights’ because their correspond­
ing duties cannot be fulfilled due to a lack or scarcity of resources. The 
desire is that acquisition of resources will enable the manifesto right to 
become a fully fledged right with correlative duties. However the impedi­
ment to the child’s right to be loved is not one of scarcity. It is not the case 
that there is insufficient ‘love’ to go around but instead that ‘loving’ cannot 
ever constitute a duty. The impediment to the child’s right to be loved is 
not solved by the passage of time. Therefore the right to be loved cannot 
even be properly understood as a manifesto right.
Non-interference and architecture
Almost all international declarations and domestic conventions are State- 
centred; they are designed to regulate the actions of the State in regards to 
the individual, not the interpersonal actions of individuals. Given this 
aspect of international law we should consider the possibility that a child’s 
right to be loved is not a claim-right to receive love held against the child’s 
parents or care-giver, but a claim-right against the State. A claim-right 
against the State could be understood in two ways: (1) a duty in the State 
not to interfere with that love, and/or (2) a duty in the State to provide the 
architecture by which the love can be received.
The State’s duty of non-interference may consist of provisions such as 
not doing anything to prevent the development of a loving relationship 
between parent and child. For example, the State should not forcibly 
remove children from their parents or primary care-givers except in extreme 
need, nor should the State lie or mislead either parent or child as to the nat­
ure of the separation. Just that happened in Britain and Australia through­
out the 1920s to 1960s when 500,000 British children were removed to 
Australia. Not only were they removed but many families were told that 
their child had died and the children told that their parents did not love or 
want them anymore (Commonwealth of Australia 2001). Duties of non­
interference such as these are tangible and able to be enforced.
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In addition to duties of non-interference, the State may hold duties to 
provide the architecture in which a child could be loved. The State holds 
within its power the ability to modify institutional architecture to enable 
parental love to flourish. For examples programs such as paid paternity 
leave would allow parents and children more time together to develop 
bonds of love. It could also include not separating children from parents in 
immigration decisions and providing adequate visiting time for parents of 
children who are jailed.
Many of the provisions identified above already exist in the UN Conven­
tion for the Rights of the Child without any reference to love. For example, 
Article 7 states, ‘the child shall . . .  as far as possible, the right to know and 
be cared for by his or her parents’. Articles 9 and 10 provide that a child 
shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, and gives 
detailed explanation of the exceptions by which the separation may occur, 
including provisions for the State’s responsibilities in the event of the deten­
tion, deportment or death of the parents. Article 18 states that ‘State Parties 
shall render appropriate assistance to parents and legal guardians in the per­
formance of their child-rearing responsibilities and shall ensure the develop­
ment of institutions, facilities and services for the care of children’ and 
Article 20 asserts that children temporarily or permanently deprived of his or 
her family environment are entitled to special assistance by the State. These 
articles explicitly set out the type of provisions that would make up the con­
tent of the State’s duty of non-interference and provision of the architecture 
to allow love to flourish. CROC seeks to do this clearly and by effectively 
by identifying the duty-holder, claim-holder and action required without any 
mention of ‘love’. A child’s right to be loved as a claim-right against the 
State may be the most convincing way of interpreting the right to be loved 
but it is better expressed without mention of love. For this reason I argue that 
the right to be loved does not properly exist in this context either, for really 
it is only a re-badging of a range of other claim-rights, some of which 
children already hold within law, others of which are still to be codified.
The provisions creating the architecture of love come closest to the pol­
icy suggestions that Liao himself makes in the final section of his paper. 
Liao speaks of developing ‘institutional arrangements that would adequately 
provide for children’s various essential needs’ such as compulsory parenting 
classes and changes to the current single family adoption scheme (Liao 
2006, p. 439). These two policy suggestions seem to be advocating the 
involvement of government in enhancing institutions to increase the possi­
bility that more children are loved -  in short to provide the necessary archi­
tecture. The policies he explores do not relate to a child’s claim to be loved 
held directly against her parents or care-givers -  the very theory for which 
he spent so long arguing. A quick look at the type of policies that would be 
needed in order to enforce such a right, may provide good reason for why 
Liao avoids confronting it. Teachers or friends may have a responsibility to
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report the parents of any child they suspected were not being loved. How­
ever how would a teacher or friend establish the presence or absence of 
love? Would we accept a child’s assertion that she is being loved? No, as 
Liao argues, because if she is mistaken in her belief then the duty is still not 
being fulfilled. Maybe trained authorities could judge the presence of love 
in a parent-child relationship? Finally, if it were possible to identify a 
breach of duty it seems inconceivable that we could force a parent to love 
their child in the same way that we enforce other duties such as debt repay­
ments. If there is no way to remedy the claim after it has been abrogated 
then maybe the only way to enforce the right is to prevent the breach from 
ever occurring. For example, we may envision that those who are deemed 
unable to provide proper parental love would not be allowed to have chil­
dren. Prospective parents may need to sit some sort of ‘love test’ the same 
way in which prospective adoptive parents are subjected to intense scrutiny, 
not just of their material ability to provide for the child but of their psycho­
logical endowments (Lafollette 1980). In such a policy autistic couples may 
well never be able to have children due to their inability to perform actions 
that the strict definition of parental love calls for. The objector may say that 
these examples are simply ridiculous, however they are only ridiculous 
given the ridiculous nature of the right itself.
Conclusion
I am not seeking to argue that children should not be loved. Children 
should ideally be loved by their care-givers who genuinely care for the 
child’s interests and combine this with loving treatment and respect for the 
rights of the child. Parental love is a particular and unique experience; it is 
something that is often cherished by those who grew up with it and by par­
ents who feel it towards their children. It is almost always a desirable state 
of affairs.
Liao seeks to provide the philosophical basis for a statement many peo­
ple may find self-evident -  that children have a right to such love. I sought 
to demonstrate in this paper that although many people may feel that it 
seems right that children should be loved, this does not equate to a right as 
a claim. Liao’s argument fails to establish a child’s right to be loved exists, 
as opposed a simple right to desirable treatment. The scientific literature 
used to substantiate the claim that parental love is a primary essential con­
dition for a good life is insufficient. It does not even show that Liao’s (a) 
to (e) provisions are essential conditions. Instead it shows that short-term 
separations cause distress, but can be countered by improving institutional 
care and stimulation. Experiential or sensory privation can lead to a lack of 
physical and cognitive development but this can be reversed by increasing 
stimulation which does not have to be linked to the primary care-giver. 
Finally, children who grow up in institutions or are exposed to multiple
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changing care-givers can suffer lasting social consequences from the lack 
of bond formation in early childhood.
Even if Liao had sufficient empirical evidence, loving cannot be a duty. 
Loving is a reason for action and not an action itself. This double claim 
states that the ‘emotional aspect’ is not an action and that to include it in 
the discourse of rights is to misunderstand the nature of a duty. It is also 
unclear what the relationship is between the emotional aspect of parental 
love and the (a) to (e) provisions. I have shown that the emotional compo­
nent does not always result in desirable treatment. A claim to love does not 
always achieve that which it is constructed to protect.
Finally 1 considered two alternative interpretations of a child’s right to 
be loved: love as a manifesto right and love as a claim-right against the 
State. Manifesto rights are defined by the understanding that they can 
become legal rights. The right to be loved is constrained by conceptual 
impediments, not issues of scarcity, and therefore can never become a fully 
fledged right. A child’s claim-right against the State seems to be an inter­
pretation that could be realized as a legal right. However the United 
Nations Convention for the Rights of the Child lays out these provisions 
individually and in far more detail than any consideration of a right to be 
loved could accomplish.
Children’s rights should be statements defining the relationship between 
the interests of the child and the duties to which they give rise. These 
duties are actions or inactions that are in some way able to be achieved by 
the duty-holder and are properly understood to lie both with the State and 
with individuals with whom the child frequently comes in contact. In this 
way a child’s rights begin to sketch out the relationships they have with 
the rest of the world, but are by no means an exhaustive description. There 
is much to be done in the area of children’s rights. If one wishes to 
increase the effectiveness of the care and protection given to children, one 
should concentrate on establishing moral and philosophical grounding for 
rights that are currently given little attention by adults and the State -  such 
as a child’s economic rights and to fair political representation -  rather than 
confusing rights with love.
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Notes
1. For detailed analysis of these domestic documents, see Veerman (1992).
2. Exceptions include Liao (2006), MacCormick (1982) and Archard (2004).
3. For children’s status as right holders, see Archard (2004), Campbell (1992), 
MacCormick (1982), O’Neill (1988) and Purdy (1994).
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ABSTRACT
In many countries, including Australia, governments have legislated against 
anonymous gamete donation. A recent Australian Senate inquiry has reinforced 
this position and has supported non-anonymous donation grounded in a child’s 
right to know the identity of their genetic parents. This article will consider the 
main reasons for the existence of such a light and will argue that it must first be 
shown that there exists a right to know the nature of one’s conception before a 
right to identifying information regarding one’s donor can be properly respected. 
The existence of such a right requires that the principle of ‘no harm, no foul’ is 
false in the case of non-disclosure of a child's genetic origins. Establishing this is 
imperative to guide Australian legislation regulating and protecting a child’s 
right to know their genetic parents. In this paper, I consider two arguments to 
overcome no harm, no foul -  the argument from risk of harm and the argument 
from respect. If no harm, no foul does not hold, then the state in Australia will 
hold a duty not only to allow donor-conceived children access to identifying 
information regarding their donors but also a duty to ensure disclosure regarding 
the nature of the child’s conception in the first place.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
On a Friday night, I go to a bar to meet a friend who has told me she 
has had a terrible week and needs to unwind. When my friend arrives, 
she is wearing a very ugly dress; it accentuates all the wrong features 
and makes her look unattractive. After greeting me, she says ‘do you 
like my dress? I just bought it today!’ I smile, tell her she looks fantastic 
and buy her a drink. In this, I pretend to like her outfit and pretend she 
looks good when in fact the truth is quite the opposite. Yet in withholding 
the truth from her, I have done her no harm; in fact, I may have even 
done her some good. If I had told her that she looked a wreck, she may 
have sunk into further depression and failed to enjoy her night out; by 
choosing to tell her she looks fantastic, I have spared her of the harm 
that may have resulted from learning the truth.
© The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, 
please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.
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For many Australian parents of children conceived using donated 
gametes, this is a very persuasive logic.1 If the child is never told that 
they were donor-conceived, then they are saved from any psychological 
dam age, or ‘genealogical bew ilderm ent’, that may arise from  the 
knowledge that the people who have raised them are not their genetic 
relations. ‘No harm, no foul’, right?2 Why does a child have a right to 
know they are donor-conceived if such knowledge will cause them 
harm and being separated from this knowledge will protect them from 
such harm? It seems that the no harm, no foul rule presents a strong 
argum ent against openness in cases such as these. In order to explain 
why a child has a right to know their genetic parents, we must not only 
show why it is im portant that a child, once knowing they are donor- 
conceived, has access to inform ation regarding their donor, but also 
why it is im portant that children are told of the nature of their 
conception in the first place.
In this article, I will first give some background by briefly outlining 
the differing legislative positions across the States and Territories in 
Australia and highlighting the recent recom mendation by the 2011 
Australian Senate, Legal, and Constitutional Affairs References Committee 
report on donor conception practices in Australia (hereafter Senate 
Inquiry Report) for separate but uniform legislation across the country. 
The Senate Committee’s recommendations, taken with the respective 
legislation of the States and Territories, indicate strong support 
for non-anonymous donation throughout Australia, based on a child’s 
right to know their genetic parents.
Part Two of the article will then consider the three most commonly 
cited reasons for moving to a system of non-anonymous donation:3 (i) 
that children have an interest in knowing their true medical and genetic 
history, (ii) that children have an interest in knowing their genetic 
family in o rder to avoid concerns of consanguinity, and finally (iii) 
that children who are aware that they are donor-conceived suffer 
psychologically when they are denied information about their origins 
and identity. An appeal to this third reason, arguably the most 
convincing of the three, is open to the response that children should 
therefore no t be told about the nature of their conception at all. It 
is difficult to resolve this problem  by referring to traditional ideas of 
harming.
Therefore, in order to support the position that children have a right 
to know the ir genetic parents, we must show that children have a 
right to be told of their genetic origins in the first place. I will explore 
two alternative arguments in support of this latter claim. First, non­
disclosure generates strong risks for the donor-conceived child. Second, 
even if these risks could be mitigated, children have a right to be treated 
with respect and truth-telling about information regarding one’s life 
course is intimately tied up with respect for an individuaFs identity.
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I conclude that the second argum ent constitutes good cause for 
rejecting no harm, no foul.
If the no harm, no foul principle does not hold, then Australian 
governments may have an obligation not only to allow access of donor- 
identifying information to donor-conceived individuals but also to 
ensure these individuals are inform ed of their status as right holders 
in the first place. In the final section of the article, I argue that if a 
ch ild ’s right to know their genetic parents does indeed  imply a right 
to disclosure, then governm ents may have to ensure or enforce this 
disclosure.
1 .  A U S T R A L I A  A N D  A N O N Y M O U S  D O N O R  C O N C E P T I O N  
A. History of Anonymity in Australia
Donated gametes are sperm or eggs donated from a third party to 
produce a pregnancy through artificial reproductive technologies 
(ART). In ART, pregnancy is achieved by intracervical insemination or 
intrauterine insemination of donated sperm, or less commonly through 
in vitro fertilisation (IVF) using donated sperm or eggs or both. Sperm 
and egg donation can be done directly between individuals, but for the 
purposes of this paper, I will focus primarily on gamete donation 
facilitated through clinics. Preserving the anonymity of gamete donors 
in ART procedures in Australia was the norm until very recently. Secrecy 
and donor anonymity were initially considered essential for legal, 
social, and policy reasons; however, these once persuasive reasons have 
lost their resonance.
Legally, donor anonymity was necessary to allow the donor-conceived 
child to be properly seen as the legal child of the social parents.4 
Anonymity not only gave the social father rights over the child but also 
pro tected  the donor from incurring any legal duties towards the 
child (Dewar, 1989; O ’Donovan, 1989). However, in the 1970s and 
1980s, legislation was enacted by all Australian States and Territories, 
protecting the legal status of children conceived by donor conception.5 
This removed the legal rationale for secrecy. A second reason for 
secrecy arose from negative public attitudes. D onors were viewed 
with suspicion, especially as donation involved masturbation. The close 
association in people’s minds with eugenic practices, as well as the 
perceived shame of infertility, added to negative perceptions (Daniels 
and Taylor, 1993: 157-9; Firth, 2001). However, public attitudes have 
largely changed. Indeed, fertility technology is now seen as a treatm ent 
that couples have a right to access (see the debate in Uniacke, 1987). The 
third and final argum ent for preserving anonymity claims that without 
anonymity to protect donors, rates of sperm and egg donation would 
drop, thereby denying many infertile couples access to trea tm ent.6 
However, this argum ent too has lost resonance. In Sweden, the first
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country to move to an open system of gamete donation, donation rates 
initially slumped when anonymity was abolished in 1985, but they soon 
rose back to normal levels (Daniels and Lalos, 1997; Turkmendag et al, 
2008: 288). Victoria in Australia has shown similar findings (Blood 
et al, 1998). However. I will briefly return  to this objection in more 
detail at the end of the article.
Just as the reasons to preserve anonymity have largely fallen away, 
the reasons against anonymity have grown stronger. There is now a 
community of adult donor-conceived individuals who argue that they 
have a right to know their genetic parents (Turner and Coyle, 2000). In 
response to the advocacy of donor-conceived individuals and the 
removal of countervailing considerations, in 1988 Victoria became the 
second jurisdiction in the world (following Sweden) and the first in 
Australia to adopt a non-anonymous system of gam ete donation, 
whereby children were allowed access to the identity of their donors. 
Since then, many countries have adopted similar systems.7
B. Legislation in Australia Today
The current legislative position within Australia is characteristically 
fragmented. The regulatory framework of ART has been described as 
‘a patchwork . . . lacking cohesion and order’ (Szoke, 2003). There is 
no Commonwealth legislation governing donor conception in Australia 
and there is considerable debate regarding whether the Commonwealth 
is constitutionally empowered to legislate in this area (Schneller, 2005: 
228; Szoke, 2003: 75) At present, each State and Territory has the 
legislative power to regulate gamete donation; however, only four 
states, Western Australia (WA), South Australia (SA), New South Wales 
(NSW), and Victoria (Vic), have done so. There remains no legislation 
in Tasmania (Tas), Queensland (Qld), the Northern Territory (NT), or 
the Australian Capital Territory (ACT).
Amongst the States that do have legislation, the approach and 
direction differ greatly. Victoria, WA, and NSW all recognise a child’s 
right to know their genetic parents and do not allow clinics to accept 
anonymous gamete donations. Victoria and NSW allow donor-conceived 
individuals, aged 18 years and over, to access identifying information 
regarding their donor by contacting the respective State registers. 
WA allows donor-conceived individuals aged 16 years and above to 
access identifying information after they have completed compulsory 
counselling. Importantly, WA, Vic, and NSW explicitly in terp re t a 
child’s right to know their genetic parents as encompassing a right to 
identifying information regarding their donor, and recognise a state 
responsibility to enable access to this identifying inform ation. SA 
legislation does not explicitly state that a child has a right to know, 
though this is implicit within the requirement to adhere to NHMRC
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guidelines, which specif)' that ‘persons conceived using ART procedures 
are entitled to know their genetic parents’ (Part B, 6.1: 25). SA has not, 
however, undertaken the responsibility for enabling access to this 
information through the establishment of a register (SA legislation has 
recently been am ended to enable the establishment of a register in the 
future if desired). At the moment, individuals must contact the clinic 
directly.
Although there exists no Commonwealth legislation, the Commonwealth 
still exerts some influence over the regulation of gam ete donation 
within Australia. The National H ealth and Medical Research Council 
(NHMRC), Australia’s leading statutory body on health and medical 
research, was established by Commonwealth legislation.9 The Prohibition 
of H um an Cloning for Reproduction and the Regulation of H um an 
Embryo Research A m endm ent Act (2006) establishes that all clinics 
operating in States or Territories where no existing legislation exists 
must still comply with the NHMRC guidelines and the Fertility 
Society of Australia’s Reproductive Technology Accreditation Code of 
Practice (2010) in order to obtain accreditation. ACT, NT, and Qld do 
not have legislation regulating donation, although they are subject to 
NHMRC Guidelines as indicated above. The NHMRC Guidelines specify 
that ‘persons conceived using ART procedures are entitled to know 
their genetic parents’ (Part B, 6.1: 25). Therefore, even where there is 
no explicit legislation, it is im plicit through the registration process 
that all children in Australia have a right to know their genetic 
parents. Significantly, in ACT, NT, and Qld, as in SA, it is left to the 
donor-conceived individual to identify and contact the correct clinic to 
obtain identifying information.
Australia is also a signatory to the United Nation Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CROC), which has been invoked by theorists as a 
potential additional basis to support a child’s right to know their genetic 
parents. Article 3, the prim ary guiding principle of the Convention, 
states that parties must act in the best interests of the child. Furthermore, 
Article 7 states that children have a right to a name and nationality, and 
Article 8 states that children have a right to the preservation of their 
identity. Yet there is debate regarding whether CROC really can support 
a donor-conceived child’s right to know their genetic parents. Blair 
(2002) argues that CROC does not support an unequivocal right of 
access, as the original in ten t of the drafters was not to encom pass 
reproductive technologies. Tobin however puts forward a strong 
argum ent that the combined force of articles within CROC provides a 
basis for such a right (2004).
In February 2011, an inquiry by the Australian Senate’s Constitutional 
and Fegal Affairs Committee produced a set of recommendations that 
overwhelmingly supported  legislation against anonym ous donation 
and reiterated a child’s right to know their genetic parents. However,
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the Committee noted that the varied approaches between States with 
legislation, and the lack of legislation in the o ther States and Territories, 
were leading to confusion and in some instances breaches of the child’s 
right to know (Senate Inquiry Report, 2011, sec 2.3: 7). It recom m ended 
separate but uniform legislation across all the jurisdictions, facilitated 
through  the Standing Comm ittee of Attorneys G eneral (SCAG) 
mechanism. It seems clear, then, that the Commonwealth will continue 
to support a system of non-anonymous gamete donation. A clear basis 
for non-anonymous donation needs to be established if Australia is to 
in troduce uniform  legislation. In order to clarify the duties that 
governments hold in protecting a child’s right to know, we must be clear 
about the basis for this right. In the next section, I identify the three 
main arguments that ground a child’s right to know their genetic parents.
2 . A C H I L D ’S RIGHT TO KNOW
In order to properly understand the duties that lie with the state,10 we 
must identify why a child has a right to know their genetic parents. 
There are scholars that hold that rights can only be awarded to those 
that have the capacity to make rational choices and that this necessarily 
excludes children (H art, 1984; Steiner, 1994). However, it is widely 
acknowledged that the interest theory of rights allows children to be 
properly understood as right holders and aligns to our commonsense 
understanding of children’s rights (Archard, 2004, Campbell, 1994; 
Cowden, 2012; MacCormick, 1975). Therefore, throughout this article, 
I assume a ‘right’ to be a claim that is grounded in an interest held by 
a claim holder that is worthy of protection and therefore creates a duty 
in others. Therefore, we must identify what interest of the claim holder, 
the donor-conceived child, is of such sufficient importance that it creates 
a duty to allow them access to identifying inform ation about their 
genetic parents. In short, what interest grounds this right? In this 
section, I will consider the three main reasons cited in support of a 
child’s right to know their genetic parents: the importance of genetic 
and medical history, the risk of consanguinity, and psychological harm.
A. Genetic and Medical History
People have an interest in accessing genetic and medical information 
about their genetic parents. It is in a child’s interests to have knowledge 
of congenital diseases or traits that run in her (genetic) family. This is 
im portant for diagnosing and treating diseases, and also for making 
fully informed family-planning decisions (Dennison, 2007: 14). False 
assumptions regarding one’s medical history can lead to an individual 
being misdiagnosed, unknowingly forgoing important care or undergoing 
unnecessary treatment (Lamport, 1988). This concern seems to constitute 
an interest worthy of protection.
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However, even if this interest is of sufficient im portance to ground a 
right, the duty it produces would not necessarily entail knowing o ne’s 
donor. This interest can be protected without revealing identifying 
information about the donor. Indeed, information about the donor’s 
medical and genetic history is already released to the families of most 
donor-conceived individuals before the treatm ent begins. Clinicians 
often consider that they have met reasonable demands about genetic 
histories by the careful screening of potential donors for a great variety 
of heritable diseases and characteristics (Dennison, 2007: 14; McWhinnie, 
1995: 815). For example, the Californian Cryobank provides a quarterly 
catalogue of donors detailing inform ation from  blood type, medical 
history to hair colour and the highest education level attained 
(California Cryobank, 2011). In Australia, the social parents are allowed 
access to the medical and genetic history of the donor, while still being 
denied  identifying inform ation (NHMRC G uidelines). Even if this 
non-identifying information had not been previously provided or an 
unexpected situation arose whereby genetic testing of the donor was 
needed, this could be done without revealing the donor’s identity.
So one’s interest in genetic and medical history can ground a right 
to non-identifying information, but it is not clear why this interest would 
be sufficient to allow children access to identifying information and to 
know their genetic parents. This interest would be most appropriately 
protected by building more detailed donor profiles rather than revealing 
the donor’s identity. The comprehensive genetic screening undertaken 
by clinics is usually far more detailed than an individual’s own knowledge 
of their family health history (Dennison, 2007: 14). Therefore, the 
child’s claim to the genetic and medical history of their genetic parents 
cannot alone be the basis for identifying inform ation about o n e ’s 
genetic parents.
B. Consanguinity
Many donor-conceived children are concerned  about the risk of 
unknowingly form ing a sexual relationship with their genetic half­
sibling. Consanguineous relationships can increase the risk of serious 
genetic disease in resultant children (Schull, 1958). If consanguineous 
couples do have children, they should undertake genetic counselling 
and screening, a process that most couples will only undertake if they 
are aware they are consanguineous. In addition, consanguinity may 
have adverse legal consequences. In Australia, the Marriage Act 1961 
(Cth) states that marriage is void when it is between a half-brother and 
-sister (Commonwealth of Australia, Subsection 23(2)). However, the 
chances of a consanguineous relationship occurring seem to be very 
low. In evidence given to the Australian Senate Inquiry, one witness 
stated, . . there is no adjective which accurately describes just how tiny
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this chance really is’ (Senate Inquiry Report, 2011: 70). Yet this remains 
a real concern for donor-conceived individuals (Dennison, 2007: 15). 
As noted by another witness:
[ijt is not just the issue of consanguineous relationships, which are statistically 
unlikely; it is the psychological impact on the child who, for a fellow, will be 
wondering about every girl he sees, “Is she my half-sister?”
Yet if we take this as a legitimate interest, albeit one based in being 
psychologically secure rather than statistical importance, again there 
exist many ways to address this concern w ithout providing donor- 
conceived children with the identity of their donor.
Currently within Australia, there are limits to the num ber of families 
that may receive gametes from a single donor. In WA and New South 
Wales, this limit is set at 5 families and in Victoria it is 10 (Human 
Reproductive Technology Directions [WA] para 8.1; Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Act 2007 [NSW] s 27 (1); Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 
2008 [Vic] s 29). This restriction is designed to reduce the statistical 
possibility of individuals forming consanguineous relationships, although 
there has been some criticism about inconsistent enforcement of these 
limits (Senate Inquiry Report, 2011: 73). Yet even if limits on the number 
of families to whom donors can donate prove ineffective, other steps can 
be taken to address these concerns. In the UK, long before the removal 
of anonymity, donor-conceived individuals could contact the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority and request information about 
whether their prospective partner is a genetic relation. The Authority 
would then check the register and let the donor-conceived individual 
know without revealing the identity of the donor (Blyth and Hunt, 1998).
Given the statistical rarity of consanguineous relationships and the 
fact that they can be prevented by revealing non-identifying information 
regarding the relation between two donor-conceived individuals, this 
interest does not seem sufficient to ground a right to access identifying 
inform ation about o n e ’s genetic parents. It cannot ground a ch ild ’s 
right to know their genetic parents.
C. Psychological Harm
The most persuasive basis for a child’s right to know their genetic 
parents is that lack of access to identifying inform ation about an 
individual’s donor can lead to psychological harm . Most donor- 
conceived children report a feeling of loss of identity, and what has 
been term ed ‘genealogical bewilderment’ when they are not allowed 
access to identifying inform ation regarding their genetic parents. As 
one advocate website stated, ‘who we are is partly inherited -  it is the 
beginning of our life story, knowing our history helps to understand 
who we are’ (Parentlink, 2011). For many donor-conceived children, 
the importance of knowing their donor does not lie in issues of medical
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history or consanguinity, but rather in a deeper understanding of who 
they are and where they sit in the world in relation to others. One 
witness told the Australian senate inquiry:
I cannot begin to describe how dehumanizing and powerless I am to know that 
the name and details about my biological father and my entire paternal family 
sit somewhere in a filing cabinet . . . with no means to access it. Information 
about own family, my roots, my identity. (Senate Inquiry Report, 2011, 77)
A nother man, conceived by donated gametes in the 1970’s, described 
the feelings and trauma he had lived with his whole life:
After having children of my own and holding them in my arms, I came to 
realize what my conception had truly deprived me of. I had lost kinship, my 
heritage, my identity and my health history. This realization was crushing, 
depressing and immensely painful . . . the consequences of my conception 
had profound implications and affected me deeply without my even knowing 
it, and it is something that will negatively impact on me for the rest of my life. 
Every day I have to get up and look at a face in the m irror that I do not know. 
As a teenager, I struggled constantly with my sense of self and identity. (Senate 
Hansard, November 2010)
In 1964, Sants (1964: 113-41) dem onstrated that adopted  children 
may develop psychological difficulties regarding identity if information 
about their origins and details of their genetic parents were not made 
available. Further studies have confirmed that for adoptees, not 
knowing their biological origins led to an incomplete sense of self that 
resulted in low self-esteem and a threat to their identity (Brodzinsky et 
al, 1992; Krueger-Jago and Hanna, 1997). Many commentators argue 
that the findings arising from the study of adopted children apply 
equally to children conceived by donor gametes, that in having 
conclusive evidence of this harm we should work to prevent it occurring 
again (Dennison, 2007; McWhinnie, 2001; McGee et al, 2001). Others, 
however, have disputed this claim. Shenfield (1994) and Turkmendag 
et al (2008) maintain that the position of adopted children is dissimilar 
to donor-conceived children as adopted children are abandoned 
whereas donor-conceived children are wanted and are usually genetically 
related to one of their social parents. Nevertheless, emerging research 
about the experiences of donor-conceived children supports the 
contrary view. The first study of adult donor-conceived individuals 
found a diversity of negative experience resulting from  no t knowing 
their genetic parents. Participants reported feelings of ‘genetic 
discontinuity’, shock, deceit, mistrust of family, abandonm ent by donor 
and practitioners, frustration, and loss due to lack of information 
(Turner and Coyle, 2002). Although their study is of a relatively small 
sample size and participants were recruited from donor support groups, 
the evidence is growing that access to identifying information regarding
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one’s genetic parents is essential to a child’s mental health (Scheib, 
Riordan and Rubiri, 2003).
Unlike concerns about medical and genetic history or consanguinity, 
one’s interest in being free from psychological harm cannot be 
rem edied by non-identifying information about the donor. The very 
harm  arises from a lack of knowledge about the donor’s identity. 
Providing identifying information will allow donor-conceived individuals 
the opportunity to place a name, a face, and a person in a space that 
was once empty. It allows individuals the opportunity to contact and 
know their donor, to complete their family history, and to fulfil their 
own sense of identity. Many donor-conceived individuals, having been 
presented with the opportunity to contact their donor, have reported a 
sense of fulfilment, contentedness, and even enrichm ent in the new 
family relationships they have formed (Senate Inquiry Report, 2011: 
78-80). As Turner and Coyle reported , donor-conceived individuals 
expressed a:
need and a right to know who their donor fathers are and, if possible, to have 
some sort of relationship with them. It seems, therefore, that for these donor 
offspring, ‘non-identifying’ information might not be sufficient to m eet their 
identity needs. (Turner and Coyle, 2000: 2050)
Therefore, the interest in being free from psychological harm seems to 
present the most convincing argum ent that an individual has a right 
not only to information about their donor’s medical and genetic history 
or about who they might be related to but also to information about 
who their donor actually is.
3 . N O  H A R M,  N O F O U L
Yet if one’s right to know one’s genetic parents is grounded in an 
interest to be free from psychological harm, surely a more effective way 
to protect children from this harm is not to tell them about the nature 
of their conception at all. When one has a sense of identity and genetic 
history that seems to be so im portant for the psychology of an individual, 
does it m atter that this genetic history and identity is false? Just as my 
friend may have a better night not knowing that she is wearing an ugly 
dress, a donor-conceived child may lead a better life not knowing that 
their social parents are not their genetic relations. The best way to 
protect an individual’s right to be free from psychological harm  seems 
to be not to tell them of the nature of their conception at all.
Indeed, this seems to be the most common reaction from parents. 
Worldwide, disclosure rates are very low. It appears that that legislating 
the child’s right to know does not necessarily communicate the message 
to potential parents that they have an obligation to tell their child of 
their genetic origins. In the UK, where there is a legal right to access
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identifying information, only 5 per cent of parents have informed their 
adolescent children about their genetic origins. Similar rates exist in 
Italy (0 per cent), Spain (4 per cent), and The Netherlands (23 per cent) 
(Golombok et al, 1996, 2002a,b; Scheib, Riordan and Rubiri, 2003). 
Blood et al, 1998 have reported similar findings in Australia. These low 
rates are not necessarily due merely to the short time the legislation has 
been in force. Sweden’s legislation was introduced in 1985, yet in 2000 
still only 11 per cent of parents had informed their children of the 
nature of their conception. A 2004 study indicated that by then 46 per 
cent intended to tell; however, this still falls below a majority of parents 
(Golombok et al, 2004; Gottlieb et al, 2000). The option of keeping a 
child’s genetic origins secret is often not available to parents of adopted 
children. Gamete donation, however, offers the opportunity  of a 
pregnancy that appears to the child and to outsiders to be a product 
of natural conception .11 Obviously, this is only true for heterosexual 
couples; same-sex couples m ust necessarily be open about the nature 
of the conception (Vanfraussen et al, 2001: 2019).12 Therefore, in the 
following I will be primarily concerned with heterosexual couples who 
choose to keep the involvement of donated gametes a secret.
A. Inadequacy of Arguments from Harm
It is difficult to refute the no harm, no foul principle by appealing to 
traditional ideas of harm ing. Not disclosing the nature of a ch ild ’s 
conception does not seem to constitute harm to the child. Traditional 
notions of harm ing are most commonly expressed in the ‘harm  
principle’, famously articulated by John Stuart Mill (1985/1859: 22), 
holding that ‘the only purpose, for which power can be rightly exercised 
over any member of a civilised community against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others’. It follows that if no harm is caused to others by your 
actions, then you have no reason not to engage in that action.
What, then, is harm and how do we tell when it has been caused? 
According to Feinberg, harm must lead to some kind of adverse effect 
on its victim’s interests -  distinguishable components of a person’s good 
or well-being (1986: 145-6). To demonstrate the way in which harm ing 
works, Feinberg introduces the idea of an interest graph. For example, 
to set back an interest is to reverse its course on the graph, to thwart an 
interest may be to stop its progress without necessarily putting  it in 
reverse and to impede an interest is to slow down its progress without 
necessarily stopping or reversing it (Feinberg, 1986: 147). For an action 
to constitute prima facie harm, it must satisfy the ‘worsening test’, that 
B’s interest is in a worse condition on the in terest graph than it was 
before A acted.
Non-disclosure fails to satisfy the worsening test. Studies seem to 
indicate that donor-conceived children are not harm ed when they are
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not told about the nature of their conception. Indeed, they m ight 
benefit from ignorance about the nature of their conception. In the 
comparative studies conducted by Golombok, four groups of children -  
conceived naturally, by donor insemination (DI), by IVF, and adopted -  
underw ent standardised tests and observational procedures. The 
children conceived by donor conception were not told of the nature of 
their conception. The quality of the parent-child relationship in DI 
families, IVF families, and adoptive families em erged as better than 
in the control group of natural conception families (Golombok et al, 
1996,1998; Golombok, 1998). This suggests that a child’s interest in being 
free from psychological traum a would measure highly on the interest 
chart when they do not know the truth about their conception. Telling 
them of the truth would almost necessarily lead to a downward trend in 
this interest, whereas concealing the truth would allow the interest to 
continue, up or down, as it would if the child were naturally conceived.
Yet not all harms are ‘worsening’ harms -  in order to show conclusively 
that the action is not harm ful we must also show that it fails the 
‘counterfactual test’. The counterfactual test states that harm exists if 
B’s interest is in a worse condition than it would be had A not acted as 
he did. To use Feinberg’s example, suppose the hot favourite for the 
Miss America contest is detained on the eve of the competition, and 
that if she had competed she would certainly have won the prize of a 
million dollars. She is no worse off than she was before the detention, 
but she is much worse off than she would have been if she were not 
detained (1986: 149). It is even possible to improve B’s condition while 
counterfactually harming them. Suppose I go to see the doctor with an 
ear infection. My doctor prescribes painkillers that alleviate my pain, 
but the infection still lasts another 2 weeks and significantly drains my 
energy. If my doctor had prescribed a course of antibiotics, the infection 
may have cleared up immediately. My doctor’s negligence adversely 
affected my interests even though I am better off from his actions than 
I would be had he not acted at all.
Is the child’s interest in being free from psychological traum a worse 
off than it would have been if their parents decided to disclose the 
nature of their conception? As we have seen, knowledge of o n e ’s 
status of being a donor-conceived person often brings negative 
psychosocial consequences. However, we must acknowledge that this 
might not always be the case. Indeed, some donor-conceived children 
born to same-sex partners are well-balanced and secure in their 
identity (Vanfraussen etal, 2001). Yet in the pure com parison between 
the two counterfactuals’ respective positions on the interest chart, 
the position of the non-disclosure situation will still sit comfortably 
higher than the disclosure situation. We are com paring a harm-free 
existence to one where the child will inevitably have to deal with a 
difficult situation -  even if some children deal with it relatively well.
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So the non-disclosure action fails the counterfactual test as well as the 
worsening test.
At this point, we must take time to address the objection that the 
definition of harm offered above is too narrow as it relies on harm 
being understood in experiential terms. Harms can occur when we are 
not aware of them (Archard, 2007). Consider, eg, that my colleague’s 
work is badly mistranslated into another language in a way that grossly 
misrepresents his views. This mistranslation causes damage to his 
reputation in another country, to the point that one university decides 
not to offer him a prestigious invitation. Even though my colleague is 
unaware of the mistranslation, the resulting damage to his reputation 
or the lost opportunity, he has clearly been harm ed as his interest in 
advancing his career has been set back. This constitutes a case of non- 
experiential harm. However, in our case of non-disclosure, the very 
harm we are trying to avoid is one that only arises from knowledge or 
awareness. Unlike the m istranslation case, which involves a clear 
setback in concrete interests, it is still unclear what interest is being set 
back when one is unaware of o n e ’s genetic origins. It cannot be that 
I am harmed when I am unaware of my genetic origins simply because 
I have an interest in being aware of my genetic origins -  such an 
argum ent would attem pt to pull the case for disclosure up by its 
bootstraps. Unlike the m istranslation case, we cannot identify an 
independent harm that exists without the child’s knowledge.
If the right to know one’s genetic parents is grounded solely in one’s 
interest in being free from psychological harm, then the availability of 
the total non-disclosure option seems to render the right nugatory. 
Social parents may point to the no harm, no foul principle, and argue 
that they can protect the child by keeping the nature of their conception 
a secret, rather than disclosing the donor’s identity. So while even 
though a child may have a legal right to access identifying information 
about their donor, they will not know that this information even exists 
unless they are first told by their parents that they are donor-conceived. 
Therefore, in order to continue to support the notion that donor- 
conceived children have a right to know their genetic parents, we must 
find some way to overcome the no harm, no foul principle and show 
that children also have a claim to be told the nature of their conception.
4 . R I S K  OF  H A R M  A N D  R E S P E C T
In this section, I p resent two argum ents tha t may support the right 
to know, independently  of traditional notions of harm ing. First is 
the argum ent that children have a claim to be told the tru th  because 
they have an interest in no t being exposed to the risk o f harm  in 
non-disclosure, and second that disclosing the tru th  about the 
nature of the ch ild ’s conception is a form of respectful behaviour
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towards the child, and that the child has an interest in being treated  
with respect.
A. Risk of Harm
The risk of harm , as opposed to harm itself, may offer a credible 
grounding for a ch ild’s in terest in being told the tru th  about their 
genetic origins. The risk of a donor-conceived child finding out about 
their conception from someone else is quite high. In Golombok’s study, 
89% of parents had not inform ed their child about the nature of their 
conception, but 53% had told other people (Golombok et al, 1999). 
A New Zealand study found that 75% of couples had inform ed others 
of the nature of the conception of their child (Daniels, 1988: 380). 
Even when doctors and clinics had advised couples not to, most had 
told someone else (Manuel, Chevret and Czyba, 1980; Klock and Maier, 
1991; Lasker and Borg, 1989). Even if they are not directly told, donor- 
conceived children may pick up on signals caused by secrecy as they 
grow older (Brewaeys, 1996). Baran and Pannor reported  that DC 
children often feel like they ‘do not fit in . . . because of differences in 
physical features, characteristics and talents’ (1993). Furtherm ore, 
McGee argues that as genetic technology becomes more advanced, 
genetic screening -  which may inadvertently reveal paternity -  will 
becom e m ore and m ore com m on, further increasing the risk of 
discovering the nature of one’s conception (McGee, 2007).
Not only is the risk of harm high but also the gravity of the potential 
barm  increases as the child becomes older and is not told of their 
genetic origins. Children who are told early have neutral or positive 
responses (Daniels and Lalos, 1997). In Australia, Kane’s research 
shows that:
people who have been informed as young children appear to have a very clear 
sense of who is their father -  it is the man who raised them, even when it has 
been a difficult or distant relationship. (Johnson and Kane, 2007: 125)
Parentlink recommends that, in order to reduce the risk of harm, 
children should not need to be ‘told’ of their conception, rather they 
should simply always have known. They argue that ‘children should 
grow up with this knowledge rather than be told in a way that makes it 
seem unusual. From a very early age it can be woven into your child’s 
understanding  of who she is -  even if you feel she is too young to 
understand’ (Parentlink, 2011). As mentioned earlier in the paper, 
individuals who are told later in life are far more likely to report feelings 
of stress and psychological trauma.
We may (and do) prohibit risky behaviour because of the high likelihood 
that harm will arise. For example, dangerous driving, such as speeding 
or running a red light, is usually harmless; yet we prohibit this risky
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action in order to prevent potential harm. Similarly, we may say that 
non-disclosure is likely to cause harm later if the donor-conceived 
individual discovers the truth; therefore, we should prohib it non ­
disclosure. This may give us good reasons to engage in truth-telling 
behaviour, but it does not explain why the donor-conceived individual 
has a right to know of the nature of their conception. For no individual 
has a right to be free from others’ reckless driving unless that driving 
ultimately results in harm. If I am standing of the side of the road as a 
car speeds past me, I cannot impose a duty on that driver nor seek 
compensation from him because of the risk that he could have hit m e . 5 *13 
The prohibition on dangerous driving does not g round rights in 
individuals nor is it based on their individual claims.
In fact, the prohibition on non-disclosure could be seen simply as a 
way of mitigating the risk of harm arising from finding out later in life. 
If so, then we must consider whether the risk could be mitigated in 
other ways. The risk argum ent is based on the assumption that there is 
a high likelihood that the child will find out. One response to this may 
be simply to try harder to ensure that the child never finds out. For 
example, one could require potential parents to sign a confidentiality 
agreem ent and attend counselling to ensure they are able to conceal 
any unwanted ‘signals’. We could even ensure that clinics providing 
genetic screening for health purposes are prevented from revealing 
paternity issues that might also arise.
So while the risk of harm  argum ent may provide strong moral 
imperatives to tell the truth, it seems insufficient to explain for why an 
individual has a valid claim to know the nature of their conception. 
And, perhaps most importantly, the risk of harm does not seem to 
properly capture what donor-conceived individuals themselves are 
expressing. Many people have said that even if they never found out, 
they still think they had a right to know and that still somehow they 
would have been wronged. So in order to properly establish an 
individual’s right to know the nature of their conception, we need a 
claim that exists even when there is no risk of the child being told.
5 . R E S P E C T
The stories told by donor-conceived children place considerable
emphasis on the elem ent of deceit and lack of respect associated with
non-disclosure. This seems to more closely reflect the wrong that
donor-conceived individuals believe has been done even if they would
never discover the deception. Children, therefore, may have a right to
be told about their genetic origins not because of the potential harm
of not telling, or the preventing of harm in not telling, but because
deception of this nature constitutes a wrong in that it violates the 
respect owed to that child.
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Consider the example of ‘pure’ rape (Gardner and Shute, 2000). 
Pure rape is a case where a victim is raped but is not aware that it has 
happened: she may have been drugged at the time, is left with no 
physical injuries and because of her lack of knowledge of the act, suffers 
no psychological harm. In this case is the act of rape wrong? G ardner 
and Shute argue that this case in fact isolates the core wrong of rape, 
stripping it of the associated harms that usually accompany it (2000: 
196). Rape is wrong, according to them, because it involves treating the 
woman as something other than a person; it constitutes treating her as 
a thing (Gardner and Shute, 2000: 203-04). Therefore, harmless acts 
can still be seen as wrongs. I believe the same is true for the donor 
conception. By focusing on the case where the child does not know she 
is donor-conceived, we can isolate the wrong without the distractions of 
collateral harms.
‘Respect’ captures this sense of ‘wrongness’ that is independent of 
the consequences of the individual finding out about the nature of 
their conception. Respect is a mark of status owed to som eone. 
Recognition of this value is expressed through behaviour towards the 
subject of respect. Darwall identifies two types of respect: the first is 
‘recognition respect’ that is owed to members of a class simply and 
solely in virtue of their possession of some qualifying feature (1977: 
38). This kind of respect is of a fixed and determinate kind. The other 
form of respect, ‘appraisal respect’, is respect that derives from a 
positive evaluation of persons or things by some standard. Importantly 
for our purposes, recognition respect restricts the type of morally 
permissible actions one can take towards the object of respect (Darwall, 
1977: 40).
It is recognition respect that is relevant to this argum ent; we owe 
the child respect no t because of their life achievements bu t because 
of their status as a subject worthy of respect. Truth telling is a form 
of respectful behaviour and therefore the individual child has a 
claim, based in respect, to know the truth about their conception. 
Eekelaar (2006: 75-6) too has argued that disclosure consists of 
respect as it empowers children with inform ation that is incapable 
of m anipulation by adults. Some com m entators have poin ted  out 
that children may not be due the same type of respect as adults 
(Teitelbaum, 2006). This is because often the property that gives an 
individual the relevant status is that of autonomy or rational decision 
making. Children, it is argued, do not have this property. In this 
sense, they are unable to form rational preferences and pursue 
them. W ithout this essential elem ent of autonomy, children are no t 
due recognition respect.
There are a num ber of responses to this objection. First, it may be 
that we owe respect not to the child, but to the adult that child will 
become. Feinberg constructs a category of rights called ‘rights-in-trust’
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whereby the child holds rights in trust for the future adult, who will be 
a rational, autonomous agent (1986). Therefore, we owe a duty to tell 
the truth of the nature of the conception to the child because this is a 
form of behaviour respectful towards the autonomy of the adult they 
will develop into. There are a num ber of problems with constructing 
rights in trust, including metaphysical concerns regarding predictions 
of the autonomy of the future adult. However, one way to demonstrate 
that respect is owed to the child now vis-ä-vis the adult they will become 
is to consider the case of a terminally ill-child (Archard, 2004). Does a 
child who is going to die in 5 years have the same claim to be told the 
nature of their conception? It seems that a 5-year-old child who is not 
told of their true genetic origins and who dies not knowing (and who 
was always going to die before becom ing a fully autonom ous agent) 
has been wronged in the same way as we think adult donor-conceived 
individuals have.
The wrong seems caught up somehow in the individual’s identity. We 
need not insist that the essential property of respect is autonomy.14 
A lthough recognition respect is binary rather than scalar (unlike 
appraisal respect), the concept may adm it d ifferent bases for 
recognition. For example, one can have recognition respect for the law 
by virtue of it being the law, or recognition respect for nature (Darwall, 
1977: 40). Recognition respect could also encompass respect for persons 
who hold their own identity. Children certainly form a sense of identity 
from a very early age. Children can understand that their social parents 
are im portan t to them  and  who they are -  how they sit in  relation to 
the rest of the world. C hildren in their middle ch ildhood becom e 
increasingly aware of biology as an underlying characteristic of family 
relations, and also rapidly begin to express greater curiosity about their 
origins (Brodzinsky et al, 1995; Newman et al, 1993). For these reasons, 
children are due the same kind of respect as adults — as persons with a 
sense of identity. Failing to tell the truth about a child’s genetic origins 
is therefore a morally impermissible action as it fails to respect that 
child’s status as an identity-holding entity.
A. Two Claims -  Two Legal Rights?
There are many reasons cited for why social parents should disclose the 
nature of the conception to the child: that the risk of la ter discovery 
remains, that family secrets are destructive, that secrecy reinforces the 
stigma of donor-assisted conception, and the previously exam ined 
medical and consanguinity concerns (see Baran and Panor, 1993; 
Daniels and Taylor, 1993; McWhinie, 2001; Triseliotis, 1988). However, 
the most common and emotive reason is that a person simply has a 
right to know the truth about their conception and their biological 
parents. It may be far easier to construct a legal constraint around the
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broader non-rights-based reasons for ensuring disclosure, but organisations, 
politicians, and donor-conceived individuals themselves still come back 
to the right of the individual. In this article, while I acknowledge that 
those parallel tracks to outlawing non-disclosure may exist, I have 
sought to build a framework that does justice to reference to the central 
right claim. From the above analysis, it is clear that the child’s right to 
know their genetic parents must be comprised of two distinct claims:
1) a child’s right to be told about the nature of their conception based 
on their interest in being treated with respect and
2) a ch ild ’s right to access identifying inform ation regarding their 
donor based on their interest in being free from psychological harm.
I will now examine whether these claims create only moral duties, or 
w hether they are sufficient to support legal prohibition  on non ­
disclosure and legal entitlem ent to access identifying information.
The second claim is a strong claim with a solid basis in harm. There 
is a clear reason for legislating to protect this right and a clear legal 
tradition  for legislating to protect from harm  (Feinberg, 1986). The 
first claim, however, seems m uch weaker -  in two distinct ways. First, 
the concept of respect is no t as solid as harm. A lthough I have 
offered a definition of respect, I have in no way offered a conclusive 
understanding of the concept; respect is still based on something more 
intangible and therefore is harder to use it as a basis for legal regulation 
(Lysaught, 2004: 665). Second, the claim to be treated with respect may 
create a moral duty in parents to be honest to their children; but is this 
really any different from other types of deception regarding paternity? 
Many children are not told the tru th  about the nature of their 
conception even when they are conceived naturally. Doctors conducting 
tissue typing for organ donation estimate that 5-20 per cent of organ 
donors discover that they are genetically unrelated to the men believed 
to be their biological father (McEwan, 2003; Rothman, 1989). Recent 
systematic review suggests that up to 9.6 per cent of the naturally 
conceived population is unrelated to their presumed fathers (Beilis et 
al, 2005). Why then should we create a legal right to disclosure for 
children born by donor conception if we do not regulate truth telling 
in other cases? If we, as a society, are content for the law not to interfere 
in the ‘m arital infidelity’ case, even though it is based on the same 
argum ent from respect, what fu rther reasons support legislative 
interference in the donor conception case? I argue that the claim 
regarding donor conception can move from a weak moral claim into a 
strong legal right in three distinct ways.
Firstly, the first claim to disclosure is necessary in order to protect and 
enable the second stronger claim to access of identifying information. 
As previously noted, one cannot know that one has a right to access 
identifying information about one’s genetic parents unless one is first
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told that one was donor-conceived. Therefore, the first weaker claim 
becomes a necessary part of the stronger second claim, for if we want 
to enable individuals to access their legislated right to indentifying 
information then we must ensure that they are aware of the relevant 
facts.
Second, the first claim is also necessary to p ro tec t the previously 
m entioned concerns regarding medical and genetic history and 
consanguinity. Although these two concerns were inadequate to ground 
a right to identifying information, they may very well stand on their 
own, producing duties to gain access to genetic and medical non­
identifying information and non-identifying information about one’s 
siblings. Disclosure regarding the nature of one’s conception is necessary 
to realise these additional interests. Not ensuring disclosure also 
infringes on the legislated rights of the d ono r themselves. In 
Victoria, the donor can approach the Victorian-Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Authority requesting information about children resulting 
from their donated gametes. The Authority is required to contact the 
child for their consent to releasing the information (IT Act, 1995, Vic, 
ss.76, 77). T here is the possibility (given the high levels of non­
disclosure) that the individual will not know of their genetic origins. 
Schneller notes \  . . that this section of the Act Is unworkable without 
the ability to ensure that parents inform their children of their DI 
conception’ (2002: 233). In order to carry out its current obligations 
under the legislation, the State of Victoria has an interest, or even a 
responsibility, in ensuring disclosure takes place. In this sense, these 
additional interests of the child and of the donor act as parallel props 
for the claim that donor-conceived children have a right to be told the 
truth regarding the nature of their conception.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the claim is distinct and of 
greater significance than other children’s claims to disclosure, because 
of the involvement of the state. Unlike the examples of private individuals 
who conceive a child and then conceal its paternity, the state is involved 
in the creation and conception of donor-conceived children. The 
Commonwealth provides funding for ART processes, including donor 
conception, through the Medicare scheme. Ten items are listed on the 
Medicare Benefits Schedule relating to ART, attracting a 75 to 85 per 
cent rebate (Senate Inquiry Report, 2011: 4). Additional funding for 
ART procedures is provided through the Extended Medicare Safety 
Net, which provides a rebate for those who incur out-of-pocket costs for 
out-of-hospital sendees. In addition to funding the practice, the States, 
Territories, and Commonwealth play an im portant role in regulating it 
through legislation and guidelines.
The state’s involvement in the conception of these children causes it 
to acquire duties towards them that it does not hold to children at 
large. This principle is not a new one. The Commonwealth has made
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two high-profile public apologies to children who were removed from 
their families, from Indigenous communities or the UK, and relocated 
elsewhere in Australia. The state’s involvement in these practices of 
removal produced special duties that it was seen to have breached. 
T herefore, it may be that the state is com plicit in the deception of 
children conceived using donated gametes through state-funded 
medical procedures and conducted at state-regulated clinics, if it does 
not take steps to ensure disclosure. This would arguably constitute 
unconscionable action by the state.
To return to an objection raised at the start of the article, in legislating a 
right, governments must also consider wider public policy considerations. 
Turkmendag et al (2008) argue that legislating a child’s rights to know fails 
to take into account the rights of the would-be-parents. The removal of 
anonymity, it is argued, causes a drastic drop in the rate of gamete donation 
therefore infringing the would-be-parent’s right to conceive. This argument 
seems to have much resonance throughout the debate; however, it is 
unclear that there is any evidence supporting it. As mentioned previously, 
donation rates have risen again in Sweden and Victoria, but furtherm ore 
there is clear evidence that the rate of donations has not dropped in the 
UK since removing anonymity, in fact the num ber of first-time donors 
has actually increased (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
2011). Even if there was a shortage in gamete donations, there is a 
strong argum ent that this outcome is more acceptable than knowingly 
creating individuals who will never be able to know their genetic parents 
and therefore subject to the psychological harm outline earlier, especially 
when it is unclear on what basis would-be-parents claim a right to 
procreate that creates a duty to assist in the process, rather than a duty 
simply not to interfere.
The combined force of these three arguments, but especially that of 
state involvement, demonstrates that a child’s right to disclosure and a 
ch ild ’s right to access no t only creates moral duties in their social 
parents bu t also imposes two distinct duties on the state to use its 
legislative power. First, the state should ensure that donor-conceived 
children are aware of their status and nature of their conception; and 
secondly it should allow donor-conceived children access to identifying 
information regarding their donor. These would correspond to legal 
rights in each donor-conceived individual. It is im portant to recognise 
that the framing the legal rights in this way does not mean that the state 
has a duty to ensure that the donor forms a relationship with the donor- 
conceived child. Once the child has access to the information, the state 
cannot force the donor to interact with the child. The law ‘may be 
able to destroy hum an relationships; but it does not have the power to 
compel them to develop’ (Goldstein et al, 1979).
Finally, it is worth noting that just as the second right bolsters the 
strength of the first, the reverse is also true. If the second right, to know
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identifying information about one’s donor, is based purely on harm, 
then  does it cover a ch ild ’s right to know the ‘tru e ’ identity of the 
donor? For example, a child may be told they are donor-conceived, 
and their donor may in fact be a famous mass-murderer. At the time he 
donated his sperm, the donor seemed a respectable young man but a 
few years later he was uncovered and sentenced to a life in prison in a 
very public trial. Clearly, telling the child the truth would harm them; 
is it therefore permissible in this case to lie? I argue not, because a 
child’s right to be told the truth regarding the nature of their conception 
(grounded in respect) encompasses a right to be told the truth about 
the identity of their donor. So even though the right to identifying 
information regarding one’s donor is primarily based in harm, it too is 
bolstered by the claim to be treated with respect.
C O N C L U S I O N S
In this article, I have argued that in order for a child to have a right to 
know their genetic parents, we must first overcome the principle of 
no harm , no foul. The no harm , no foul principle cannot be easily 
overcome by reference to traditional ideas of harm. However, I have 
argued that children should be inform ed of the nature of their 
conception, based on their right to be treated with respect. Truth 
telling is a form of respectful behaviour related to the im portance of 
identity to an individual. Once we have shown that no harm, no foul 
does not apply, it follows that the child’s right to know their genetic 
parents is com prised of two distinct claims: (i) the righ t to access 
identifying inform ation regarding one’s donor based on o n e’s claim 
to be free from psychological harm arising from lack of access to 
identifying information and (ii) the right to be told about the nature of 
one’s conception based on one’s claim to respect as an identity-holding 
individual. The existence of this additional and separate claim to disclosure 
regarding the nature of one’s conception produces new duties within the 
state. Unlike the case of other naturally conceived children, Australian 
governments are directly involved in the process of donor conception 
through legislation, regulation, and funding.
As it stands, no jurisdiction has legislated to com pel parents to 
disclose the nature of their child’s conception nor taken steps to inform 
children independently (Schneller, 2005: 223). At the mom ent, clinics 
are under no direct guidelines to encourage parents to disclosure the 
nature of the conception. If the state does not compel or encourage 
parents or clinics to disclose, and takes no steps to inform  donor- 
conceived individuals directly, it may be viewed as com plicit in the 
deception of these children. I argue that if no harm, no foul does not 
apply, the state must take steps to ensure that children are informed of
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the nature of their conception. It is unclear w hether the Commonwealth 
has power to legislate in this area. Therefore, the best m ethod to ensure 
disclosure seems to be to establish separate but uniform  legislation 
through the process of the SCAG. There are many ways in which the 
States and Territories can ensure disclosure, such as annotating birth 
certificates, notifying the child directly, or m andating counselling to 
couples who receive state assistance. It is not in this scope of this paper 
to examine which approach would be best -  that is a project for future 
research -  however it is clear that a child’s right to know their biological 
parents must encompass a right to be told about their genetic origins. 
A harmless action may yet still constitute a foul.
NOTES
I would like to thank David Archard, Tom Campbell, Keith Dowding, Nicholas Duff and Leif 
Wenar for their helpful comments and conversations on earlier versions of this paper.
I The study by Turkmendag et al. (2008) also indicates that this is persuasive logic for parents in 
the UK. Potential parents are concerned about the potential adverse affects of disclosure on a 
child’s development.
2The phrase, ‘no harm, no foul’ was originally coined by American basketball sportscaster, 
Chick Hearn in the 1960’s. The phrase indicates the rule of advantage play. If an action that is 
against the rules of the game does not affect the outcome of the game, then no foul (wrong) has 
been committed and no punishment should be played out.
31 use ‘non-anonymous donation’ to refer to countries or States whereby anonymous donation 
is not allowed. This is not to be confused with other systems, which may be considered ‘open’ as 
both anonymous and non-anonymous donations are accepted, such as the ‘double track’ system 
recommended by Pennings. See Pennings, G. (2007) ‘The Double Track Policy for Donor 
Anonymity’, Human Reproduction 12 (12): 2839-44.
4 Throughout this paper, I shall refer to the parents who are genetically related to the child as 
the ‘genetic parents’ and the parents who are the legal guardians of the child as the ‘social 
parents’.
r,Status of Children Act, 1975 (Tas); Artificial Conception Act 1984 (NSW); Family 
Relationships Act 1984 (SA); Family Relationships Amendments Act 1984 (ACT); Status of 
Children Act 1984 (Vic); Artificial Conception Act 1985 (WA); and Artificial Conception Act 
1985 (Qld).
fiIn January 2011, the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) launched a 
public consultation regarding increased compensation for gamete donors. Submissions expressed 
the view that adequate compensation may be a method to address the gamete ‘shortage’. See 
‘HFEA launches public consultation on sperm and egg donation’, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/6285. 
html (accessed: 29 July 2011).
’Countries that no longer support anonymous gamete donation include Sweden, UK, Austria, 
Switzerland, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, and The Netherlands.
8During the 2010 Senate inquiry, the Attorney Generals’ department declined to provide legal 
advice on whether there exists a commonwealth power within the constitution that would allow 
the commonwealth to legislate in this area.
9 Commonwealth National Health and Medical Research Act (1992 (Cth)).
101 will use the lowercase term ‘state’ to refer to the institution of the state generally, as distinct 
from the capitalised ‘State’, which refers to one of the six States of Australia.
II In fact, this was one of the ‘selling points’ of gamete donation. Dr Finegold explained that 
when presenting the reasons for preferring artificial insemination over adoption he would explain 
to prospective parents that, ‘To his friends, the husband has finally impregnated his wife . . .  in AI 
(Artifical Insemination) the child is never told’. See WilfredJ. Finegold, MD, Artificial Insemination, 
Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas Publisher, 1964a.
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12 While it is theoretically possible for a same-sex couple to conceive, with the assistance of ART, 
a child that shares the DNA of both parents, the technology required for this does not yet exist, 
and even if it did there would be considerable ethical, legal,and possibly genetic impediments to 
its application.
13This remains true in Australia as seen in the recent asbestos miner case, Amaca Pty ltd v Ellis; 
The State of South Australia v Ellis; Millenium Inorganic Chemicals Limited v Ellis [2010] HCA 5. 
Although the appellants were found to be negligent and to have breached a duty or duties owed 
to the defendant, Mr Cotton, it could not be shown that Mr Cotton’s lung cancer was a result of 
the appellant’s risky behaviour. Mr Cotton had no claim to be free from risky behaviour without 
the risk eventuating into harm.
14It has not always been the case that respect for persons entailed that a ‘person’ must be 
autonomous. See Lysaught, M. T. (2004) ‘Respect: Or, How Respect for Persons Became Respect 
for Autonomy’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 29 (6): 665-80.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusions and Future Directions
Introduction
Michael King has argued that CROC is like the magical fairy Tinkerbell from 'Peter Pan'. 
Like Tinkerbell the Convention possesses the power to change children's lives but in 
order to do so it depends on people believing in its existence (King, 1994, 385). As lovely 
as this analogy is, it is simply not enough for people to just believe in the existence of 
children's rights. Belief is a hard subject to introduce into any social science project. 
One's belief in the power and existence of children's rights can be just as easily 
countered by someone else's belief in the superiority of the family, the subordinate 
status of children and the denial of rights to children. How does one resolve a debate 
based on belief? Rights do not appear out of nowhere like magical fairies. Rights, as they 
are understood in this thesis, are not based on belief but justification. Rather than have 
an ultimately fruitless debate about belief in the existence of such rights, the proper 
approach is to have a debate about what it is that such rights are intended to protect 
and why or why not those things are worth protecting. Rights are human creations; they 
are powerful social and political tools for change.
This thesis began with the question - do children have rights? Despite the advancement 
of children's rights in law, such as the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CROC), national legislation and regional charters protecting children's rights, there 
still exists an underlying disagreement about whether children have rights in a 
philosophical or theoretical sense. Addressing this disagreement and providing a 
theoretical basis for children's rights is necessary to properly understand how such 
rights function, the shape of their corresponding duties and how to effectively 
implement them in policy and practice. In the introductory chapter I stated that this 
thesis has four aims: first, to present a theoretical argument for why children have 
rights; second, to examine and unpack the role of the terms 'capacity' and 'competence' 
in rights theory and their application to children's rights; third, to apply the theory of 
children's rights to particular cases; and finally, to demonstrate the power of a strong 
theory to bring children's rights from the realm of 'slogan' into reality. This thesis has
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addressed these four aims in two parts. In part one I developed the theoretical basis for 
children's rights over three papers. In part two I applied this theory to two case studies: 
whether children have a right to be loved, and whether children have a right to know 
the identity of their genetic parents. The former illustrates the limitations of rights for 
children while the later illustrates their power. Throughout the investigation into why 
children have rights this thesis has also highlighted some important aspects of the 
nature of rights in general.
In this concluding chapter I draw together the main conclusions from the previous five 
papers and identify areas for future research. The five conclusions from this thesis are;
1) children have rights;
2) there is an important relationship between capacity, competence and children's 
rights;
3) the nature of duties is relevant to children's rights;
4) children's rights are special claims; and
5) a strong theory of rights for children is important for translating rights into practice.
7.2 Children have rights
It should be clear by now that children do indeed have rights. They not only have rights 
in law they also have conceptually defendable rights in theory. Children have rights 
because they have interests that are of sufficient importance to be protected. These 
interests ground claims that produce duties in others to act or refrain from acting. Rights 
are therefore understood as Hohfeldian claims with correlative duties. In the 
introductory chapter I stipulated that when I speak of rights I mean normatively justified 
claims. Some of these claims can (and should) be translated into legal rights. However 
some of these claims function better outside a legal framework.
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The five papers of the thesis directly address Brennan's two-fold challenge of first 
demonstrating that it is conceptually possible for children to hold rights and second, 
providing evidence that children do hold particular rights. The first paper applied the 
Hohfeldian framework of rights to the two leading theories of rights, will theory and 
interest theory. The analysis demonstrated that children can hold rights under the 
interest theory of rights because children can hold claims. The simplest definition of 
interests employs a thin evaluative stance to distinguish between benefit and detriment. 
Interests therefore must be those things that are at the very least presumptively 
beneficial to the claim holder. It is clear that children have interests that are 
presumptively beneficial, such as an interest in adequate nutrition. If children can hold 
interests then it is conceptually possible for them to hold rights.
However, even if children hold interests, it may be that none of these interests are 
sufficiently important to justify the imposition of duties of others. Therefore the second 
part of the thesis applies the theory of children's rights to illustrate how children can 
hold particular rights. The final paper applies the theory of why children have rights to 
the question of whether children who are conceived using donated sperm and eggs 
have a right to know the identity of their genetic parents. The paper draws upon 
empirical evidence to argue that donor conceived children have a genuine interest in 
being free from any psycho-social harm that might arise from being prevented from 
knowing the identity of their donor. This is a real interest held by real children that 
justifies the restriction of the Hohfeldian liberties of others through the imposition of 
duties. The right to know the identity of one's genetic parents is an example of why 
children are not only conceptually capable of holding rights, but actually do hold them. 
In this sense the final paper of the thesis illustrates what children's rights can be.
The work of showing that children hold particular rights is not only done in the final 
paper; examples appear throughout all five papers. The first paper argues that children 
have a right to life that produces duties in others not to kill them and that children have 
a right to nutrition that produces duties in others to provide adequate nutrition. The 
fourth paper argues that children have a right to adequate socialisation as they have an 
interest in the benefits of social interaction and being free of the harms of social
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deprivation. This produces a duty in others to provide them with adequate interaction 
and stimulation. The third paper argues that children have a right to develop core 
competencies and this produces a duty in others to assist in the development of these 
competencies. Therefore all five papers of the thesis build upon and defend the 
conclusion that children have rights.
7.3 Capacity and Competence
A child's competence is relevant to the determination of their rights. The second paper 
of this thesis argued that there is a useful distinction to be made between the concepts 
of 'capacity' and 'competence'. A capacity is a counterfactual ability. One has the 
capacity to A when one has all the relevant skills internal to that person to A. 
Competence, on the other hand, is one's actual ability to A. Competence is the capacity 
to A plus the relevant mental states (such as knowledge and intention) necessary for 
successfully doing A. The distinction provides a useful tool to engage in debates 
regarding the requisite threshold children may have to meet in order to hold rights. The 
precise use of language is relevant in philosophical debates but also in policy-making.
In the first paper I outlined the argument from incompetence whereby children are 
denied rights on the basis of their reduced capacities and competencies. For will 
theorists the argument from incompetence takes the form of denying children the 
status of right-holder as they lack the power to waive or enforce their claims. Having 
drawn the distinction between capacity and competence it becomes relevant to ask 
which is the correct threshold for will theory. I have argued that it is actual competence 
that is required in order to hold a power. This is a relatively high threshold for children 
(especially young children) to meet. Therefore many children lack this power as they 
are incompetent in rational decision-making, and therefore cannot hold rights.
Interest theory, however, demonstrates that it is conceptually possible for children to 
hold rights. The first paper of the thesis argued that it is not conceptually necessary for a
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child to hold the power to enforce or waive their claim in order to hold a claim right. 
Children's rights can be enforced by others, such as their parents or the State, without 
the force of the claim being reduced. Therefore it is not necessary for a child to be 
competent in autonomous choice to be the type of being that may hold rights. Yet this 
does not show that children can hold all of the rights that we normally ascribe to adults. 
The type of rights that children can hold is constrained by their competence.
Although the argument from incompetence as it is employed by will theory can be 
overcome, a thorough analysis of interest theory demonstrates that capacity and 
competence still plays a part in constructing the rights of children. A child must be 
competent in realising the interest to which a particular claim pertains. This is necessary 
for the interest to be considered of sufficient importance to impose duties on others.
At this point, in order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to point out a small revision. In 
the first paper of the thesis, I argued that children must have the competence to realise 
the interest for the claim to constitute a right, in doing so I stated that,
'If I am temporarily incompetent and cannot walk down the street because I 
have broken my leg, I am still at liberty to do so, but my lack of competence 
means it is of insufficient importance to impose a duty on others, as I will not be 
able to realise the benefit to which the claim pertains.’
However, as becomes evident in the second paper, one does not simply drop in and out 
of competence if one is not exercising this competence. In this sense there is a 
distinction between a 'material existence' and a 'formal existence' of a right (Dowding & 
Van Hees, 2003, 288). My claim to walk down the street free from interference may still 
have formal existence in that it is still formally recognised in theory but it does not have 
material existence, as it cannot currently be exercised. Therefore temporary 
incompetence in exercising a right does not always preclude its existence. Future 
development of the theory presented here will need to incorporate a distinction 
between this temporary incompetence and the type of incompetence that not only
192
means a right does not exist in the material sense but also in the form al.1
Despite this distinction between temporary incompetence and incompetence proper, it 
is still true that the concept of competence restricts the type of rights that children can 
hold. They w ill not hold all the same rights that adults hold as they are in a period of 
developing the ir capacities and competencies. If the benefit o f the right pertains to  
autonomous action that a child cannot yet do they cannot have an interest tha t protects 
this action. For children, the rights that we w ill restrict are ones usually pertaining to  
physical or cognitive incompetence. For example a newborn baby cannot have an 
interest in voting, but may have an interest in being treated well by the government. 
When acknowledging the distinction between capacity and competence it appears that 
it is again actual competence that is required in order for a child to  realise the benefit to  
which the claim pertains. I argued this in the firs t paper of the thesis, however, as I w ill 
discuss below in the section on future research, it may be possible for rights to be 
awarded on the basis of a child's capacity even when the ir competence is unknown.
The analysis o f competence in the second paper demonstrates that it is 'task specific'. 
Competence in one area does not entail competence in another. Similarly incompetence 
in one area does not necessarily entail incompetence in another. For example just as my 
competence in making a rational decision about what I would like to wear today does 
not necessarily entail competence in making complex medical decisions about a 
potential surgery, my incompetence at driving a large truck does not entail 
incompetence in driving a car. This makes sense in terms of the relationship between
1 Such a distinction may follow the framework laid out by Dowding and Van Hees in Dowding, K & 
Van Hees, M (2003) 'The Construction of Rights', American Political Science Review, 97(2): 281- 
293. Such a framework may be useful for addressing arguments such as the following; some may 
argue that the right to be free from pain still exists even if one cannot feel pain. The 
corresponding duty not to cause pain is easy to fulfill, as it is impossible to breach. Yet we may 
ask if these types of formal rights are worthy of the name? What does rights-talk gain from 
insisting that those incapable of feeling pain have a theoretical right to be free from pain? 
Further research can build on this to determine when rights materially exist.
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competence and rights set out above. It is the specific competence to realise the 
particular interest that is of concern.
In the introductory chapter I argued that this theory of competence constraining rights 
is different from Brennan and Noggle's 'role dependent rights'. In their paper 'The Moral 
Status of Children', Brennan and Noggle seek to reconcile three common sense 
assumptions regarding children. These are the 'Equal Consideration Thesis' - that 
children are due equal moral consideration as adults; the 'Unequal Treatment Thesis' -  
that we can prevent children from doing things that it would be illegitimate to prevent 
adults from doing; and the 'Limited Parental Rights Thesis' -  that parents can exercise 
limited but significant discretion when raising children (Brennan and Noggle, 1997, 3-4). 
In order to reconcile these, Brennan and Noggle (1997, 6) convincingly argue that 
'granting equal moral consideration does not imply that each person has the same 
package of rights and duties'. As I have argued above, demonstrating that children can 
conceptually hold rights does not entail that they immediately hold all the same types of 
rights as adults; they may have a different 'package of rights and duties'. However, the 
reason that Brennan and Noggle give for this conclusion is importantly different from my 
own. Brennan and Noggle argue that the reason unequal treatment is consistent with 
equal consideration lies in the difference between basic rights and rights that are 
dependent on context.
'Some rights are constructed from basic moral rights plus other factors. They 
depend in part on facts about the persons who bear them, facts about the 
relationships of which they are a part, facts about previous commitments they 
have made, and facts about the societies in which they live' (Brennan and 
Noggle, 1997, 7).
Some of these contextual rights are dependent on the right-holders 'role' and if one 
does not play the role then one cannot hold the right. For example Brennan and Noggle 
argue that many of our political rights derive from our role as citizen or voter, as 
children are not mature enough to play these role they cannot hold the rights. Contrary 
to this position, I have argued that rights turn on interests, not roles.
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First, many of these role dependent 'rights' that Brennan and Noggle identify are 
Hohfeldian powers not claims. For example a Judge has the power to sentence someone 
to prison, that is, to change someone else's Hohfeldian relations. It may be true that 
these powers are bestowed on them because of their professional roles; however they 
are not claim rights based on interests. Saying that children do not hold these powers is 
the same as saying that adults do not hold these powers - this does not tell us why 
children may hold different claim rights.
Furthermore for the examples that are indeed claim rights, such as the right to vote 
(that has strong correlative duties that others not impede our rights to vote and that 
perhaps the government has positive duties to enable us to vote) these claims are not 
properly explained by pointing to roles alone. We do not have the claim right to vote 
because we play the role of 'citizen' or 'voter', we have the claim right to vote because 
we have an interest in voting. Maybe part of the explanation of why we have these 
interests is related to our role in society, but it is not the ultimate justification. Brennan 
and Noggle's theory is initially appealing because I think it is ultimately reducible to 
interests. Understanding rights as claims justified by interests constrained by 
competence not only explains those rights that are attached to roles but also the rights 
of children and adults generally. It allows us to maintain that children have rights but 
not all of the same rights as adults. Children have particular rights because they have 
interests that are of sufficient importance to impose duties on others. Children do not 
have other rights because they do not have the relevant interests; for some of these 
interests the reason children do not have them is because they do not have the 
competence to realise the benefit to which the interest pertains.
Capacity and competence therefore have an important role in understanding rights for
children. However the analysis of the relationship between capacity, competence and
rights also sheds light on an aspect of rights in general. The requirement that the claim-
holder be competent to realise the benefit of the claim is not only true for children, but
also for adults. This aspect of rights theory, though, is often obscured when we only
concentrate on the rights of adults, for adults are often in command of most of the core
competencies. It is likely, however, that as adults we will lose and acquire new
competencies throughout our lives that will influence our interests and, as a result, our
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rights. Arguments about how rights are constructed for children may be just as relevant 
for the elderly (Lau, 2012) or other classes of people. Establishing a strong theory as to 
why children have rights can therefore shed light upon the rights of adults as well 
children as they develop and decline.
7.4 Duties
It is not just capacities and competencies that play a role in how a right is constructed. 
Rights are also constrained by whether the corresponding duty is reasonable and 
achievable. The first paper of the thesis demonstrates that a Hohfeldian claim always 
has a correlative duty. The duty correlated with a child's claims must be reasonable and 
achievable in order for the claim to be sufficiently important to impose restrictions on 
the Hohfeldian liberties of others. The duty-holder, therefore, must hold the capacity or 
competence to fulfill the correlative duty.
This constraint becomes clear when considering a child's right to an open future in the 
third paper of the thesis. Feinberg (1980) claims that children have a right to an open 
future. For a child to have a truly open future, their parents may be required not to 
'close off' any potential future. However to properly protect such a right we would have 
to impose significant duties on the parents and the State. It would be almost impossible 
to truly guarantee that no potential future at all will be closed off to a child. Some 
futures are simply incompatible: for example, one cannot complete the training to be a 
world class ballerina without closing off other possible futures, such as becoming a 
weightlifter. Attempting to achieve as open a future as possible may result in parents 
taking what Mills (2003) calls a 'smorgasbord' approach by exposing children to many 
experiences and skills. These duties may be onerous on parents but they might also have 
dubious benefit. It is far more likely that what is important is the possibility of a 
meaningful future, the quality not the quantity. It is clear that the reasonableness of the 
correlative duties can constrain which interests are sufficient to ground rights.
A similar conclusion is reached when considering the question as to whether children 
have the right to be loved. In order for children to have a claim to parental love, there
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needs to exist a reasonable and achievable correlative duty. However a child cannot 
have a right to be loved because 'love' is not a duty that can be controlled or reasonably 
imposed upon people. This, though, does not preclude us from stating that parental love 
is a desirable state of affairs for children; it is just not something that can appropriately 
take the form of a right. This example demonstrates the limitations of children's rights. 
There may be things that we think are desirable outcomes but that we cannot construct, 
and therefore protect, through rights. So whilst there is some truth to O'Neill's (1988) 
critique -  that we only see part of the story by looking at rights -  it is not fatal for 
children's rights. Rights still remain powerful and useful tools for protecting the needs 
and interests of children. I will set out the case for their power below. However, it is 
reasonable to see rights as only part of the way in which we understand a child's moral 
status.
Finally, the emphasis on duties allows us to see how rights are not isolated elements, 
but rather sit within a matrix of relationships. Rights based frameworks are often 
criticised as being atomistic, of being overly focused on the individual and ignoring the 
complex nature of groups, communities and relationships (Taylor, 1992). Feminist 
critiques of rights point to the importance of relationships, especially for children 
(Minow, 1986). Wenar's (2005) model of a molecular right demonstrates that rights 
must be seen as sitting within a web of Hohfeldian elements. The fourth paper of this 
thesis argued that parental love cannot be the object of a right but acknowledges that 
the combined effect of Hohfeldian elements can be used to create circumstances where 
relationships and love may thrive. The emphasis on a duty needing to be reasonable and 
achievable is not a drawback of thinking of rights in this way; instead, it should be seen 
as a strength. It recognises that rights are held by individuals but sit in relation to other 
Hohfeldian elements; they impose duties on others, and are restricted by the liberties of 
others. This tells us something not just about rights held by children but rights in 
general. Rights are social beings, they cannot exist in isolation, without other people to 
bear the duty, hold the claim and realise the interest.
197
7.5 Children's rights as special claims
In the introduction to this thesis and the first paper I argued that a strict definition of a 
'child' is not necessary for a theory of children's rights. This is because what is important 
are the interests of the individual, constrained by their competencies. It does not matter 
whether an individual falls strictly into the category of 'child' or 'adult', but rather 
whether they hold interests that are of sufficient importance to justify the imposition of 
particular duties on others. One could conclude from this that we should do away with 
talking about 'children' altogether when it comes to rights. Analytical political theory is 
the project of examining concepts, terms and ideas and refining their use. By using the 
terms interests, capacities and competencies when we speak of rights, we equip 
ourselves with a more precise language and avoid the value laden term 'child'. These 
terms can be used not only to describe the rights of young human beings but also the 
middle aged and the elderly.
In addition there are certain disadvantages of focusing on the term 'children's rights', 
the term leads us to believe that there is a fixed and determinable group of rights that is 
clearly assigned to a fixed and determinable group of people. From the discussion and 
arguments presented in this thesis it is clear that this is not the case. It is almost 
impossible to determine a fixed definition of children that will reliably tell us who is and 
who is not a child and that is not open to challenge. Even if such a definition did exist, 
rights may vary drastically in both content and form between different children. The 
interests of a small baby will be different from the interests of a 15 year old and this is 
partly to do with the difference in their capacities and competencies. By focusing on the 
interests of an individual we cut through these concerns. So maybe the key conclusion 
of this thesis should be that children can hold rights but talking of 'children's rights' is 
unhelpful. We should just simply talk of the rights of particular individuals regardless of 
what stage of life they are at.
Whilst we could possibly do away with the term 'children' when talking about rights, it 
might not be desirable when we consider the way in which rights work in practice. 
Rights are at their most powerful when they are effective social and political tools to 
protect those things we think are most important. Doing away with the term children
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altogether may not allow us to achieve this. Speaking simply of capacities, 
competencies, claims and interests may be more precise but it is unlikely that people 
will stop referring to young human beings as 'children'. If we want these rights to 'work' 
then they need to attach to concepts that people will use. Analytical political philosophy 
therefore cannot solely be about identifying stipulative definitions and concepts but also 
engaging with the use of 'ordinary language' ultimately in order to make something that 
works. As I argued in the introduction it can even be the case that some conceptions of 
children can be very effective in providing motivation to secure and protect their rights. 
So although a definition of children is not necessary in the conceptual construction of 
rights it may be useful in translating them into policy. Especially since I have argued that 
children are people with rapidly developing competencies.
Furthermore, I have argued that it is useful to define children as young human beings 
whose capacities and competencies are rapidly evolving, because this highlights an 
aspect of how rights for children may work differently to those for adults. The 
distinction between capacity and competence allows us to recognise something special 
about children, that while they may not have the same developed competencies as 
adults, unlike other incompetents they have the capacity to become competent. In 
addition children have the capacity to gain a capacity; these are 'latent capacities'. This 
becomes important when we begin to talk about the development of a child's 
capacities. It also allows us to refute claims made by traditional liberal political theorists 
that children are in the same moral category as others who are static in their 
incompetence.
The existence of these developing latent capacities, capacities proper and competencies 
ground special claims held by children. In the third paper of the thesis I outlined the 
future interest problem, which stated that interest theory works best with clearly 
identifiable present interests, however actions could be taken towards children now 
that could harm their future interests. In response I argued that children have a present 
right to develop their core capacities. Core capacities are those they would normally 
develop or those that are important to achieving normal human functioning. Therefore 
children hold claims to the development of particularly important capacities. This
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produces duties in others to assist in their development. It is true that adults may also 
hold these types of developmental interests, however because children are defined by 
the rapid development of capacities and competencies it is likely that these types of 
interest will be a special feature of childhood. Therefore despite the fact that a strict 
definition of child is not necessary for a theory of children's rights, a broad 
understanding of children as young human beings who are in a process of developing 
and acquiring capacities and competencies is useful for constructing rights for children.
7.6 A strong theory
I began this thesis by arguing that it was not enough to point to the existence of 
children's rights in law, we must also show that rights for children are theoretically 
defensible. This is not just an exercise in theoretical consistency. A strong theory of 
rights for children is necessary to understand the nature of particular rights and the 
shape of the corresponding duties. It can strengthen and build upon existing legal 
jurisprudence and effectively assist to translate rights into reality.
The theory of why children have rights tells us what children's rights are. The main 
strength of interest theory is that it squarely focuses the attention on what the right is 
protecting. By identifying the relevant interest we can identify the correlative duties and 
the shape the right takes. The power of a clear theory of why children have rights 
becomes apparent when examining the child's right to know the identity of their donor. 
This right is often given as the justification for removing anonymous gamete donation. 
Investigating what interest grounds the right can tell us important things about how the 
corresponding duties should play out in reality. In the final paper of the thesis I 
examined the three major interests that are usually cited to justify a child's right to 
know the identity of their donor. These are: a child's interest in knowing their own 
medical and genetic history; a child's interest in knowing their genetic family in order to 
avoid concerns of consanguinity; and a child's interest in being free from the 
psychological and social harms that can arise from being prevented from knowing the 
identity of one's genetic parents. If the right really does exist to protect the first two
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interests then this right can be fulfilled while simultaneously protecting the anonymity 
of the donor. For example we can provide detailed medical and genetic history 
information without specific identifying information or we can provide specific 
information about whether an individual was or was not related to someone else 
without providing the identity of their genetic parents. However to protect the third 
interest, the interest in being free from psychological harm, we must impose a 
corresponding duty to reveal the identity of the donor. In this sense the theory of why 
children have rights properly guides our actions by shaping our duties.
In this case, identifying the interest that the right protects also tells us something more. 
If children have a right to know the identity of their donor they must also hold a 
separate but related right to disclosure, to be told that they are donor conceived in the 
first place. I argued that the involvement of the State within the gamete donation 
process produces duties in the State to ensure this disclosure. This aspect of a child's 
right has also been recently recognised by the Victorian Assisted Reproductive 
Treatment Authority (VARTA), which now sees part of its role as to provide public 
engagement to encourage and ensure disclosure. VARTA runs several Time to Tell' 
campaigns and seminars each year. 2 A theory of rights for children therefore makes it 
clear what our specific duties to children are - it guides how rights should be translated 
into policy. Arguments about why children have rights are also powerful in pushing back 
on the momentum that previously established rights possess. A striking example is the 
foreword to the Victorian Law Reform Committee's report, 'Inquiry into Access by 
Donor-Conceived People to Information about Donors'. The Chair of the committee 
states that;
'When the Committee commenced this Inquiry, it was inclined toward the view 
that the wishes of some donors to remain anonymous should take precedence - 
as they made their donation on that basis -  and that identifying information 
should only be released with a donor's consent.
2 Victorian Assisted Reproductive Treatment Authority, http://www.varta.org.au
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Upon closer consideration, however, and after receiving evidence from a diverse 
range of stakeholders...the committee unanimously reached the conclusion that 
the state has a responsibility to provide all donor-conceived people with an 
opportunity to access information, including identifying information, about their 
donors' (Newton-Brown, 2012, xvii).
Existing rights, such as the right to privacy or the right for the terms of a contract to be 
honoured, have great force. This is because their justifications are often well known and 
well established. So it is understandable that the law reform committee came to this 
area with the assumption that this existing right would be more powerful than the 
simple assertion that children have a right to know the identity of their donor. However, 
having been presented with the first hand evidence of the harm that can arise when 
individuals are denied this information, the committee changed its mind. Identifying the 
interests of children is a powerful way to establish their rights in practice.
The donor conception case is also interesting as it shows us the power of rights theory 
to provide a way into new policy problems. The questions as to whether individuals 
conceived using donated sperm of eggs have these particular rights has only arisen due 
to the development and spread of new reproductive technologies. With the expansion 
of biotechnologies, theories of rights will play an important role in shaping our actions 
towards them. Rights therefore push back on simple assumptions by establishing 
justified claims and requirements for action.
Finally, we need to know what children's rights are in order to know what they are not. 
In the fourth paper of this thesis I argued that children do not have a right to be loved. 
However, knowing what children's rights are not also plays out in the contemporary 
policy discourse. In a recent submission to the Australian Senate Inquiry re 'Marriage 
Equality Amendment Bill 2010', the organisation 'Doctors for the Family' argued that:
'The evidence is clear that children who grow up in a family with a mother and 
father do better in all parameters than children without' (Doctors for the family, 
2012).
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Following the release of the submission, there was much talk in the media of a child's 
'right' to be brought up by heterosexual parents in a stable relationship.3 Therefore, the 
argument goes, the debate surrounding same sex marriage or donor conception for 
same sex couples is not one of prejudice or discrimination but a question of protecting 
the rights of children.4 Understanding why children have rights equips us with the tools 
to unpack such arguments. Arguing that children have rights because they have interests 
that are of sufficient importance to impose duties on others forces us to point to the 
existence of the interest. In this case it needs to be made clear what interests of the 
child are supposedly furthered by having a mother and a father, and whether these 
interests are really sufficiently important to justify limiting the liberties of same sex 
couples to have children. The evidence presented in the final paper of this thesis seems 
to indicate that the opposite is true. Children born to same sex parents are well adjusted 
and suffer no detriment compared to those with heterosexual parents (Vanfraussen et 
al, 2001). Understanding why children have rights is therefore essential to counter 
attempts to use their rights as a proxy for other social policy debates.
7.7 Future directions for Research
The job of building a theoretical argument for why children have rights and how they 
work is in no way finished. Along with establishing that children have rights, this thesis 
has also identified areas of future research. In this final section of the concluding 
chapter I briefly address three potential areas of future research to indicate how
3 'The right of a child to at least begin life with a mother and a father is a fundamental right that 
should never be deliberately denied by a government which has a solemn duty to always act in 
the best interests of the child', Mark Brown, Australian Christian Lobby,
http://au.christiantodav.com/article/tas-voters-urged-bv-christian-lobby-group-to-support-child-
rights-to-heterosexual-parents/10788.htm
4 A good example of this argument was made by Joe Hockey MP on the ABC television program 
Q&A, 14th May 2012. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TulbEJz23uY
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thinking in this field of study can progress. These areas are: first, our understanding of 
children's rights may be deepened by applying Hohfeldian analysis to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child; second, more work is needed in developing the idea that rights 
may be awarded on the basis of capacity rather than competence alone; and finally, 
further investigation is needed on the precise nature of duties correlating to the claims 
of children.
7.7.1 Hohfeld
Hohfeldian rights analysis has played an important role throughout this thesis. 
Hohfeldian analysis proved useful for unpacking what children's rights mean. It allowed 
us to determine exactly what aspects of a right may be problematic for children and 
how rights might work as a combination of Hohfeldian elements. Future research could 
apply a Hohfeldian rights analysis to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CROC). The Convention is a comprehensive document that contains 54 articles -  
but how many of these articles are actually claim rights held by children? This may seem 
to be a strange thing to ask of a Convention designed to protect children's rights. 
However a Hohfeldian analysis may reveal that many of the articles are immunities, 
liberties or powers; not claims rights at all. Such an analysis may not constitute a 
damning critique of CROC. As I indicated above claims are set in a matrix of Hohfeldian 
elements. In my response to O'Neill I also indicated that our moral relationship to 
children may very well be defined by Hohfeldian elements other than claims. An 
internationally binding agreement can reasonably be expected to include articles that 
not only detail the rights themselves but the associated powers or even conditions and 
specifications of how the duties should be carried out. Hohfeldian analysis in this sense 
can lend clarity to understanding how CROC functions.
However what may also be interesting is to examine how many of the claim rights in the
Convention are the claims held by children. One central critique of the children's rights
discourse is that many of the proposed rights protect the rights of parents, not children
(Dwyer, 1994; Eekelaar, 1986). A Hohfeldian analysis can unpack such an assertion to
reveal how many articles bestow powers, claims, immunities or liberties on those other
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than children. Rights for parents may be justified but it is also very important to be clear 
that often we are not talking about children's rights per se.
7.7.2 Capacity
Throughout this thesis I have argued that it is necessary for children to have the 
competence to realise the benefit to which an interest pertains. However there may be 
cases where holding a capacity is sufficient to convince us that the interest is important 
enough to impose duties on others. For example, consider a claim right to be free from 
torture. In the first paper of this thesis I argued that if a person could not feel pain then 
they may not have this claim. They may have a right to be free from torture based on 
other interests such as bodily integrity or freedom of movement; but the claim right 
could not be based on an interest to be free from pain, since the claim holder lacks this 
competence.
However, imagine that we do not exactly know whether a particular person will feel 
pain or not, or whether the pain one person feels will be the same as the pain of 
another. My doctoral supervisor, for example, has suggested that torture techniques 
such as solitary confinement would not affect him in the same way as it would 
psychologically affect others. Consider, then, that we have two individuals, my doctoral 
supervisor and a gregarious and social undergraduate student. For the potential 
torturer, the only way to know whether these two individuals will feel the psychological 
pain of solitary confinement is to subject them to it. This would be an unacceptable 
state of affairs for most of us, for we must run the risk of potentially violating a right in 
order to ascertain whether someone has a particular competence to possess the right in 
the first place. We do know, however, that both individuals have the capacity to feel 
pain and this capacity may be sufficient for us to justify a claim-right to be free from 
torture techniques such as solitary confinement. It may not matter in this situation that 
my doctoral supervisor ultimately will not feel the psychological pain; because the act of 
establishing capacity is enough to justify awarding rights on capacity rather than 
competence.
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Considering that it is often difficult to make a clear competence assessment for children 
who are in a period of rapid development, it may be the case that there are some rights 
that we are happy to attribute to children even if we do not know if they are competent 
to realise the benefit to which the right pertains. The interest is important enough to 
justify the imposition of limits on the Hohfeldian liberties of others. Future research may 
consider how and when knowing one's capacity to realise the benefit of an interest may 
be sufficient to impose duties.
7.7.3 Duties
Along with further research on capacity and competence there are opportunities for 
future research on the nature of duties, especially on how the duties that correspond to 
particular rights are enforced. The first paper of the thesis argued that children's rights 
can be enforced by others, by their parents, guardians or by the State. This overcomes 
the problem of a child's lack of competence to exercise powers of enforcement or 
waiver. Yet for this to work effectively in practice it has to be clear exactly how others 
exercise these powers on behalf of children. For example, it may be appropriate for a 
third party to have the power to enforce a child's right, but can this third party also hold 
the power to waive the child's right? It may be that some claim rights held by children 
such as the right to education or adequate nutrition cannot be waived by a third party. 
This thesis has not sought to address whether there are constraints on the enforcement 
and waiver powers held by others, yet this would seem to be an important area for 
future research.
On closer examination it may transpire that the nature of duties can change depending
on the changing capacity and competencies of the right holder. For example, there has
been recent discussion on what a doctor's duty to provide patients with medical
information actually entails (O'Neill, 2003). The nature of the duty -  that is to what
extent and what type of information a doctor may have to provide -  may differ in
reference to the patient's competence. If I go for a surgery such as a knee
reconstruction, my doctor cannot reasonably be expected to provide me with
information about the procedure to the same level as his own knowledge. Now consider
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that between then and now I gain a medical degree, and have to go in for a different 
procedure. My right to be informed may now entail a very different type of duty. The 
surgeon may now have to provide me with much more detailed and specific medical 
information in order for me to give free and informed consent. Similarly the 
corresponding duty may change again if my mental capacities decline. In this vein 
Joseph Raz has identified the dynamic nature of rights (1984, 200). By dynamic, Raz 
means that the corresponding duties may change over time. Children's rights may be 
more dynamic rights than others, as their capacities and competencies are continually 
developing, the corresponding duties to their claims may be dynamic and changing.
Perhaps more controversially, examining the nature of duties and children's claims could 
lead us to ask if it is sometimes acceptable to infringe children's rights. Samantha 
Brennan has built upon the work of Judith Jarvis Thompson to suggest that there is a 
difference between infringing, violating and overriding a right (Brennan, 1995, 144). 
Infringements are any failure to accord a right, violations are morally unjustifiable 
infringements and overriding rights consist of permissible cases of infringement due to 
the consequences at stake. Therefore it is conceivable that caught up in the story about 
developing core competencies, is some sort of assessment that some of the rights that 
children hold can be justifiably overridden to bring about positive consequences. For 
example the international tennis player, Andre Agassi, has recounted the story of how 
his father trained him as a child. At the age of two Agassi was running around the tennis 
court with a racquet taped to his hand. His father trained him tirelessly and at levels that 
pushed the young Agassi's psychological limits.5 Despite this gruelling upbringing, or 
more precisely only because of this gruelling upbringing, Agassi enjoyed a career as an 
international tennis star. We do not have to agree that this particular treatment was 
justified by Agassi's later success to see that there can be later benefits from having 
burdens imposed upon them as children.
5 See 'Andre Agassi Profile',
http://edition.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/people/shows/agassi/profile.html and Agassi, A. (2009) 
Open: An Autobiography, New York: Random House.
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Success as adults is often path dependent; we may not be where we are today unless 
our parents had acted as they did when we were children. Could it be that such extreme 
behaviour from parents is justified to bring about success? Are there rights that children 
hold against such treatment? Can they be justifiably overridden? I am not sure what 
these rights are or how such a system would function free from abuse, but these 
questions begin to get at the heart of how children's rights may function and offer an 
interesting and compelling case for future research.
7.8 Conclusion
Children have rights, if we understand rights as Hohfeldian claims with correlative 
duties. Specifically children have rights because they have interests that are sufficiently 
important to ground claims that produce duties in others to do or refrain from doing 
particular actions. A child may not need to be competent in the enforcement or waiver 
of their claim but they must be competent to realise the benefit to which the claim 
pertains. Furthermore the correlative duty must be reasonable and achievable to justify 
constraint of the Hohfeldian liberties of others. Children are in a special category of right 
holders due to their rapidly developing capacities and competencies. Their interest in 
developing particular core competencies can produce duties in others to assist in this 
development.
At the start of this chapter I argued that belief in children's rights is not enough. A 
statement about what rights a child has should not be just an empty slogan, but should 
instead be a full and comprehensive statement about the interests of that child and the 
kind of duties the protection of these interests imposes on others. The power of the 
theory of children's rights presented here is that it necessitates that rights be justified -  
they must be based on interests that children have the competence to realise, that are 
of sufficient important to impose duties on others, duties that are both reasonable and 
achievable. Rights cannot guarantee all desirable conditions for children but they are 
powerful tools that can be effectively used to enact change and protect interests of the
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utmost importance. Understanding why children have rights presents pathways to 
translating rights from a 'slogan without definition' into practical social and political 
instruments for change.
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It may be true that the law cannot make a man love me, but it can keep him 
from lynching me, and I think that’s pretty important.
(Martin Luther King Jr)
In his response to my paper ‘What’s love got to do with it?’, Liao (2012) 
presents further empirical studies to support his claim that love is a primary 
essential condition for a good life. He claims that my critique of his use of 
the earlier literature denies the validity of such indirect scientific research. 
This mischaracterizes my argument for I clearly state that my critique is 
not sufficient to show that there cannot be any right to be loved. Indeed, I 
stated that with sufficient empirical evidence ‘the right may still stand’ 
(Cowden 2011, p. 9). However, recognizing the validity of the scientific 
project does not obscure the problems.
One problem lies here -  Liao’s insistence that there is an important 
internal emotional aspect of love, separate from external actions and 
expressions of love. This internal expression is almost impossible to mea­
sure even using indirect techniques. While we may improve methods of 
measuring indirect indicators such as the presence and absence of a paren­
tal figure, it seems unlikely that we will be able to measure the effect such 
an internal emotion has on children.1 The studies that Liao cites may be 
good indirect measures of the usual expression of love, but they still do not 
capture the internal aspect. It is Liao’s insistence that this internal emotion 
be included in the ‘love’ that children have a right to that is particularly 
problematic.
Given the difficulties isolating the internal aspect of love, why should 
we include it in the right we claim children to have? It is clear from the 
empirical literature that children benefit from the presence, touch and 
attachment to a consistent parental figure (Liao 2006, 2012). Surely we can 
characterize these elements as rights and avoid the controversial claim of 
‘love’. The insistence of taking the claim that children have a right to be
*Email: mhairi.cowden@anu.edu.au
ISSN 1369-8230 pnnt/ISSN 1743-8772 online 
© 2012 Taylor & Francis 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2012.679423 
http://www.tandfonline.com
212
360 M. Cowden
loved and trying to mould evidence to support it seems to be the wrong 
way around. Should we not examine what evidence we have regarding the 
conditions that lead children to have a good life and construct rights to pro­
tect those?
Yet I am reluctant even to say that a child has a right to some of these 
conditions. Take for example the observation of the benefits of touch to a 
child (Scafidi et al. 1990). How do we go about translating this into a 
right? Rights, as we understand them, have correlative duties. Would the 
duty in this sense be to a certain amount of touch? How can this been mea­
sured and reasonably be implemented? Hugs are good for children, mas­
sage beneficial for infants, but do we really want to translate this into a 
claim children have over their parents? This goes to the heart of my central 
argument: not everything beneficial can be governed by rights and duties.
Love is not a right
Even if there were adequate scientific evidence to show that ‘love’, includ­
ing the internal emotion, was a primary essential condition for a good life, 
it would still not constitute a right. This is because ‘loving’ is not an action 
that can be a duty and ‘love’ as defined by Liao cannot be meaningfully 
enforced. Rights need to correspond to achievable and reasonable duties 
(MacCormick 1976/1982, Raz 1984). Love, as defined by Liao, includes 
not only the desirable treatment outlined in the empirical literature, but also 
the internal emotion of love. Children then have a claim not only to the 
treatment, but also to the motivation for the treatment. My original paper 
argues that this mischaracterizes the object of rights as it is not reasonable 
to impose duties on parents that they may not have the capacity to fulfil. 
Liao contends he is arguing simply that it is not true that we can never 
command the emotion of love. But he does not show this; all he demon­
strates that we can make it easier to experience emotions, not that we can 
command them. The presence of the emotion is still beyond conscious 
control.
In my original paper I argued that the enforcement and protection of 
such a right would be undesirable. In response Liao states that children 
have a moral not a legal right to be loved. Yet moral rights still need to 
have identifiable duties that are reasonable to impose on others, otherwise 
they are only moral goals. Liao’s appeal to a right to respect as a right that 
exists without enforcement simply begs the question. What does a right to 
respect mean? Respectful behaviour, when pulled apart, does indeed entail 
duties that are enforceable. Furthermore, if Liao truly does not want to 
argue that there is also a legal right, then why talk of the duties of the state 
or indeed begin his discussion with the observation that the right exists 
within law?
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Nothing in my argument denies that children should  be loved. But 
acknowledging that love is beneficial for children does not mean that being 
loved is a right. We can just as easily say that adults have better lives if 
they form loving sexual relationships, yet there are strong reasons why we 
do not claim this is a right that imposes duties on others to form such rela­
tionships. There are lots of things that make our lives better that are not 
rights. Something can be in one’s interest yet not constitute a claim impor­
tant enough to be a right.
These ‘shoulds’ may constitute moral desiderata that we want in society 
that are inappropriate to achieve through rights for the reasons outline 
above. However we may wish the state to use other means to achieve 
them, such as social and public policy mechanisms. For example, it may be 
desirable and beneficial that children leam more than one language or that 
they have exposure to many cultures. It is unreasonable to impose a duty 
on parents to fulfil this; indeed most would be unable to do so (Mills 
2003). Yet the state may take measures through funding school language 
programmes or providing incentives for cultural exchange. In short, estab­
lishing a case that children need to be loved does not establish that they 
have a right to be loved.
Note
1. Though of course we may be able to do so in the distant future, the isolation of 
‘feelings’ and the testing of the effect of these emotions on other is not com­
pletely out of the realm of imagination. However, it is not currently possible.
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